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**European Elections and Electoral Cycles in Greece and Portugal:
1981/1987-2004**

by

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Abstract

The main aim of the paper is to explore, both in a longitudinal and comparative approach, the relations between legislative (first-order elections) and European (second-order elections) voting behaviour in two South European countries: Greece and Portugal, between 1981/1987 and 2004.

The specific objectives of the paper are the following. First, to compare the evolution of the party system (“effective number of electoral parties”) across legislative and European Parliament (EP) elections. The second objective is to compare the performance of the large, medium and small parties in first-order and EP elections. The third objective is to test if the social and ideological anchors of partisanship are weaker in EP elections than in legislative ones, thus indicating a greater probability of vote shifts between left and right in the former; or if, on the contrary, “sincere voting” is more important than “tactical voting” in EP elections, vis-à-vis parliamentary contests, and so the social and ideological anchors of partisanship are weaker in the latter.

The fourth objective is to test theories on electoral cycles, comparing aggregate electoral returns of governmental parties across first-order and EP elections in different periods of the national electoral cycle.

Key words

Second-order elections; European elections, voting behaviour; electoral cycles; Greece; Portugal.

INTRODUCTION: MAIN OBJECTIVES OF THE PAPER

The main aim of this paper is to explore, both in a longitudinal and comparative approach, the relations between legislative and European voting behaviour in two South European countries: Greece and Portugal.

The analysis is focused on the period starting from the electoral year of the first European Parliament (EP) Elections in each country: 1981 for Greece and 1987 for Portugal, respectively. The theoretical framework of the paper is mainly the perspective which was first presented by Reif and Schmitt (1980) following the first European Elections in 1979, i.e., the so-called second-order election model. First-order elections are those where there is much at stake, that is, the control of national executive power. This means that in parliamentary systems, legislative elections are first-order, as are elections for the head of state in presidential regimes. In Reif and Schmitt's terminology, other elections, which have no direct impact on the control of national executive power, such as the local and EP elections, are second-order national elections (see also Reif, 1985b; Eijk, C. van der, and Franklin, 1996; Marsh, 1998; and Norris, 1997).

This introductory part of the paper will emphasize those elements related to the process of democratic consolidation in the two countries and the political and socio-economic contour of the Greek and Portuguese membership in the EC/EU. In the first part of the paper, we will give an overview of contextual information such as a brief introduction to the Greek and Portuguese political systems, the main common and different points of the two electoral systems (for national and EP elections).

Then, we will try to pursue the following specific objectives of the paper. First, to compare the evolution of the party system, in terms of the "effective number of electoral

parties”, across legislative and EP elections, in both countries. The paper will try to see if there are any long-term influences between first-order and second-order elections, i.e., if in the two countries there are similar trends in the evolution of party system format across different types of elections.

The second objective is to compare the performance of the large, medium and small parties in first order and EP elections between 1981/1987-2004. Following theories on second-order elections (Reif and Schmitt, 1980; Reif, 1985b; Anderson and Ward, 1997; Marsh, 1998; Oppenhuis, Eijk and Franklin, 1996; Eijk, Franklin and Oppenhuis, 1996), we intend to test if the small (and medium-size) parties have always performed better in Greek and Portuguese EP elections than in legislative ones; and if, on the contrary, the large parties in both countries – usually the two countries’ governmental parties - have always performed better in first-order than in second-order elections.

The third objective is to test if, for both countries, the social and ideological anchors of partisanship are weaker in EP elections than in first-order ones, thus indicating a greater probability of vote shifts between left and right in European Parliament contests. Or if, on the contrary, “sincere voting” is more important than “tactical voting” in second-order elections, vis-à-vis parliamentary contests, and so there is a greater probability of vote shifts between left and right in legislative electoral competitions. Consequently, in this section it will be tested if electors are more likely to change their vote options by crossing the left-right divide in elections with less importance (for the European Parliament) than in the most important ones (legislative).

The fourth objective is to test theories on electoral cycles, comparing aggregate electoral returns of the governmental parties across first-order and European elections in different periods of the national electoral cycle, and using as the baseline the winners in

each previous legislative election. The hypothesis to be tested here is whether second-order elections have a singular character or whether they are used by electors as a way to express content or discontent towards the national government.

But what are the intended specific contributions of this paper to what we already know about the relations between first-order and second-order elections? And why to compare Portugal and Greece? On the one hand, empirical studies on second-order elections in the European context have usually lacked a longitudinal perspective (Freire, 2004). On the other hand, many comparisons of voting behaviour in first-order and second-order elections suffer from a major deficiency: many countries use very different electoral systems in the different types of elections, so many cases do not allow us to test hypotheses in a systematic way, because a major institutional characteristic of the political system is not kept constant. So, the two major specific contributions of this paper are the following. First, the use of a longitudinal and comparative perspective. Second, the use of these two case-studies, Greece and Portugal, with quite similar electoral systems in their own different types of elections, will allow us to test all hypotheses in a systematic way, while controlling for other institutional, cultural, social and political factors that can get in the way of clear comparisons between first and second-order elections. Looking at EP elections can also add to our knowledge an understanding of the Greek and Portuguese political and party systems. Namely, we can understand what is the effective role of EP elections in the function of the national political systems.

THE ROLE OF ELECTIONS IN THE TWO POLITICAL SYSTEMS

Prior to Portugal's relatively bloodless Revolution of Carnations on April 25, 1974, free and fair elections with universal suffrage and a competitive party system were unheard of in the nation. Portugal's transition to democracy was initiated by a coup led by junior military officers, who committed themselves to holding free and fair, popular elections one year from the date of coup. The Portuguese Constituent Assembly elections were held on schedule on April 25, 1975, and these were followed by the first free constitutional legislative elections one year later, on April 25, 1976.

Portugal's political system is semi-presidential (Duverger, 1980), and thus the only two institutions with national electoral legitimacy and a responsibility for forming government are the President of the Republic (PR) and the National Assembly. More specifically, the Head of State is the directly-elected president (through a majority run-off system). In Greece, the President is elected by a pre-existent body of popular will, the Greek Parliament. However, in both countries, national legislative elections ultimately determine which party will form the Government, and who will become Prime Minister. These are clearly the most important elections in the two political systems under study. Moreover, the Portuguese semi-presidential regime is rather weak, specially since the reduction of presidential powers in the 1982 (for details, see Freire, 2004). That is why, even for Portugal we will consider only the national legislative elections as the first-order ones.

The Greek military regime established by George Papadopoulos and his fellow right-wing colonels had been in power only for 7 years unlike the long lasting one of Salazar and Caetano (1926/33-1974). After the restoration of democracy in the Country in

July 1974, the National Unity government, led by Constantinos Karamanlis, set forth as its first goal the strengthening of democracy and the alleviation of the traumatic experiences of the civil war. It reinstated the Constitution of 1952, with the exception of the clauses relating to the King. The first free parliamentary elections took place on November 17, 1974, and on December 8 of that same year a referendum was conducted to determine the type of the polity¹. The revised Greek Constitution of 1975/1986, introduced a parliamentary government system, approved by all political powers. The President of the Republic (PR) is the Head of the State and regulator of the capacity of the regime.

The legislative branch, the Republic's Assembly in Portugal and the Chamber of Deputies in Greece, are unicameral and composed of 230 members and 300 members, respectively, elected in the 22 Portuguese multi-member constituencies and the 56 Greek constituencies (the electoral systems will be presented with more detail below).

Greece became a member of the European Community /European Union by 1st January of 1981. The first European Parliament (EP) election was held on October 18, 1981 along with the parliamentary election. The EP election was overshadowed by the critical national contest and the two largest parties suffered heavy losses. Five years later, on January 1st, 1986, Portugal joined the European Community and the first European Parliament (EP) elections were called in July 19, 1987. Like in Greece, the first EP election coincided with a legislative election. Greeks have voted for EP elections 6 times and the Portuguese 5 times, and their importance for national politics is the same as elsewhere in the EU. That is, they are of secondary importance in the functioning of the political system, both in terms of the constitutional order and (usually) in terms of their political consequences.

THE ELECTORAL SYSTEMS IN LEGISLATIVE AND EP ELECTIONS

Electoral systems across different types of Portuguese elections are quite similar, except for the presidential contests (Freire, 2004). Both legislative and European elections are fought under the d'Hondt system of proportional representation (PR), and voters are not permitted to express preferences for particular candidates (closed lists). During the democratic period, the only significant change in the legislative elections' electoral system was the reduction in the number of MPs from the 1991 election on, from 250 to 230. This latter change resulted in a minor reduction of the average district magnitude, from 11.4 seats/district between 1975 and 1987, to 10.5 from 1991 onwards. This system benefits large parties the most (those receiving more than 20% of the vote), is relatively fair to medium-sized parties (those with 9%-20% of the vote), and can even allow for the entrance of very small parties (for example, those with around 1,5% to 3% of the vote) due to the very large district magnitude of the Lisbon and Porto constituencies (48 and 38 seats, respectively, in both the 2002 and the 2005 legislative elections).

The Greek legislative elections are fought under an electoral system of proportional representation, which is paradoxically called a "reinforced system of proportional representation" (in force since 1958). Unlike the Portuguese electoral system, which is a single-tier one, the Greek is a multiple-tier system (with three, 1989-90, or four, 1974-85 and 1993-present date, tiers/stages for seat allocation). The latter system has changed significantly since 1974, according to Lijphart's criteria (1994: 42-45). Nevertheless, in the Greek electoral system seats have always been allocated in three, 1989-90, or four steps, 1974-85 and 1993-present date. According to Lijphart (1994:44) in

1974 the “weighted average district magnitude” (for the various steps of seat allocation) was 6,67, and the “effective threshold” was 18,8. Between 1977-81 and 1985, the “weighted average district magnitude” was 5,30. What changed between 1977-81 and 1985 was the “effective threshold”: 16,1 and 14,7, respectively. For the 1989-90 elections a less disproportional system was applied (Lijphart, 1994: 33, Nikolakopoulos, 1989: 94). However, since the 1993 legislative election the electoral system is very similar to the one used in 1985.ⁱⁱ

The Greek electoral system for legislative elections is very disproportional in terms of seat allocation; more specifically, it has similar results to those found in majoritarian systems and, namely, the levels of disproportionality are much higher than those found in Portugal (Rose, 1984; Lopes and Freire, 2002: 153). Using Lijphart’s criteria (and/or data) for the “effective threshold”, in Portugal the value for this index was 5.7% (1974-87) and 6.8% (1991-2005); for the Greek system the index was around 16.5% (1974-85) and 3.3% (for the exceptional period of 1989-90)-(Missing: Update for Greece: 1993-2004). Therefore, it could be supported that the main purpose of the Greek electoral system is to manufacture a one-party parliamentary majority in each election and to allow alternation over time between the two major parties (Mavrogordatos, 1984, 163). It is designed to discourage multipartyism and to foster the emergence and persistence of large parties (Bruneau, et al, 2001, 56). The voters are aware of the representational biases of the electoral system and are polarized between the two largest parties. Another difference with the Portuguese electoral system is that voting is compulsory (although with weak enforcement).

However, we should bear in mind that in both countries constituencies of extremely different magnitude do coexist. This imbalance of district magnitude provides

the small parties with the possibility of obtaining parliamentary representation by focusing their efforts on the largest constituencies. Therefore, the so-called constraining influence of the electoral system is, consequently, not so strong as one might expect (Diamantopoulos, 2001: 197).

As for the EP elections in both countries, the state consists of one single constituency returning 24 MEPs (for Portugal: 24 seats: 1987-89 and 2004; 25 seats: 1994-99; and for Greece: 24 seats: 1981-1989 and 2004; 25 seats: 1994-99). European elections are fought in Greece under the Droop / largest remainder system of proportional representation (PR), and voters, like in Portugal, are not permitted to express preferences for particular candidates (closed lists). The legal threshold, which was introduced for EP elections in 1994, is the same as that of the legislative elections: 3,0%. In Portugal there is no legal threshold, but the “effective threshold” is around 3,0% like the Greek one.

In Portugal, the difference between EP and legislative electoral systems in terms of benefits/punishments for small (8% of the vote or less) and medium-sized parties (9%-20% of the vote) is contradictory: if we consider only the two largest districts in elections for the national parliament (around 48 and 38 seats), the legislative electoral system can be said to be more fair; if we consider average district magnitude for legislative elections (1975-87: 11,4; 1991-02: 10,5), the reverse is true. On the other hand, it clearly can be said that the EP electoral system benefits small and medium-sized parties the most because fewer resources are needed for electoral campaigns in a single district. Considering the characteristics of the electoral systems in Greek legislative (very disproportional compared with the Portuguese one) and EP (basically similar to the Portuguese) elections, contrary to Portugal we can say that in Greece small and medium/small-sized parties have much higher chances of getting elected in European elections than in legislative ones.

THE PARTY SYSTEMS IN LEGISLATIVE AND EP ELECTIONS

Comparing the party systems of the two countries, we can say that Portuguese democratic politics has been dominated by four major parties (for details, see Bruneau, 1997), while the Greek party system has been characterized by a three-block alignment but the actual competition for government power has always been bipolar (for details, see Lyrintzis, 1984, Mavrogordatos, 1984).

In Portugal, the four major parties referred to above are: the centre-left Socialist Party (PS: *Partido Socialista*); the centre-right Social Democratic Party (PSD: *Partido Social Democrata*); the PCP (*Partido Comunista Português*), an orthodox communist party; and the CDS-PP (*Centro Democrático Social-Partido Popular*), a right wing party.

The return to constitutional rule in July 1974 set in motion a restructuring of the Greek party system which resulted in the presence of three “relevant” parties: the centre-right party of New Democracy, ND (*Νέα Δημοκρατία-ΝΔ*), founded by Constantine Karamanlis in September 1974; the centre-left party of Pan-Hellenic Socialist Movement – PASOK (*Πανελλήνιο Σοσιαλιστικό Κίνημα-ΠΑΣΟΚ*), founded in September 1974 by Andreas Papandreou; and the Greek Communist Party–KKE (*Κομμουνιστικό Κόμμα Ελλάδας-ΚΚΕ*).ⁱⁱⁱ

Additionally, micro parties both from the left and the right have persisted in Portuguese and Greek politics. The total percentage of the Greek micro parties is insignificant compared with the performance of the Portuguese micro parties, most probably due to higher thresholds for parliamentary representation in the former country’s electoral system.

(Figure 1, Effective Number of Parties in Legislative Elections, around here)

(Figure 2, Vote Percentage of the Two Major parties, around here)

In Portugal the two major parties (PS and PSD) have always controlled government, be it in a single party format (PS: 1976-77, 1995-2002, and 2005-2009; PSD: 1985-1995) or in coalition (PS-CDS: 1977-1978; PSD-CDS-PPM^{iv}: 1979-83; PS-PSD: 1983-85; PSD-CDS-PP: 2002-present date). Between 1976 and 1985, Portuguese governments were mainly of a coalition type and never completed their terms (see Freire, 2004, Table 1). The 1985 general election was a critical one that initiated a huge transformation of Portuguese electoral politics, eventually ending/reducing the above mentioned cabinet instability.^v That election had major consequences in the party system, some of which only began to reveal themselves in the 1987 realignment election. Among these, perhaps the most fundamental one is the concentration of the vote in the two major parties: from 1975 to 1985 the sum of the vote percentages in the two major parties (PS and PSD) was only twice slightly above 60%, but since the 1987 election onwards, the latter figure was always above 70%, and usually well above (see Figure 2). The latter phenomenon fundamentally altered the Portuguese party system format in a majoritarian direction: in Figure 1 we can see a sharp reduction of the “effective number of parties” (both electoral and parliamentary parties) in Portugal since 1987.

Therefore, while in Portugal government coalitions are part of the democratic history of the political system, in Greek politics they are “exceptions”. During the democratic period the only Greek experiment with coalition government took place from June 1989 to April 1990.^{vi} The Greek party system took shape quickly. Already by 1974 it

is observed an early stabilization of a bipolar pattern of competition. Even considering the fundamental transformation of the Portuguese party system towards a majoritarian direction (since 1987), we can say that there are two major structural characteristics distinguishing the evolution of the Portuguese party system from the Greek one. Firstly, in Greece majoritarianism began much earlier (in terms of votes, in 1981; but in terms of the “effective number of parliamentary parties” right from 1974); secondly, majoritarianism has always been much stronger in the Greek case (see Figures 1 and 2; see also Bruneau, et al, 2001). “Reinforced proportional representation” is for sure an important element explaining these two differences (as the gap between the “effective number of electoral and parliamentary parties” in Greece and Portugal point us, specially for the period 1974-85).

Having at this point a reasonable picture of the evolution of the Portuguese and Greek party systems in legislative elections, we continue this section relying on the theories on second-order elections (Reif and Schmitt, 1980; Reif, 1985b; Anderson and Ward, 1997; Marsh, 1998; Oppenhuis, Eijk and Franklin, 1996a and 1996b; Eijk, Franklin and Oppenhuis, 1996). The first hypothesis to be tested is if small (the parties belonging to the “others” category in Table 1, both for Portugal and Greece), medium-sized (the Portuguese PCP and CDS, plus the Coalition of the Left and Progress^{vii} in Greece,) and medium/small-sized (the two Greek parties of the left: KKE and SYN) parties have always performed better in Portuguese and Greek European elections than in legislative ones. The second question is whether the trends in party system format (towards bipolarization) in first-order elections is also present in second-order elections. ^{viii} / ix

(Table 1: Portuguese and Greek Political Parties' Average Vote Percentages by Decade in Legislative and EP Elections, 1981-2005, around here)

Looking at Table 1 we can clearly see that the two largest Portuguese parties (PS and PSD) always performed better in first-order elections than in EP ones: 71,6% and 67,4%, respectively.^x The same holds true for the Greek case: 84,8 to 74,2, respectively. However, the reduction of the two largest parties domination is more significant in Greece than in Portugal in second-order elections.

The Portuguese medium-sized (PCP and CDS) parties always performed better in European (21,6%) than in first-order elections (19,3%), although in the 2000s the differences are very small (see Table 1). Even for the whole period the differences are not particularly impressive, although they are in the expected direction. The Portuguese smaller parties ("others") always performed better in European (6,6 for the whole period) than in legislative elections (4,7 for 1980s-2000s).

The data on Greek medium and small political parties' average vote percentages by decade in first-order and second-order elections (Table 1) reveal the same pattern as in Portugal. The Greek medium party (Coalition of the Left and Progress) and the two medium/small parties (KKE and SYN) always performed better in EP elections than in first-order ones: 14,3 and 11,5; 14,5 and 9,9, respectively (for the whole period). Finally, like in the Portuguese case, the Greek small parties ("others") also performed better in European (11,6) elections than in legislative ones (5,3) (Table 1). However, in all the types of parties (large, medium, medium/small, and small) the differences in performance across different types of elections are larger in Greece than in Portugal. The differences between the electoral systems in second-order elections vis-à-vis the first-order ones, in each

country, can help to explain the differential magnitude of the losses of the major parties in the two countries.

In terms of parties' performance across different types of elections (averages for decades and the whole period) we tested for statistical significance (t-test for paired samples; error margin lower than 10%) and the differences always revealed significant (and in the cases of large and small parties the differences are even significant for an error margin lower than 5%).

Similar tests for Greece revealed that the differences in parties' performance (large, medium/small and small) are always significant for an error margin lower than 1%. So, in terms of the performance of different types of Greek and Portuguese political parties theories about first and second-order elections always receive empirical support.

(Figure 3: Effective Number of Parties in Legislative and EP Elections, around here)

But did the developments in the party system that occurred for legislative elections also take place in European Parliament elections? Figures 3 show the trends in the "effective number of electoral parties" (legislative and EP elections) in both Portuguese and Greek democratic elections. The "effective number of electoral parties"(ENEP) measure is taken from Laakso and Taagepera (1979), and calculated by the authors using official electoral data.

Comparing Portuguese legislative and EP elections in terms of the trends in the ENEP (Figure 3), we can see that there is a clear synchronicity. In the both types of elections there is a majoritarian drive, with the reduction in the effective number of parties. Moreover, what seems to be a very slight trend reversal in recent legislative

elections (1999-2005) is also followed in recent European contests (1999-2004). Furthermore, we can see that European elections seem to be losing their distinctive character vis-à-vis the first-order ones. In all the elections between 1999 and 2004, the effective number of parties in the two types of elections shows only very slight differences. Whether this is an indicator of a new era in Portuguese politics is unclear. Still, in the medium/long-term there seems to be some contamination from the first-order elections towards the European Parliament contests, a feature not predicted by second-order elections theory. This might mean that first-order elections are more important, in terms of financial state resources, mass media visibility and organizational structure. So, if some parties lose their weight at the national level, this will tend to contaminate other levels of power (local and European). Additionally, in a political system dominated by four major parties like the Portuguese, when the above mentioned phenomena occurs in two of the four major parties, such decline then translates into a reduction in the number of effective electoral parties.

From analysis of the “effective number of electoral parties” (ENEP) in Greek legislative elections it can be clearly assumed the strong establishment of the majority rule of the electoral system (Figure 3). Contrary to Portugal where the ENEP in both contests stands in higher numbers, in Greece always a small number of parties has dominated the party system. Like in Portugal, a higher ENEP is always present in Greek European contests, vis-à-vis legislative elections. However, since the 1994 EP elections the differences between the two types of elections are much higher in Greece than in Portugal. Moreover, in Greece the psychological effects of the legislative electoral system seem to translate to European elections: in spite of the fact that the Portuguese and Greek electoral

systems for EP elections are very similar the ENEP in Greece is usually lower than in Portugal (except for the 1994 and 1999 EP contests).

For the legislative elections in Greece (Figure 3), we can see that, since 1981, the variations in time for the ENEP are minimal and political stability is a dominant feature of the Greek party system. In terms of European elections (Figure 3), the picture is different because the amount of change between elections is usually much larger than in legislative elections, most probably due to the “softer” electoral system’s constraints. However, despite that significant difference, in Greece (like in Portugal) the ups and downs of the ENEP in EP elections seem to follow similar “trends” as in legislative elections. So, both in Portugal and Greece there seems to some contagious from first-order to second-order elections, although in the latter case this effect seems to be of a more short-term nature.

LEVELS OF SOCIAL AND IDEOLOGICAL ANCHORS OF PARTISANSHIP

In this section it will be tested if electors are more likely to change their vote options crossing the left-right divide in elections with less importance (European) than in the most important ones (legislative); or if, on the contrary, “sincere voting” is more important than “tactical voting” in second-order elections, vis-à-vis parliamentary contests, and so there is a greater probability of vote shifts between left and right in legislative electoral competitions. These hypotheses will be tested only with individual level data, both due to space limitations and to the higher appropriateness of individual level data to the study of electoral change (Heath et al, 1991, pp. 10-31).

Considering that second-order elections might be used by voters to express their discontent to the government in place, and considering that these elections have no direct

consequences for national government formation, it is possible that voters feel more free to change their vote options by crossing the left-right divide in European elections than in legislative ones. However, a symmetrical hypothesis can also be made in this respect. For example, we can consider that only small segments of the electorate are using European elections to express their discontent with the existing national government in place by changing their vote options (vis-à-vis the last legislative election) and crossing the left-right divide. The others segments of the electorate usually vote “sincerely” in European elections, i.e., for those parties they prefer the most without any tactical considerations (about the “sincere vote” in second-order elections, see Eijk and Franklin, 1996b; Eijk, Franklin, and Oppenhuis, 1996; Oppenhuis, Eijk, and Franklin, 1996). On the contrary, tactical considerations may be much greater in first-order elections among larger parts of the electorate, and so the result might be a higher level of social and ideological anchoring of partisanship in European elections vis-à-vis legislative contests.

The best way to estimate electoral change is with individual level data and panel designs (Heath et al, 1991, pp. 10-31). However, due to the difficult access to panel surveys, both in Portugal and Greece, we will use only cross-sectional data. The different sources of survey data are presented below Tables 2a to 3c. Using this empirical material, the relative anchors of partisanship across different types of elections can be compared. It will be tested if the social and ideological anchors of partisanship are weaker in European elections than in legislative ones, thus indicating a greater probability of vote shifts between left and right in second-order elections; or if, on the contrary, the reverse is true.

(Table 2a: Ideology, cleavages and the vote in Portuguese EP and Legislative elections, 1987-1994 – OLS regressions, around here)

(Table 2b: Ideology, cleavages and the vote in Portuguese EP and Legislative elections, 1999-2004 – OLS regressions, around here)

We know from prior studies (A. Campbell, 1960; J. Campbell, 1993; Eijk and Franklin, 1996c) that one of the major determinants of the different outcomes in first and second-order elections is turnout. Thus, the differences in the relative strength in the anchors of partisanship across elections might be due to differential turnout. For example, those participating in European elections might be more sophisticated voters^{xi} and their behaviour might be less determined by cleavages and ideology. Or, a differential mobilization rate might impact upon the different ideological segments of the electorate according to the ideological complexion of the national government in place. Of course, this issue is only important in the Portuguese case, because in Greece voting is compulsory (and turnout differences between legislative and EP elections are indeed very small).

Comparing the vote (recall) in legislative (1987 and 1991) and European (1989 and 1994) elections using the Eurobarometer data^{xii}, we can see that the social and ideological anchors of partisanship are always more important in first-order elections than in second-order ones--adjusted R^2 are 0.552 and 0.423 *versus* 0.504 and 0.381, respectively (Table 2a). However, the regression equations for legislative elections were re-run including only those who voted in both elections: EP and legislative. The evidence shows that the picture stayed the same in the 1987 (0.554), but not in the 1991 election (0.381), which now is about equal to the 1994 EP election. So, only in the latter case do the differences in the strength of the anchors of partisanship seem to be due to differential turnout.

Let us pass to the comparison of the 1999 elections, both legislative (voting intention) and European (past vote), as well as to the comparison of the 2004 EP elections

(past vote) with voting intention in parliamentary elections (2004) – Table 2b. Contrary to the previous analysis, the data for 1999 and 2004 reveal that in both years there was a higher social and ideological anchoring of the vote in European than in legislative elections, even without considering differential turnout.

(Table 3a: Ideology, cleavages and the vote in Greek EP and Legislative elections, 1985-1989 – OLS regressions, around here)

(Table 3b: Ideology, cleavages and the vote in Greek EP and Legislative elections, 1990-1994 – OLS regressions, around here)

(Table 3c: Ideology, cleavages and the vote in Greek EP and Legislative elections, 1996-2004 – OLS regressions, around here)

Tables 3a to 3c show the overall strong connection between past vote and the electors' left-right self-placement. One of the most remarkable features of the regression coefficients reported in all the tables is that the cleavages of religion and class, represented by measures of respondent's occupation, unionization, education and of church attendance are in most of the elections almost insubstantial in determining the voting choice.

For the period between 1985 and 1994 (tables 3a and 3b) we can see that European elections in Greece always encouraged a more ideological vote (*vis-à-vis* legislative contests): the social and ideological anchors of partisanship are always more important in second-order elections than in first-order ones --adjusted R^2 are 0,682 and 0,612 *versus* 0,472 (or 0,519) and 0,233 (or 0,405) respectively. However, this pattern is not confirmed by comparing the data for the period 1996-2004. Like in Portuguese period of 1987-1994, there was a higher social and ideological anchoring of the vote in legislative elections than

in European: the figures for the adjusted R^2 are 0,517 versus 0,453 (for 1999) and 0,352 (or 0,671) versus 0,345 (for 2004), respectively.

Summing up, from the findings of the Portuguese and Greek survey data detailed above, we must conclude that the individual level evidence allows us to infer that sometimes people are more prone to change their vote across party/ideological blocs in European elections than in legislative ones; in other occasions, the reverse is true. So, it can be ascertained that the phenomena is mainly dependent on the political conjuncture.

EUROPEAN ELECTIONS AND ELECTORAL CYCLES

The hypothesis to be tested in this section is if European elections have a singular character or if they are used by electors as a way to express content or discontent with national government (Tufte, 1975; Reif and Schmitt, 1980; Reif, 1985a and 1985b; Anderson and Ward, 1996; Shugart and Carey, 1992; Oppenhuis, Eijk and Franklin, 1996; Eijk, Franklin and Oppenhuis, 1996; Marsh, 1998). This will be done by comparing aggregate electoral results across legislative and EP elections in different periods of the electoral cycle, using as the baseline the winners in each previous (or concurrent) legislative election, i.e., the governmental parties in place.

Before proceeding with the analysis three major issues must be clarified. First, how can the dependent variable be measured? The dependent variable is the change in vote percentage for the party (or parties) that control the national government between the prior first-order elections (legislative) and the subsequent (or concurrent) second-order election (European) (a similar strategy as that used by Marsh, 1998; Reif and Schmitt, 1980; Reif, 1985a and 1985b; for a different approach in the US context, see Tufte, 1975).

Second, it is necessary to decide how to define and classify the different parts of the electoral cycle. The notion of electoral cycle is related to the idea that during any national government's existence there are popularity cycles with differential political consequences depending on the time elapsed between the first-order and the second-order elections (Marsh, 1998; Reif and Schmitt, 1980; Reif, 1985a and 1985b; Tufte, 1975; Anderson and Ward, 1996; Eijk, Franklin, Oppenhuis, 1996; Oppenhuis, Eijk, and Franklin, 1996). Some authors use continuous measures for the electoral cycle variable (Marsh, 1998). Since there are very few cases, both for Portugal and Greece, we used a discrete variable with three categories: the "honeymoon" period, i.e., until twelve months after the prior legislative election; the "midterm" period, i.e., from thirteen to thirty six months after the prior legislative election; the "later term" period, i.e., from thirty seven to forty eight months after the prior legislative election. Remember that both in Portugal and Greece normal national government terms are four years (forty eight months).

The third major issue to be solved before moving on to empirical tests relates to the expected political consequences for national governments in European elections that take place during different phases of the national electoral cycle, in terms of citizens' electoral behaviour. For the "midterm" period there is a large consensus in the literature, with most of the authors considering that governmental parties will tend to lose vote share in second-order elections (Marsh, 1998; Reif and Schmitt, 1980; Reif, 1985a and 1985b; Tufte, 1975; Anderson and Ward, 1997; Eijk, Franklin, Oppenhuis, 1996; Oppenhuis, Eijk, and Franklin, 1996). In terms of the honeymoon period (sometimes concurrent elections), some authors defend that national governments will receive greater or near identical support in second-order elections as they did in prior first-order ones (Marsh, 1998; Reif and Schmitt, 1980; Reif, 1985a and 1985b; Tufte, 1975). Others defend that since second-

order elections that take place during the honeymoon period have hardly any consequences for national governments, voters will tend to cast “sincere votes” (Eijk, Franklin, Oppenhuis, 1996; Oppenhuis, Eijk, and Franklin, 1996). Therefore, larger parties in government and opposition will tend to lose vote share to smaller parties in multiparty systems. Finally, the later term period is for some authors a period of a certain recovery in national government popularity, and so parties controlling national cabinets will tend to lose less votes than in midterm elections (Reif and Schmitt, 1980; Reif, 1985a and 1985b). However, others defend that since second-order elections tend to better fulfill their function as markers of public opinion support for government the closer they fall to the next first-order election (later term), voters will tend to cast more “protest votes” in those periods (Eijk, Franklin, Oppenhuis, 1996; Oppenhuis, Eijk, and Franklin, 1996). Therefore, according to these authors, parties in control of government will also tend to lose votes in second-order elections if they take place in the later term of the national cycle.

(Table 4: European Elections and Electoral Cycles in Portugal, 1987-2004, and Greece, 1981-2004: change in national government vote support in EP elections, around here)

Starting our analysis with the Portuguese case (Table 4), we can see that, setting aside the honeymoon periods, the party (or parties) controlling national government always lose electoral support (in terms of share of the vote) from the first-order elections to the subsequent second-order ones. From the late eighties through 2004 these losses have always been very high, always greater than 14 percentage points. Midterm losses are always higher than later term losses, as expected. However, since there is only one case for second-order elections in the later term, it is not possible to derive any conclusions

from this data. The same is true for the honeymoon period, where there is only one case, so here too it is not possible to derive any conclusions.

Concerning the Greek case (Table 4), we can clearly see that regardless of the timing of the EP elections, all the European contests do show anti-government swings, which nevertheless are always softer than in Portugal (except for 1999). According to the second order-election model, one of the hypothesized differences between European and national elections, i.e., the losses for the national government parties, is confirmed in all EP elections in both Portugal and Greece. However, the magnitude of the losses in Greece is usually rather more limited comparing to Portugal. This difference is especially worthy of mention because the reduction of electoral system's constraints in Greece (from first-order to second-order elections) is higher than in Portugal, and, thus, we can consider that there are more incentives for both "protest" and "sincere" voting.

From the Greek data, it is not possible to derive any conclusions that after the midterm period and as the next legislative election approaches, the government party either recovers or voters will tend to cast more "protest votes" because in the later term period no second-order election is recorded. All the second-order elections have been documented either during the mid-term or during the honeymoon period. As the data in Table 4 shows, in Greece all EP elections that took place during the government's honeymoon period (four electoral contests) represented vote's losses for the incumbents. Moreover, in the case of the 1994 EP elections (-9,23%) national government punishment was even greater than in any one of the two EP elections take took place in the mid-term.

Therefore, the losses of the Greek government parties in EP elections held concurrently or very shortly after first order elections seem to contradict the hypothesis of the authors that defend that national governments will receive greater or near identical

support in EP elections compared to prior or concurrent first-order ones. On the other hand, there is a significant variation in the extent of losses: from -2,35% (EP 2004) to -9,23% (EP 1994). From this contradiction it can be suggested that the results in EP elections that take place in honeymoon period are better explained by focusing on each EP election and its social, economic and political context.

CONCLUSIONS

(TO BE IMPROVED AFTER BUDAPEST DISCUSSIONS)

The main aim of this paper was to explore, both in a longitudinal and comparative approach, the relations between legislative (first-order elections) and European (second-order elections) voting behaviour in two South European countries: Greece and Portugal, between 1981/1987 and 2004. Due to fact that both Greece and Portugal use quite similar electoral systems in their own different types of elections, we considered that this would allow us to test all hypotheses in a systematic way, while controlling for other institutional, cultural, social and political factors that can get in the way of clear comparisons between first and second-order elections.

While there are limitations in the analysis of the Portuguese and Greek case due to the limited number of data points in certain analyses, and also to some scarcity of voter survey data, we believe that it nevertheless provides an interesting test for many of the theoretical claims made in the literature on second-order elections. In terms of the performance of different types of Greek and Portuguese political parties (according to their size) theories about first and second-order elections always received empirical support. I.e., large parties always performed better in legislative elections than in

European elections; and the reverse is true for medium, medium/small, and small-sized parties. Studying the performance of the two largest Portuguese and Greek parties, it could be supported that sometimes the differences between the two different types of elections are not very impressive. The Portuguese medium and small sized parties perform better in second-order elections, but the differences are not considered as large. On the other hand, we can say that the performance of the Greek small and medium/small-sized parties in the E.P electoral races is more significant. However, the differences between Greece (where the electoral systems' constraints upon party competition are much higher in legislative than in EP elections) and Portugal (where the differences in electoral systems between the two types of elections are rather small) clearly show that the electoral system is a critical variable for the effects of second-order elections on parties' performance: the Portuguese differences are much smaller than the Greek.

Comparing party system format ("effective number of electoral parties": ENEP) between 1974 and 2005 in Greece and Portugal across European and legislative elections, we concluded that there appears to be similar trends along with distinguishing characteristics: the majoritarian direction of both party systems is certainly a starting point of the studying of the evolution of the party system. In Greece (like in Portugal) the ups and downs of the ENEP in EP elections seem to follow similar "trends" as in legislative elections. So, both in Portugal and Greece there seems to be some contagious from first-order to second-order elections. So, these analyses do show that relations between first and second-order elections are not only short-term but also long-term.

On the other hand is important to consider that the effective number of the Greek elective parties (ENEP) seems to be more affected by the psychological effects of the legislative electoral system upon EP elections. That is why despite the fact that both

Portuguese and Greek European electoral systems are quite similar, the ENEP is much lower in the latter than in the former case.

In terms of the social and ideological anchors of partisanship across European and legislative elections, the findings of the Portuguese and Greek survey data detailed above resulted rather mixed: sometimes people are more prone to change their vote across party/ideological blocs in European elections than in legislative ones; in other occasions, the reverse is true. So, it can be ascertained that the phenomena is mainly dependent on the political conjuncture. Consequently, the findings do not enable us common conceptual groupings to be formed. Therefore, the question for future research is clearly the specification of the social and political events that can account for that variation.

Comparing vote support for Portuguese and Greek governmental parties across legislative and EP elections showed that second-order elections are always used by elections to punish the incumbents (if European elections take place in the honey-moon or in the mid-term period of the national electoral cycle). However, the losses of the Greek government parties in EP elections held concurrently or very shortly after first order elections seem to contradict the hypothesis of the authors that defend that national governments will receive greater or near identical support in EP elections compared to prior or concurrent first-order ones.

Another point of conclusion is that the increasing similarity between first and second-order elections, namely in terms of aggregate party system developments, means that the second-order elections model might be losing some of its heuristic value in Portugal and in Greece. The observed similarity contributes significantly to sustain that national factors have an important, persistent and structural impact on second-order elections.

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ⁱ The electoral body, by a majority of 69.18%, expressed its will against crowned democracy, thus once and for settling the issue of the form of government in Greece.

ⁱⁱ The fundamental changes introduced by the new electoral law of 1991, which was applied for the first time at the legislative election of 1993, vis-à-vis the 1985 electoral law are following:

- Introduction of the electoral threshold of 3% (like it was used between 1974 and 1985);
- The electoral coalitions are considered as unpractical (i.e., the electoral law discourage the formation of electoral coalitions);
- The main difference at the highest tier is the introduction of the procedure of “attenuating differences”: every party obtains 70% of the seats that would correspond to his votes share under PR. The smallest party that passed the threshold of 3% takes its seats in the lowest tier. Then, it takes its share of seats in the districts where it has fared best. The seat allocation procedure continues for all the parties from the smallest to the largest.

ⁱⁱⁱ The Greek party system is characterised by three main and clearly separated political camps, which have been figured under the interplay of the two historical conflicts of the Greek history of the 20th century: the “national schism” and the Civil War (1946-49). On the eve of the dictatorship, in 1967, three parties dominated the political arena: the National Radical Union, ERE, representing the right; the Centre Union, EK, representing the centre; and the United Democratic Left, EDA, representing the left. The post –1974 Greek party system has remained essentially intact: ND represents the new right; PASOK the new centre (namely the centre-left); and the traditional Left was split between the orthodox Communist party of Greece (KKE) and the Euro-communist KKE-Esoterikou (“of the Interior”). KKE is an anti-system party and pursues a strategy based on hard-line opposition to imperialism, globalisation and European integration (Verney, 2004: 17). The Coalition of the Left and Progress (SYN/Synaspismos) was founded in 1992 after the break-up of the earlier electoral coalition with the same name and represents the so-called “renewal left”. It is a political tendency that emerged from the KKE-Esoterikou.

^{iv} PPM, *Partido Popular Monárquico*, is a micro, right-wing party that advocates a monarchic regime.

^v A new party instigated by the former president Ramalho Eanes (1976-86), PRD: Partido Renovador Democrático, fought that election, achieved 17.9% of the vote and reduced the PS to 20.8%, its worst result ever in legislative elections. However, the Socialists began recovering slowly in the next election (1987), and the PRD declined to about 5%, practically disappearing in the next election (1991).

^{vi} Between June 1989 and April 1990 Greece experimented two coalition governments. The first was with ND and SYN (Tzannetakis government) and the other one following the November elections of 1989, PASOK joined ND and SYN in the new Zolotas cabinet. (For more details, see Verney, 1990).

^{vii} The Coalition of the Left and Progress was formed in December 1988 and joined the KKE with the Greek Left (EAR), itself formed only in 1987 following the self-dissolution of the KKE-Esoterikou and its fusion with a number of small parties and personalities of the broader left (Verney, 1990)

^{viii} However, in order to trace the evolution of each one of the four Portuguese major parties, and to compare the performance of large and medium/small-sized parties across different types of elections in both countries, we pinpoint the following rules concerning the decomposing of the votes in the Portuguese coalitions. First, we calculated the average vote percentage of each party (PSD, CDS, and PPM) in the elections before (1976) and after (1983) the coalition period. Second, we summed these three averages and determined the proportion of this total vote for each party of the coalition. Third, we used this proportion to determine the vote percentage of each party in 1979 and 1980, by multiplying the proportion mentioned above by the coalition's total vote in each election. These procedures were used with the data presented in Figures 1 and 3, as well as in Table 1. In EP elections similar procedures were also used. Note that in the 2004 EP elections in Portugal, the calculations to decompose the votes in the PSD- (CDS-) PP coalition (Força Portugal) considered only the prior EP electoral results (1999), because when this article was being written the 2004 EP election was the latest one.


^{ix} Besides the ones referred to in the previous note, there were other pre-electoral coalitions, but we counted them as singular parties. FRS (*Frente Republicana e Socialista*) in 1980, which included the PS and other micro parties: UEDS and ASDI. However, we counted this coalition as PS/FRS. The PCP has always run in coalition since 1979: APU (*Aliança Povo Unido*, 1979-85), a coalition with the micro party MDP/CDE; CDU (*Coligação Democrática Unitária*, 1987-02), a coalition with the tiny party PEV and independents. In both cases, we counted the coalitions with the Communists as single forces: PCP-APU and PCP-CDU.

^x The very small difference in the 1980's is due to a very good result of a new party (PRD, *Partido Renovador Democrático*: center-left) in legislative elections, a result built mostly on former PS' voters, which was not reproduced in the EP elections that took part in that decade (specially the 1989 EP elections showed a very good recover of the Socialists, vis-à-vis the 1987 legislative elections).

^{xi} Of course, the term sophistication is used loosely here. We could just as easily say fickle. Voters who demonstrate consistent ideological positions and party loyalties that correspond to a predictable sociological position may be just as (if not more) sophisticated as voters who shift back and forth between parties.

^{xii} Both Eurobarometers include recall questions about past vote in EP (1994 and 1989) and legislative elections (1991 and 1987), which we used. The post electoral survey (2002) – see Freire et al, 2003 - included questions on past voting in legislative elections (2002 and 1999).


Figure 1: Effective Number of Parties in Legislative Elections



Date: Year of Election


Sources: data elaborated by the authors from official electoral results available at www.cne.pt, for Portugal; and www.ypes.gr and www.parties-and-elections.de/greece2.html, for Greece.

Figure 2: Vote Percentage of the Two Major Parties



Sources: see Figure 1

Figure 3: Effective Number of Parties in Legislative and EP Elections



Date: Year of Election

Sources: see Figure 1

Table 1: Portuguese and Greek Political Parties' Average Vote Percentages by Decade in Legislative and European Parliament Elections

Political Parties	Type of Elections	1980's ⁽¹⁾	1990's ⁽¹⁾	2000's ⁽¹⁾	1980's-2004 ⁽¹⁾
PORTUGAL					
PS+PSD (Large)	Legislative EP	61.1 60.1	77.9 71.7	78.0 70,5	72,3 67,4
PRD (Medium)	Legislative EP	11.5 4.4	0.6 0.2	- -	6,0 2.3
PCP+CDS (Medium)	Legislative EP	26.5 27.7	16.1 21.1	15.6 15,9	19,4 21,6
Others (Small)	Legislative EP	4.1 6.6	3.6 4.0	4.3 9,2	4,0 6,6
GREECE					
ND +PASOK (Large)	Legislative EP	85.3 75.8	82.9 69.6	86.2 77.1	84.8 74.2
Coalition ⁽²⁾ (Medium)	Legislative EP	11.5 14.3			11.5 14.3
KKE +SYN ⁽³⁾ (Med/Small)	Legislative EP	11.9 16.6	9.1 13.2	8.9 13.6	9.9 14.5
Others (Small)	Legislative EP	2.7 8.4	8.2 17.2 ⁽⁴⁾	4.9 9.3	5.3 11.6

Sources: data elaborated from official electoral results available at www.cne.pt, for Portugal; and www.ypes.gr and www.parties-and-elections.de/greece2.html, for Greece.

Notes:

- (1) Political parties' vote percentages are averages for each decade (1980, 1990, and 2000) or for the entire period (1980-2004). Only for Greece, the averages of the 80's include the legislative election of 15th April 1990 because the structure of the party system was identical with the one of the legislative elections of 1989.
- (2) Coalition: Coalition of the Left and Progress. This coalition ran for office in the legislative elections of 18th June 1989 (named as 1989a), at the concurrent European Elections, and then at the legislative elections of 5th November 1989 (named as 1989b), as well as at the legislative elections of 15th April 1990.
- (3) For the decade of 80s the average calculations include the Communist Party of Greece (KKE) and the Euro-communist KKE-Esoterikou ("of the Interior").
- (4) EP 1994 – Political Spring (Politiki Anixi) 8,65%, Democratic Revival (Demokratiki Ananeosi) 2,80%. EP 1999 – Democratic Social Movement (Demokratiko Kinoniko Kinema) 6,85%, Political Spring (Politiki Anixi) 2,28%.

Table 2a: Ideology, cleavages and the vote in Portuguese EP and Legislative elections, 1987-1994 – OLS regressions

Independent variables	Dependent variable: past vote ordered in a left-right scale			
	Legislative 1987	EP 1989	Legislative 1991	EP 1994
Self placement on a left right scale	0.705***	0.683***	0.626***	0.586***
Education	-0.013	-0.019	0.080**	0.072
Household Income	0.045	0.117**	0.028	0.100*
Union membership	0.054	-0.045	0.061	0.091*
Church attendance	0.112***	0.111**	0.077**	0.097*
Occupation	n.u.	n.a.	n.u.	n.u.
Adjusted R ²	0.552	0.504	0.423	0.381
N	1000	1000	1000	1000
Valid N	324	276	420	272

Sources: European and Legislative elections, 1987 to 1994: data elaborated from Euro-barometers 31.1 (1989) and 41.1 (1994), ICPSR study numbers 9360 and 6535.

Notes:

- 1) * $p < 0,1$; ** $p < 0,05$; *** $p < 0,01$.
- 2) Standardized regression coefficients (Betas) are presented.
- 3) N.u. = not used.
- 4) Self-placement on a left right scale: 0 – left; 10 – right
- 5) Age Finished School ordered from lowest to highest.
- 6) Household Income (Quartiles): 1 – Poorest; 4 - Richest.
- 7) Union membership: 1 – yes; 2 – No.
- 8) Church attendance: ordered from lowest (“never”) to highest (“more than weekly”).
- 9) Occupation: 1 – manual workers; 2 – routine non-manual workers; 3 – professionals.
- 10) Party vote was ordered in a scale from left (minimum value) to right (maximum value). Due to spatial limitations political parties’ ordering cannot be presented here. However, the authors can furnish that information upon request.

Table 2b: Ideology, cleavages and the vote in Portuguese EP and Legislative elections, 1999-2004 – OLS regressions

Independent variables	Dependent variable: past vote ordered in a left-right scale (Except Legislative 1999 and 2004: voting intention)				
	EP 1999	Legislative 1999	Legislative 2002	EP 2004	Legislative 2004
Self placement on a left right scale	0.610***	0.430***	0.617***	0.478***	0.505***
Education	-0.064	-0.064	0.038	-0.044	-0.013
Household Income	n.u.	0.063	n.u.	n.u.	n.u.
Union membership	0.029	-0.084	0.084**	0.021	0.033
Church attendance	0.007	0.127**	0.068**	-0.179***	-0.080*
Occupation	-0.038	0.105**	0.030	0.010	-0.004
Adjusted R ²	0.354	0.243	0.419	0.325	0.292
N	500	1000	1303	1000	1000
Valid N	169	303	538	368	478

Sources: European Elections 1999 – *European Election Study (EES) 1999*; Legislative Elections 1999 – *European Value Study (EVS) 1999/2000, The Third Wave* (Portuguese field work: October-December 1999); Legislative elections, 2002: data elaborated from the *Post Electoral Survey – Portuguese NES Survey*, in Freire, et al, 2003; European Elections 2004 – *European Election Study 2004*.

Notes:

- 1) * p < 0,1; ** p < 0,05; *** p < 0,01.
- 2) Standardized regression coefficients (Betas) are presented.
- 3) N.u. = not used.
- 4) Self-placement on a left right scale: 0 – left; 10 – right
- 5) Education. For EVS 1999 and Portuguese NES Survey 2002: highest level of education attained ordered from lowest to highest. EES 1999 and 2004: Age when stopped full-time education, in ascending order.
- 6) Household Income ordered from lowest to highest.
- 7) Union membership: 1 – yes; 2 – No.
- 8) Church attendance: ordered from lowest values (1: “never”) to highest (“weekly” or “more than weekly”).
- 9) Occupation: 1 – manual workers; 2 – routine non-manual workers; 3 – professionals. For EVS 1999: 1 – manual workers; 2 – routine non-manual workers; 3 – professionals; 4 & 5 – petty bourgeoisie; 6 – employers. For EES 1999 and 2004, subjective social class: 1 - working class; 5 – upper class. For EES 1999 and 2004: subjective social class.
- 10) Party vote was ordered in a scale from left (minimum value) to right (maximum value). Due to spatial limitations political parties’ ordering cannot be presented here. However, the authors can furnish that information upon request.

Table 3a: Ideology, cleavages and the vote in Greek EP and Legislative elections, 1985-1989 – OLS regressions

Independent variables	Dependent variable: past vote ordered in a left-right scale			
	Legislative 1985	Legislative 1989a	EP 1989	Legislative 1989b
Self placement on a left right scale	0,597***	0,589***	0,765***	0,648***
Education	0,065**	0,012	-0,073***	0,038
Household Income	n.u.	n.u.	n.u.	n.u.
Union membership	-0,103***	-0,124***	-0,058**	-0,110***
Church attendance	0,117***	0,096***	0,054**	0,078**
Occupation	0,031	0,013	0,119***	-0,013
Adjusted R ²	0,462	0,472	0,682	0,519
N	1998	1996	1000	1200
Valid N	671	501	573	379

Sources: the European Elections of 1981 and 1984 are not included because of lack of data (the dependent variable of past vote is not available at the Eurobarometer data set). For the European elections of 1989 and 1994: data elaborated from Eurobarometers 31.1 (1989) and 41.1 (1994). For the Legislative elections of 1985, 1989a, 1989b, 1990 data were available by Professor Ilias Nicolakopoulos, with the permission of the National Center of Social Research (NCSR). The survey of 1985 is on *Political Culture of the Mediterranean countries (Greece, Portugal, Spain and Italy) in comparison*. The Greek survey was conducted from 6th to 28th May 1985 by NCSR. The surveys of 1989a, 1989b, and 1990 are pre-elections surveys conducted also by NCSR. The survey of 1993 was conducted by *Media Plan S.A.* and is available from Professor Ilias Nicolakopoulos. The authors constructed the tables in collaboration with Dimitrios Kokoromytis, Political Scientist- Research Associate at the *Constantine Karamanlis Institute of Democracy* and Dimitrios Vatikiotis, Analyst-*Opinion S.A.*

Notes: See table 3b.

Table 3b: Ideology, cleavages and the vote in Greek EP and Legislative elections, 1990-1994 – OLS regressions

Independent variables	Dependent variable: past vote ordered in a left-right scale		
	Legislative 1990	Legislative 1993	EP 1994
Self placement on a left right scale	0,547***	0,379***	0,773***
Education	-0,052	-0,079**	0,005
Household Income	n.u	n.u	n.u
Union membership	-0,100**	-0,109***	0,010
Church attendance	0,089**	0,193***	0,015
Occupation	-0,023	0,038	0,080***
Adjusted R ²	0,405	0,233	0,612
N	1200	2009	1002
Valid N	405	639	615

Sources: see Table 3a.

Notes:

- 1) * p < 0,1; ** p < 0,05; *** p < 0,01.
- 2) Standardized regression coefficients (Betas) are presented.
- 3) N.u. = not used /N.a=not available
- 4) Self-placement on a left right scale: 0 – left; 10 – right
- 5) Age Finished School ordered from lowest to highest. For the surveys of the legislative elections 1985,1989a, 1989b, 1990 and 1993 the education is measured from the lowest to highest. For the Euro-barometers the age when stopped full-time education, in ascending order.
- 6) Household Income: not used
- 7) Union membership is measured according to the indicator of evaluation of the Union of Greek Industrialists (SEV/ΣΕΒ) και Greek Confederation of Workers (GSEE/ΓΣΕΕ) based on a 10-point scale where 1 means “not at all sympathetic” and 10 means “very sympathetic”. For the legislative elections of 1985, 1989a, 1989b, 1990 and 1993: evaluation on SEV and all the trade unions.
- 8) Church attendance: ordered from lowest (“never”) to highest (“every Sunday” or /more than weekly”).
- 9) Occupation: Three-Class Scale: 1 – Working Class (routine & manual occupation); 2 – Intermediate (non- routine manual workers- Intermediate); 3 –: Managerial & Professional.
- 10) Party vote was ordered in a scale from left (minimum value) to right (maximum value). Due to spatial limitations political parties’ ordering cannot be presented here. However, the authors can furnish that information upon request.

Table 3c: Ideology, cleavages and the vote in Greek EP and Legislative elections, 1996-2004 – OLS regressions

Independent variables	Dependent variable: past vote ordered in a left-right scale				
	Legislative 1996	EP 1999	Legislative 2000	Legislative 2004	EP 2004
Self placement on a left right scale	0,668***	0,638***	0,800***	0,591***	0,536***
Education	0,186***	0,062	0,230	0,060	0,008
Household Income	n.u	n.u	n.u	n.u	n.u
Union membership	-0,099**	-0,121***	n.a	-0,006	-0,112***
Church attendance	0,047	0,050	0,087**	0,040	0,044
Occupation	-0,098**	0,047	-0,004	-0,009	0,177***
Adjusted R ²	0,517	0,453	0,671	0,352	0,345
N	1196	500	2000	2000	500
Valid N	282	337	1470	753	378

Sources: The data of the legislative elections of 1996 are from the Comparative National Elections Project (CNEP) with the permission of the National Center of Social Research (NCSR), which conducted the Greek survey. The data of the legislative elections of 2000 and of 2004 are taken from pre-electoral surveys of MRB and OPINION organizations respectively, available from Professor Ilias Nicolakopoulos. European Elections 1999– *European Election Study (EES 1999)* and European Elections 2004 – *European Election Study 2004 (EES 2004)*.

Notes:

- 1) * $p < 0,1$; ** $p < 0,05$; *** $p < 0,01$.
- 2) Standardized regression coefficients (Betas) are presented.
- 3) N.u. = not used /N.a. =not available
- 4) Self-placement on a left right scale: 0 – left; 10 – right
- 5) Age Finished School ordered from lowest to highest. For the surveys of the legislative elections the education is measured from the lowest to highest. For EES 1999 and 2004: Age when stopped full-time education, in ascending order.
- 6) Household Income not available
- 7) For EES 1999 and 2004: Union membership: 1 – yes; 2 – No. For the legislative elections the variable of union membership is measured according to the indicator of evaluation of the Union of Greek Industrialists (SEV/ΣΕΒ) και Greek Confederation of Workers (GSEE/ΓΣΕΕ) based on a 10-point scale where 1 means “not at all sympathetic” and 10 means “very sympathetic”.
- 8) Church attendance: ordered from lowest (“never”) to highest (“every Sunday” or /more than weekly”).
- 9) Occupation: Three-Class Scale: 1 – Working Class (routine & manual occupation); 2 – Intermediate (non- routine manual workers- Intermediate); 3 –: Managerial & Professional. (See sources as above). For EES 1999 and 2004, subjective social class: 1 - working class; 5 – upper class.
- 10) Party vote was ordered in a scale from left (minimum value) to right (maximum value). Due to spatial limitations political parties’ ordering cannot be presented here. However, the authors can furnish that information upon request.

Table 4: European Elections and Electoral Cycles in Portugal, 1987-2004, and Greece, 1981-2004: change in national government vote support in EP elections

Date of the European Election	Change in vote percentages of the party(ies) controlling national government: EP elections compared with the prior (or concurrent) legislative election		
	Honeymoon: 0-12 months after legislative election	Midterm: 13-36 months after legislative election	Later term: 37-48 months after legislative election
	PORTUGAL		
1987*	-12.8		
1989		-17.5	
1994		-16.2	
1999			-0.6
2004		-14.3	
	GREECE		
1981*	-4.53%		
1984		-6.48%	
1989*	-3.17%		
1994	-9.23%		
1999		-8.6%	
2004	-2.35%		

* Concurrent national election

Sources: in terms of electoral returns, the data was elaborated by the authors from official electoral results available at www.cne.pt, for Portugal, and www.ypes.gr, for Greece.