

What Are (Semi-)Presidential Elections About? The 2006 Presidential Elections in Portugal*

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Abstract

Drawing on an increasingly large body of knowledge on “less important elections”, and particularly on their interconnections with elections used to select the executive, this article focuses on what remains a mostly neglected aspect of semipresidential regimes: the dynamics and patterns of voting behaviour in presidential elections. Using data derived from a panel survey conducted in two-waves, following the 2005 legislative and 2006 presidential elections in Portugal, it provides an empirical evaluation of four alternative theoretical approaches to voters’ choices and shifts from legislative to legislative to presidential elections. It shows that, albeit “candidate effects” are predictably important, this is not enough to undercut the crucial role played by the party and ideological cues that result from the process of candidate selection and endorsement, and suggests that the dynamics of voter defection from government parties share important similarities with those found in other “less important elections”. It concludes by suggesting how institutional and political differences may affect the extent to which similar findings are likely to be obtained in other semipresidential regimes.

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Semipresidentialism, a political regime type where “a popularly-elected, fixed-term president exists alongside a prime minister and cabinet who are responsible to parliament” (Elgie, 1999: 13), has become an increasingly popular institutional choice in the last few decades. It has been adopted in many of the new “third wave” democracies, most notably in former Eastern Bloc (Baylis, 1996; Elgie, 2005), and has become, in fact, “the most prevalent system of government in Europe” (Amorim Neto and Strøm, 2006: 623). We know today much more about semipresidentialism than we did when Maurice Duverger first introduced the concept to an English-speaking audience in his seminal article (Duverger, 1980). Several scholars have debated and refined the very definition of this regime type (Shugart and Carey, 1992; Elgie, 1998; Roper, 2002; Siaroff, 2003), while others have discussed its implications for democratic stability and performance, particularly in what concerns the likelihood of high-level institutional conflict over power and policy between presidents and prime ministers or its consequences for the partisan composition of cabinets (Shugart and Carey, 1992; Linz, 1992; Protsyk, 2005; Skach, 2005; Schleiter and Morgan-Jones, 2005; Neto and Strøm, 2006).

Interestingly, however, one particular issue about semipresidentialism has seldom been explored, and it concerns the very nature of one of its defining elements: the popular election of the head of state. The relative silence in the literature about the nature of elections is employed to elect presidents in semipresidential democracies is unfortunate. On the one hand, it has left those elections at the margins of an increasingly large body of knowledge about the interconnections between elections that serve to determine the composition of the executive and those used for other bodies or levels of government, such as legislative elections in presidential regimes (Shugart, 1995), European Parliament

elections (see, among many, Reif and Schmitt, 1980; Marsh, 1998; and Ferrara and Weishaupt, 2004) or even local or state elections (Anderson and Ward, 1996; McLean, et al., 1996; Jeffery and Hough, 2001; Freire, 2004). On the other hand, it has meant that the whole debate about the very nature and consequences of semipresidentialism has been insufficiently informed by the study of presidential elections in this type of regimes. More specifically, the question of whether the concept of “semipresidentialism” designates an internally homogeneous or heterogeneous set of political systems could certainly benefit from examination of the patterns of voter behaviour in presidential elections in different countries, while the study of trends and causes of government’s parties losses and gains in those elections would obviously illuminate discussions about the political consequences of semipresidentialism, particularly in what concerns the likelihood of partisan compatibility or cohabitation between presidents and prime-ministers and the effects of this particular regime type on the horizontal and vertical accountability of governments (Shugart and Carey, 1992; Elgie, 2001)

This article consists on a case study of a particular presidential election in a particular semipresidential regime, the Portuguese 2006 elections. Thus, its ability to answer broad questions about presidential elections in semipresidentialism must certainly not be overstated. However, one particular feature makes it potentially interesting in terms of both hypothesis-testing and hypothesis-generating in this respect: the fact that it is based on a unique two-wave panel survey conducted following the 2005 legislative and 2006 presidential elections in Portugal.¹ This allows us not only to test general hypotheses about individual voting behaviour in the election of the Portuguese head of state, but also to properly test more specific hypotheses about changes and

interconnections between elections that serve to determine the partisan composition of the executive (legislative elections) and presidential elections.

In the next section of this article, we will start by presenting four theoretical approaches that have been often advanced in the study of “less important elections” (Marsh, 2003) and have, in some cases, been empirically tested or at least speculatively applied to the study of presidential elections in semipresidential regimes: the “popularity contest” hypothesis; the “surge and decline” hypothesis; the “second-order” theory; and the “policy-balancing” hypothesis. In the third section, we will provide some basic information about the political and institutional context under which the 2006 presidential election took place. Finally, in the fourth and fifth sections, we will test hypotheses both about the factors that generally shaped vote choices in the 2006 election and the causes of defection to opposition candidates on the part of previous voters in the government party. We will conclude by discussing the nature of presidential elections in Portugal and the conditions under which we can expect similar or different patterns to emerge in other semipresidential regimes.

Approaches to (semi-)presidential elections

The popularity contest

The simplest way to think about what drives voters in presidential elections in semipresidential regimes is to conceive them as being a *popularity contest*, where voting choices are primarily determined by voters’ evaluations of the qualities and attributes of candidates. There are several reasons why this is, *prima facie*, a promising way of

thinking not only about presidential elections in Portugal but also about presidential elections of semipresidential regimes, or at least a particularly representative set of them.

First, the impact of “leader” or “candidate” evaluations is stronger in presidential than in legislative elections (McAllister, 1996) and, even more generally, in all elections using majoritarian rules (Norris, 2004). Furthermore, research on electoral behaviour in Portugal has revealed that, even in legislative elections – and contingent upon particular political contexts and parties – affect towards party leaders has had a comparatively high impact on vote choices (Gunther and Montero, 2001; Lobo, 2004; Lobo, 2006). The phenomenon has been explained on the basis of the relatively shallow socio-structural anchorage of the vote, caused by the historically late creation of the Portuguese democratic party system, the parties’ orientation towards building electoral support within the state apparatus (rather than through the extra-parliamentary institutionalization of true mass-based parties) and by the particular legacies of the 1974-1976 revolutionary period, which super-imposed on the traditional left-right cleavage a more fundamental one around the option for liberal democracy (Biezen, 1998; Gunther and Montero, 2001; Jalali, 2003).

However, one of the most important reasons why we could expect presidential elections in Portugal and other semipresidential regimes to be a “popularity contest” in the sense we have described is related to the particular sub-type of executive-legislative institutions that exist in the country. The particular brand of Portuguese semi-presidentialism is a “premier-presidential” one (Shugart and Carey, 1992), i.e., a system where the cabinet is accountable *exclusively* before parliament. Although prime ministers are appointed by presidents, the fact that the former are responsible only to parliament “is

a feature that restricts the president's real choice of prime-ministerial candidate to someone he expects to be able to command parliamentary support" (Shugart, 2005). This means, therefore, that *presidential elections lack direct consequences for the control of the executive*. This stands in stark contrast with two other situations. The first is the one in which, although cabinets may be institutionally unaccountable before presidents, the latter are the *de facto* heads of the parliamentary majority, a circumstance that has turned the "premier-presidential" French case, on several occasions, rather more "presidential" in political practice (Shugart, 2005). Another is, of course, the "president-parliamentary" mode of semipresidential government, where the direct accountability of the executive both before parliament *and* the president brings this form much closer to presidentialism in political practice, as it happened, in fact, in the Portuguese case before the 1982 constitutional amendments that put an end to the direct accountability of the cabinet before president (Shugart and Carey, 1992).

A plausible implication of the fact that presidential elections in Portugal lack direct consequences for the composition of the executive is that, unlike what occurs in legislative elections, cues such as party identification, ideology or perceived economic or government performance may tend to become inconsequential. Instead, since executive power is not at stake, the outcome of presidential elections is likely to be determined by voters to whom the concerns that are typically present in general elections are rendered irrelevant by the very irrelevance of the presidential office, and where voting decisions are made simply on the basis of voters' evaluation of the personal qualities of candidates. This is, in fact, what the existing research has already found for presidential elections in a

semipresidential system such as Ireland (Brug, et al., 2000), where, as in Portugal, the election of the president has no direct bearing on executive authority.

Second-order elections

The assumption that elections other than those that serve to determine the composition of the executive are less important and salient for voters is shared by other potentially applicable theoretical approaches. However, they end up reaching very different conclusions about what drives voters' choices, the interconnections between elections for different bodies and levels of government, and their substantive electoral consequences. One of those approaches is the "*second-order elections*" theory. Contrary to "popularity contest" account, it suggests that elections where less substantive power is at stake – second-order elections – might precisely lead to a situation where voters can rely on little else but the conventional cues and concerns typical of first-order elections.

Developed in order to explain patterns of government parties' losses in European Parliament elections, the second-order approach focuses on ideology and evaluations of government performance as the crucial cues used by voters, and makes specific predictions about how voters should behave in first- and second-order elections. On the one hand, because second-order elections do not affect who governs, some voters are likely to use them in order to send a costless signal about their level of (dis)satisfaction with government performance, by voting for the opposition (or by simply abstaining – Marsh, 1998). On the other hand, again because less actual power is at stake, voters who had voted strategically in one of the larger parties in first-order elections become, in second-order ones, more likely to opt for parties or candidates that are closer to their

preferences. As a consequence of these two mechanisms – expressive and sincere voting – losses for larger parties are likely to ensue, particularly for government parties and when second-order elections take place at points in the electoral cycle unfavourable for the government (Reif and Schmitt, 1980).

There are good reasons why we should examine whether voting behaviour in presidential elections in at least some semi-presidential systems conforms to the expectations of the second-order model. It is true that France, again, emerges as an exception in this respect among premier-presidential systems: in the French case, presidential elections should perhaps be best conceived as first- rather than second-order elections, considering that, under circumstances of partisan compatibility of president and parliamentary majority, the President becomes the *de facto* head of the executive (Reif, 1985). However, the same cannot be said about many other premier-presidential systems, where “elections to choose a non-executive head of state” should probably be conceived as second-order elections (Eijk, et al., 1996; Marsh, 2000). It is also true that others have argued that, in spite of this, the “personalization” of presidential elections in semi-presidential systems and the fact that they are fought under a run-off majority system (forcing parties to coalesce and preserving incentives for strategic voting) advises their exclusion from the “second-order” category (Freire, 2004). However, is that “personalization” so high as to render ideological or other cues irrelevant? Do the pressures towards strategic voting induced by the electoral system neutralize the incentives towards sincere voting inherent to the lower importance of presidential elections? This is, clearly, a matter for empirical investigation.

Surge and decline

An additional approach that might be potentially relevant for the study of presidential elections in Portugal and other semi-presidential systems is directly derived from the study of elections in the United States. The “*surge and decline*” theory, which has emerged in the context of the study of American congressional midterm elections (Campbell, 1960), shares some commonalities with the second-order approach. It too is based on the notions that some elections are less important and salient than others, that the cues and predispositions of voters relevant for important elections are also relevant for less important ones, and that incumbents are likely to experience losses in less important elections. However, unlike the second-order theory, it focuses on party identification as crucial predisposition/cue for vote choices.

From a “surge and decline” point of view, “low stimulus” elections represent a return to “normalcy” in terms of how different groups of voters, defined in terms of their party identification, tend to behave, a “normalcy” that inevitably leads to losses for executive incumbents. These losses ensue because, in high stimulus elections – such as those that contribute to determine the partisan control of the executive – low interest voters, independents, and partisans of the “losing” side tend to be mobilized to vote by the importance of what is at stake and to be swayed by the short-term contexts that favour the winners. However, in subsequent low stimulus elections, the “surge” that led the incumbent to power is likely to be followed by a “decline”, as voters who have lower levels of political engagement return to abstention and opposition partisans return “home” to their parties and candidates.

There are also good reasons to take this approach seriously as a depiction of the interconnections between legislative and presidential elections in some semipresidential systems. As several studies testing the “surge and decline” hypotheses in the European context seem to suggest (Anderson and Ward, 1996; Marsh, 2003), the “surge and decline” theory may travel much better from the United States to Europe than one might be at first inclined to think. Although party identification has been commonly seen as a mere proxy for actual voting behaviour in the European context (Butler and Stokes, 1969; Budge, Crewe, and Farlie, 1976), the decline of party identification in Western democracies in the last decades and the factors found to influence it, together with the fact that the impact of party identification on the vote seems to vary across countries according to predictable institutional factors (Dalton, 2000; Norris, 2004), is scarcely compatible with the notion that party identification, as measured in surveys, is nothing else but a mere proxy for the vote. Thus, the notion that party identification can “be usefully applied in most democratic systems” (Dalton, 2000: 20), particularly those where party systems that are not clearly anchored in social structures – such as Ireland (Marsh, 2006) but also, as we have seen, in Portugal – has regained credibility in comparative electoral research.

Besides, there are little reasons to believe this to be less true when we consider elections not run on a strictly partisan basis. In referendums, for example, regardless of attitudes towards the issue at hand or the incentives to use the vote to signal a particular judgment about government performance, the endorsement of a particular by parties might very well be the most visible cue at hand for voters, allowing parties to have a decisive impact on the vote of those who identify with them (Bowler and Donovan, 2000;

Hobolt, 2006). On the other hand, not all presidential elections in semipresidential systems are necessarily similar to the Irish case in what concerns the lack of informational shortcuts allowing voters to connect presidential races with party politics (Brug, et al., 2000). In Portugal, for example, parties have explicitly endorsed presidential candidates, who were very often been major political figures, such as former prime ministers (Mário Soares in 1986, 1991 and 2006 and Cavaco Silva in 1996 and 2006) or party leaders (Freitas do Amaral in 1986, Jorge Sampaio in 1996 and 2001, and both Jerónimo de Sousa and Francisco Louçã in 2006). Thus, the notion that party identification may matter in both legislative and presidential elections, which underlies any application of the surge and decline theory to the study of the interconnections between them in semipresidential systems, is certainly deserving of attention.

Policy balancing

The fourth and last theoretical approach that is potentially applicable to our case is one in which different types of elections are also conceived as being inextricably linked, like in the second-order and surge and decline approaches. However, from this point of view, what connects those elections is not only the reliance of voters on similar cues, but also the fact that, because (at least some) voters are ideologically moderate and see presidential elections as not entirely irrelevant for policy outcomes, they tend to act purposefully to promote certain combinations of partisan control of the executive and other branches of government. “Policy balancing” theory has been applied to explain midterm losses (or split-ticket voting) in American midterm elections (Alesina and Rosenthal, 1989; Fiorina, 1992; Carsey and Leyman, 2004) or vote shifts from

government to opposition parties in European Parliament elections (Carruba and Timpone, 2005). The main hypothesis that derives from it is that ideologically moderate voters are likely to be interested in placing veto-points to the executive in order to promote moderate policies, even if they themselves contributed to the formation of the executive majority in the first place.

For a Portuguese audience, the “policy balancing” approach will sound quite familiar: it corresponds, after all, to one of the “folk theories” about presidential elections that has often circulated in the Portuguese media and political discourse, i.e., the notion that “the Portuguese don’t like to put all the eggs in the same basket” when legislative and presidential elections are concerned. This theory is especially plausible because although presidential elections in premier-presidential systems have no direct bearing on executive authority, this does not mean that voters should see them as entirely devoid of policy and political consequences. Portuguese presidents for example, enjoy the ability to veto legislation emanating from parliament and government decrees, as well as to refer legislation for both *a priori* and *a posteriori* review by the constitutional court. Although the direct impact of these powers on policy outcomes may be relatively limited – considering the possibility of veto override by parliamentary majorities and the uncertainty attached to judicial rulings (Magalhães, 2003) – they can nevertheless impose important political costs on cabinets. Such costs include, for example, the increased public visibility brought to bear on a law that has been vetoed or referred for judicial review, or need the to ensure that no defections or absences occur in parliament in order to obtain the absolute majority of all elected MP’s that is necessary to override vetoes (Shugart, 2005). Extant research suggests that Portuguese presidents have used the

political leverage that derives from this either in order to obtain concessions from governments in policy-making or to engage in “wars of attrition” with parliamentary majorities (Frain, 1995; Araújo, 2003), conditioning, in any case, the ability of majorities to pass their preferred policies at will. Furthermore, Portuguese presidents enjoy the power to dissolve parliament, constrained only by time limits, and have it used no less than four times since 1982, leading in all cases to new elections that significantly changed the political status-quo.² Regardless of whether such power is regularly used or not, its mere existence forces, again, parliamentary majorities to take preferences of the president and his constituency into consideration. Voters are likely to be aware, therefore, that the existence of situations of compatibility or cohabitation in terms of the partisan compositions of the executive and the presidency are not irrelevant for policy outcomes in Portugal.

Table 1 summarizes the main features of these four different approaches and the predictions that derive from them when applied to the context of presidential elections in semipresidential systems. Both the second-order and the surge and decline theories suggest that, in elections other than those that serve to determine the composition of the executive, voters remain likely to rely on the sort of cues they typically resort to in elections that determine who governs. However, while the former stresses the role of ideological positions and perceptions of government performance, the latter focuses on party endorsements and attachments. In contrast, the popularity contest approach suggests that evaluations of the attributes and personal qualities of candidates will be paramount in determining vote choices.

Table 1 about here

When applied to presidential elections in semi-presidential regimes such as the Portuguese, three of the four approaches suggest a similar particular pattern of change from legislative to presidential elections – losses for the government, i.e., for the government-endorsed candidates –, but also three rather different mechanisms through which such losses might take place. “Second-order theory” suggests that defections within government ranks are likely to take place both among government supporters who are temporarily dissatisfied (who are more likely to vote for opposition candidates or simply not to vote) and among voters who had strategically voted for the government party (who are more likely to vote, this time around, for candidates closer to their sincere preferences). “Surge and decline” explains losses in a different way: while low interest voters who had previously supported the current incumbent are more likely to abstain, only partisans of the current incumbent will tend to remain faithful to government-endorsed candidates. Finally, “policy balancing” sees government losses as the result of purposeful defection on the part of previous government voters to opposition candidates in order to promote moderate policies, and predicts those defectors will be found among those who are more ideologically moderate.

The 2006 elections and their political context

The 2006 elections were fought by five candidates. Cavaco Silva, former prime minister, was supported by two opposition parties, the centre-right Social Democratic

Party (PSD) and the rightist Social Democratic Centre-Popular Party (CDS-PP). Although he delayed the official announcement of his bid for the presidency until October 2005, a mere two months before the election, his candidacy had for long been seen as an almost certainty. Having been defeated in a previous presidential bid in 1996, he initiated a return to the public sphere in 2003, with the publication of a memoir of his days as PSD's party leader and prime minister between 1985 and 1995, followed by a series of carefully managed public pronouncements and newspaper articles that were the object of increasing public attention. In the meantime, in spite of some speculation and name-throwing, both the PSD and the CDS-PP mainly neglected to search for an alternative candidate, and Cavaco Silva's bid for the presidency became increasingly seen as inevitable, particularly as several opinion polls conducted since 2003 revealed that he was the best potential candidate positioned to end the previous dominance of the office by candidates endorsed by leftist parties (namely, Mário Soares and Jorge Sampaio, both former leaders of the Socialist Party - PS).

In the meantime, for the PS, the presidential elections could be an opportunity to rebound from recent electoral mishaps. The Socialists had triumphed in the March 2005 legislative elections, obtaining 46.4 percent of the valid votes and forming, for the first time in the history of this centre-left party, a single-party cabinet supported by an absolute majority in parliament. However, the local elections held in late October 2005 suggested signs of trouble very early in the electoral cycle, as the party failed to conquer the mayor's office in any of the five major cities in the country and obtained a national score no different from that of 2001, which had been already so low that it had prompted the resignation of the Socialist Prime Minister António Guterres. However, no credible

candidates seemed to emerge. The first candidate the PS seemed to flirt with was, precisely, Guterres, but his public image had been severely tarnished by his last years in office, perceived to be responsible for the large budget deficit found by the end of 2002 that violated the European stability and growth pact and remains, at the time of this writing, at the forefront of the Portuguese political agenda. The Socialists then seemed to consider other possibilities, including Manuel Alegre, who had been not only one of the party founders but also the main challenger of prime minister José Sócrates' bid for the party's leadership in 2004, and was generally perceived as representing the more leftist and laicist factions of the PS. However, as the endorsement of Alegre by the PS appeared increasingly plausible, the party's leadership decided, in an unexpected turn of events, to endorse former president and prime minister Mário Soares, who announced his candidacy in August 2005. After some hesitation, Alegre refused to step down, and confirmed by late September that he would also present himself as an independent candidate. Finally, three other candidates emerged: Jerónimo de Sousa and Francisco Louçã, leaders, respectively, of the Communist Party (PCP) and the Leftist Bloc (BE), two leftist parties which have been partially competing for the same electorate in legislative elections; and Garcia Pereira, a well-known lawyer and eternal presidential candidate of the PCTP-MRPP, a fringe party in the extreme-left.

The campaign was marked by two revelations about mass opinions early on during the months of September and October. The first was that, in all opinion polls conducted since all candidacies were confirmed, Cavaco Silva emerged with a very comfortable advantage over all remaining candidates and with the clear possibility to win at the first round. The second and more shocking revelation was that ever since Alegre

and Soares were both included in the menu provided to respondents in opinion polls, the former obtained more voting intentions than the latter, indicating a severe split within the potential electorate of the official candidate endorsed by the PS. These revelations changed the dynamics of the campaign and represented a shock from which Soares's campaign never fully recovered. His candidacy, in an effort to capitalize on his previous presidency between 1986 and 1996, had been initially presented as "national" and "supra-partisan". However, this unexpected third place in the polls forced Soares to ponder a more aggressive strategy vis-à-vis Cavaco Silva than previously anticipated, as well as to reconsider the notion that all remaining candidates to the left of Cavaco could be generally ignored throughout the campaign. In the end, only in the December polls did Mário Soares's voting intentions surpassed those in Manuel Alegre, but early January witnessed a new inversion of that trend. As the date of the election — January 22nd — approached, polls revealed a last minute trend, i.e, the decisive rise of Alegre and the decline of both Soares and Cavaco Silva, with the latter moving to increasingly uncomfortable terrains in what concerned his ability to obtain more than 50 percent of the valid vote in the first round.

Table 2 about here

In the end, with a score, on average, two percentage points below that found in the very last voting intention polls, Cavaco Silva ultimately won the presidential elections in the first round. Table 2 provides the full results, comparing them with those of the 2005 legislative elections. First, while abstention increased by three percentage points, the results of the candidate endorsed by the Socialist Party were catastrophic: losses

represented more than 20 percentage points among the electorate as a whole and more than thirty percentage points in terms of the valid vote. Even the combined vote for the two candidates emanating from the Socialist area (21.2 of the electorate, 35.1 of valid votes) still fell quite short of the score obtained by the Socialist Party in 2005 (28.9 of the electorate, 46.4 of the valid votes). Conversely, while the smaller parties managed to convert their previous electoral support in legislative elections into support for their candidates with just minor losses, Cavaco clearly surpassed the electoral support enjoyed less than a year earlier by the two parties that, now, had endorsed his candidacy.

A popularity contest?

The first step in appraising the plausibility of the different approaches to (semi-) presidential elections we advanced so far is to test their different conceptions of what kind of factors are likely to determine vote choices: the evaluation of the personal qualities of candidates; ideology; evaluations of government performance; and partisanship. In February 2006, a post-electoral survey was conducted following the presidential elections, using a nationally representative sub-sample of a larger sample of voters who had been surveyed following the 2005 legislative elections. In order to test our generic hypotheses about what drove voting behaviour in presidential elections, we use a multinomial logistic regression of presidential vote choices in the 2006 elections as expressed in the vote recall question, with vote for Soares – the government-endorsed candidate – used as the reference category (1), vote for Alegre coded as 2, Cavaco Silva as 3, Francisco Louçã, Jerónimo de Sousa and Garcia Pereira aggregated in a single category (Others, 4), and abstention as 5.

Independent variables include *Gender* (Male, 1; Female, 2), *Age* (absolute value) and *Education* (12-point scale, from “None” to “Post-Graduate education”), employed as basic control variables. Social-structural variables, which aim at taking into account the extent to which the vote is anchored on relevant and historical social and political cleavages, include *Subjective social class* (5-point scale, from “Working class” to “Upper”), *Union membership* (No, 0; Yes, 1) and *Religiosity* (4-point scale, from “Not at all” to “Very”). An additional group of variables concern the long-term attitudinal predispositions towards particular vote choices, including left-right ideology and party identification (Miller and Niemi, 2002). Thus, we used *Attachment to PS*, a folded 7-point scale, ranging from “Very close” to one of the opposition parties (-3) to “Very close” to PS (3), with 0 for independents and missing values, as well as *Left-right self-placement*, ranging from 0 (Left) to 10 (Right) in response to the standard item.

Finally, “short-term” factors, including leader/candidate effects and issues (Miller and Niemi, 2002), are also considered. Evaluations of *Government performance* are measured in a five-point scale, ranging from 1 (“Very bad”) to 5 (Very good”) and DK/NA answers recoded as an intermediate category (3). Finally, *Soares’s personal qualities* consists in an index with values ranging from 0 to 1. The survey asked respondents to choose which presidential candidate they perceived to be the most “honest”, “able to defend responsible policies”, “strong”, “able to make decisions”, “able to strengthen the economy”, “able to fight unemployment”, “the most charismatic” and “most able to communicate with people”. We recoded all individual answers as 1 when Soares was selected and 0 when he was not, and simply calculated an average index, with 0 meaning that Soares was not chosen as the best candidate in any dimension and 1 that

he was chosen as the best candidate in all dimensions.³ Finally, we introduce *Interest in politics*, a four-point scale ranging from 1 (“Not interested/DK/NA”) to 4 (“Very interested”), as an explanation of abstention. Table 3 presents the results.

Table 3 about here

One of the most consistent results of this analysis is that those who voted for Soares differ from voters in all other candidates (and also from abstainers) in that their evaluation of the qualities of the Socialist-endorsed candidate was higher than that made by other members of the electorate, a phenomenon that resists the introduction of all other relevant controls. However, this is not enough to conclude that the 2006 Portuguese presidential elections were a mere “popularity contest”, or that partisan endorsements or candidates’ ideological statements were inconsequential as voting cues. First, ideology also seems to matter somewhat, at least in helping to distinguish voters in Soares from those that decided to vote for any of the candidates endorsed by the smaller leftist parties (voters which, predictably, were considerably more leftist than Soares’s). Second, although voters for the two candidates emanating from the Socialist area (Soares and Alegre) are indeed indistinguishable in terms of their level of partisan attachment to the Socialist Party, the same clearly does not occur in what concerns the other candidates who were endorsed by other parties.

Since logit coefficients are not easily interpretable, we can ascertain the substantive impact of the some of the main variables by calculating the predicted probabilities of voting for Soares across changing values of those independent variables, while the remaining ones are kept constant that their mean values.⁴ Table 4 shows how

the probability of voting for Soares, expressed in percent terms, changes as the values of evaluations of *Soares's personal qualities* also changes from a low to a high level, with “low” and “high” conceived as, respectively, one standard deviation below and above the mean sample values.⁵ As we can see, the probability of voting for Soares increased nine-fold for individuals with a high evaluation of Soares in comparison with those that made a low evaluation. Conversely, the table reveals that the majority of voters with low evaluations of Soares ended up voting in Cavaco Silva, way above his share of the electorate (31 percent in the electorate, 45.4 percent in the sample, due to underreporting of abstention in the survey).

Table 4 about here

Table 5 does the same kind of analysis for the impact of *attachment to the Socialist Party*. As we can see, its impact on the probability of voting for Soares is only slightly lower than that detected for the evaluation of his personal qualities, showing a seven-fold increase from low to high levels of attachment to the PS. Predictably, these effects are also strong and positive with what concerns the probability of voting for Alegre. Conversely, individuals with a low level of attachment to the Socialist Party were overwhelmingly more likely to vote for Cavaco Silva than to vote for any other candidate or to abstain.

Table 5 about here

Another way of highlighting how parties' endorsements and voters' party identification also had an important role to play in voting choices in the 2006 elections above and beyond "candidate effects" is through a visual representation. Figure 1 plots the predicted probability of voting for Soares against the evaluation of his personal qualities, while the attachment to the Socialist Party variable is set, respectively, at "low" and "high" levels, and the remaining variables are kept at their mean values.

Figure 1 about here

Figure 1 does support the notion that presidential elections were, to some extent, about the personal qualities of candidates as perceived by voters, by showing how the probability of voting for Soares sharply increased as individuals' evaluations of his personal qualities improves. However, it also shows that low levels of attachment to the Socialist party preserved the probability of voting for Soares at extremely low levels, even as the evaluation of his personal qualities is already way above the actual mean value of that index in the sample (.12). In other words, in the 2006 presidential elections, although voters in Soares were certainly different from others in terms of their negative or positive evaluations of the candidate, and although the official endorsement of Soares by the PS was not enough to significantly deflect Socialist partisans from a vote in Alegre, party identification was certainly important when it came to decide between voting either in the two Socialist-area candidates or in any of the remaining candidates. There was, in sum, much more to the 2006 elections than a mere popularity contest.

Defectors and government losses

One thing that clearly stands out from the available data is that defection from within the ranks of previous voters in the Socialist Party to those of presidential candidates not endorsed by the PS was the single most significant electoral shift that took place between the 2005 and 2006 elections. On the basis of our two-wave panel post-electoral survey, it is possible to estimate that about 17 percent of the entire Portuguese electorate (excluding the small contingent of new voters that registered between the 2005 and the 2006 elections) shifted from voting in the PS to voting in a candidate other than Soares, with abstention on the part of previous Socialist voters adding 6 percent more to the tally. From a different point of view, this means that less than one out of three of the previous PS voters ended up voting for Soares in 2006. These are mostly net losses, since the ability of Soares to attract previous abstainers or non-PS voters was almost non-existent.

Nor can it be said that all of the government's losses were absorbed by the other candidate of the Socialist area, Manuel Alegre. In fact, nearly half of PS voters in 2005 ended up shifting either to Cavaco Silva, to one of the candidates endorsed by the smaller left-wing parties, or to abstention in 2006. Nothing as dramatic took place with the electorates of the remaining parties or even with previous abstainers. For example, about four out of five previous abstainers or voters in either the PSD or the CDS in 2005 ended up, respectively, abstaining again or voting in Cavaco Silva in 2006. And although those who voted for the PCP and the BE electorates in 2005 were indeed more divided when it came to the 2006 elections — one out of four voted for Alegre — those defections were,

in both in absolute and relative terms, almost insignificant when compared with those experienced by the Socialists.

How did this happen? Once the notion that the 2006 elections were exclusively a popularity contest can be discarded, and once we realize how considerations and cues typically relevant in legislative elections were also relevant in presidential elections, three additional accounts about those elections remain credible. The first, the “second-order elections” account suggests that defection from the ranks of the PS arose mostly among both previous “strategic” voters that wished to signal their sincere preferences in less important elections and supporters of the incumbent party that were now willing to express their displeasure with the executive, either by abstaining or by voting in the opposition-endorsed candidates. The second account – “surge and decline” – is that the losses incurred by the Socialist Party resulted mainly from defections on the part of voters with lower levels of attachment to the PS (independents and opposition partisans) to opposition candidates, as well as from low interest voters to abstention. The third account – policy balancing – suggests that the losses experienced by the Socialist Party resulted mostly from the defection of moderate voters, interested in preventing the control of both the presidency and the executive by a single party and the lack of policy moderation likely to result from unified government.

Following the strategy adopted by Marsh (2003) in his study of European Parliament elections, we test these different hypotheses by focusing our analysis on those respondents that, in the first wave of the panel survey, recalled having voted for the winning party, the PS. The model of voting behaviour tested here is similar to that used in the previous section, including the role of party identification, interest in politics and

evaluations of government performance. We want to determine, first, the applicability of a “surge and decline” type of explanation: whether there was a systematic tendency towards defection from the PS to candidates other than Soares among those whose partisan attachments are further away from the PS, as well as a tendency towards defection to abstention among low interest voters. Second, regardless of the null result obtained when the full sample was used, the “second-order” account still raises the hypothesis that, among previous voters for the government party, the worse government performance was evaluated, the more likely were voters to defect. However, we include two additional independent variables in this “defection” model. The first is the perceived importance of presidential elections for the country, a four-point scale ranging from 1 (“Not at all important”) to 4 (“Very important”). If the “sincere voting” hypothesis advanced by the “second-order elections” account holds, we should observe that the less important the former PS voters perceived these presidential elections to be, the more likely they were to defect to candidates endorsed by other parties, particularly those candidates endorsed by the smaller parties in the left. Finally, we also include the distance between each respondent’s left-right self-placement along an 11-point left-right scale and her perception of the ideological mid-point between the PS and the PSD, the two larger centrist parties along the same 11-point scale. In other words, we expect that the closest former PS voters are to that perceived mid-point (i.e., the more ideologically moderate they are), the more likely they were to switch from a vote in the Socialist Party to a vote in the centre-right candidate (Cavaco Silva) in order to promote control of the executive and the presidency by different parties.

Table 6 presents the results of a multinomial logistic regression analysis where the option to vote for Soares – the reference category – to “defect” to any other candidate or to abstain is regressed on the independent variables described above. By focusing on this sub-sample, we sharply reduced the number of observations, making it therefore less likely to find statistically significant relationships, which led us to relax the threshold of statistical significance to $p < .10$. However, as we can see, this has not prevented the detection of several coefficients whose level of statistical significance goes well beyond that.

Table 6 about here

It is clear that the evaluation of Soares’ personal qualities continues to play a major role not only in the choices of the electorate as a whole – as we saw in the previous section – but also in the choices made by former PS voters. As we can see in table 7, if the evaluation of Soares’s qualities among former PS voters had been generally positive, he would have been able to retain the majority of the Socialist voters in his camp. However, we know that was not the case. The average evaluation of Soares on a scale of 0 to 1 within the group of former Socialist voters was .19, and almost half of them (46 percent) thought that Soares was not the best candidate in any of the eight different dimensions, a phenomenon that, as we can see, seems to have provided a major contribution to engrossing the ranks of voters for both Cavaco Silva and Manuel Alegre in the 2006 elections.

Table 7 about here

A second part of the story is told by the “second-order” account. As table 6 also shows, previous Socialist voters who defected to candidates endorsed by the smaller leftist parties are different from those who remained in the Socialist camp in three respects: their ideological self-placement (obviously, more leftist), the importance they awarded to the presidential elections, and their evaluation of government performance. The less important they felt presidential elections to be and the less satisfied with government performance they were, the more likely they were to abandon the Socialist ranks and vote in Jerónimo de Sousa, Francisco Louçã, or Garcia Pereira. In other words, another factor that contributed to Socialist losses in 2006 besides the (low) popularity of Soares was the fact that his candidacy suffered from defections among previous PS voters who used these elections to express their discontent with the government and to vote according to their sincere preferences. Such voters ended up choosing candidates supported by the smaller parties to the left of the PS, suggesting that a second-order pattern was also behind the losses experienced by the Socialists in 2006.

The third part of the story – and the one that has taken more voters away from the Socialist camp as a whole – is provided by the “surge and decline” approach. On the one hand, although partisanship did not help to distinguish those Socialist voters who chose to remain with Soares from those who defected to Alegre, previous Socialist voters with low levels of attachment to the Socialist Party were much more likely to vote both for Cavaco Silva and for the candidates endorsed by the smaller leftist parties, i.e., all candidates supported by parties other than the PS. When we consider that nearly half of previous

voters in the PS expressed that they were either “independents” or close to parties other than the Socialist, we can have a better grasp both of the “surge” that had benefited the Socialists in 2005 and of the “decline” that followed. On the other hand, there is also a tendency for low interest voters within the previous PS voters to simply demobilize rather than choose any other option, as the “surge and decline” approach suggested might be the case.

Table 8 about here

Finally, two null findings should also be mentioned. On the one hand, it seems dissatisfaction with government performance only played a very limited role. While some dissatisfied voters were led to defect to candidates endorsed by the small leftist parties, government performance was inconsequential in what concerned shifts towards Alegre, Cavaco Silva or even to abstention among previous Socialist voters. This, together with the general lack of impact of evaluations of government performance in voting decisions among the electorate in general that we previously detected, suggests that the 2006 presidential elections in Portugal have not worked as “referendum” (Tufte, 1975) or “barometer” elections (Anderson and Ward, 1996). On the other hand, the ideological closeness of former PS voters’ to the mid-point between their perceived ideological positions of the PS and the PSD — their “ideological moderation” — is also not helpful, keeping other things equal, in distinguishing those who voted Soares from those who defected. Thus, we find no evidence for the notion that greater ideological moderation among voters in the Socialist camp prompted choices motivated by the interest in

balancing the control of the executive branch on the part of the Socialists with control of the presidency by the PSD-endorsed candidate.

Conclusion

Any observer of the Portuguese case could be forgiven for guessing that presidential elections were mostly about the personalities, the personal allure or the perceived qualities of candidates. After all, in Portugal – as in most premier-presidential systems – presidential elections are not about who governs, and even legislative elections, as most studies have shown, seem to be pervaded by highly personalized politics and a shallow socio-structural and ideological anchoring of the electorate. Closer examination, however, suggests a much more nuanced story. In spite of the importance that evaluations of candidates' qualities indeed had in the choices made by voters, the latter were certainly not oblivious to party endorsements of candidates and all other elements of information that allow them to place each candidate in a particular partisan camp. Thus, even in an election not ran in a partisan basis and where candidates often presented themselves as “supra-partisan”, “national” or “independent”, party identification still played a crucial role in voting behaviour, contributing to explain choices between candidates endorsed by or emanating from different parties along rather predictable lines.

Presidential elections in semipresidential systems remain, doubtless, a territory worthy of much further exploration. However, this study suggests a few potentially promising avenues of research in this regard. Political systems commonly defined as “semipresidential” are, in fact, very heterogeneous, both in terms of the powers available

to the president in the constitution and in practice and, as we begin to realize, in terms of the main patterns of voter behaviour that characterize the election of the head of state. Thus, in “president-parliamentary” regimes or in cases such as France – which, as Duverger had noted long ago, stands as a special case where the president “exercises in practice much stronger powers than his counterparts” (Duverger, 1980: 180) – their political and institutional closeness to the presidential logic is likely to result in elections similar to those in presidential systems. There, the vote is shaped by the usual combination of “short-“ (candidates), “medium-“ (issues) and “long-term” forces (partisanship or ideology), and elections become, furthermore, mechanisms of accountability for executive performance (Lewis-Beck, 1997; Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier, 2000; Lewis-Beck and Nadeau, 2000). At the other extreme, in cases such as Ireland (Brug, et al., 2000), figurehead presidents with mostly symbolic and representational roles, candidates recruited within minor party figures, and the credible de-emphasis of candidates’ partisan ties seem to have resulted in presidential elections where ideological and partisan cues are rendered useless as guides to voting choices. Other semipresidential regimes such as Austria and Iceland, where candidates are typically also “elder statesmen” or “political outsiders” who de-emphasise party ties (Müller, 1999; Kristinsson, 1999), are likely to display similar patterns.

However, proper “premier-presidential” regimes such as Portugal may constitute a third type in this regard. On the one hand, while evaluations of government performance played – except in the narrower sense of expressive voting on the part of previous PS supporters – an overall negligible role in voters’ decisions, patterns of defection from the government on the part of particular segments of the electorate fitted

the basic predictions of theories of “less important elections”, namely, the “surge and decline” and “second-order” theories. Thus, in such systems, presidential elections are clearly not about who govern, and Portuguese voters seem to have been made aware of that at some level, not least by candidates themselves. Cavaco Silva, for example, was particularly reluctant during the campaign to express any concrete judgment about the performance of the Socialist government, a strategy that deprived dissatisfied voters from cues suggesting that a vote for him would be a vote “against” the incumbent.

On the other hand, however, presidential elections in premier-presidential regimes are neither about choosing a pleasant or in any way appropriate personality as head of state either. In “premier-presidentialism”, presidents preserve non-irrelevant powers, and parties are likely to care deeply about who holds such powers. In Portugal, they actively endorse and run well-known and high-level party figures as candidates, and the phenomenon is far from a Portuguese exclusive among “premier-presidential” systems, as the examples of candidates such as Purvanov in Bulgaria, Kwasniewski or Walesa in Poland, Iliescu, Constantinescu, and Basescu in Romania or Paksas in Lithuania clearly illustrate. This allows voters to connect their long-term predispositions with the vote in presidential elections, rendering party identification and, to a lesser extent, ideology, into reliable predictors of vote choices in presidential elections.

Notes

¹ The 2005 and 2006 post-electoral surveys were coordinated by the Social Sciences Institute of the University of Lisbon and fieldwork was conducted by the Centre for Public Opinion Polls and Studies of the Portuguese Catholic University. For the 2005 survey, a multistage-area sampling method was employed, with localities in Continental Portugal (64) randomly selected, with probability proportional to size, within strata defined by region and locality size. Households were selected by random route and respondents were selected randomly within each household, provided they were 18 years of age or older. In the absence of the respondent, two additional visits to each household were made. The survey's fieldwork took place between March 5th and May 8th. Sample size is 2,801. The 2005 survey was conducted under the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems research network. The 2006 survey was applied, by phone, to sub-sample of the original 2005 sample. Of the 1200 respondents selected from the original sample, preserving the original stratification by region and size of locality, 812 responded to the 2006 survey. Fieldwork took place between January 25th and February 7th 2006.

² The first, in 1985, followed a crisis in the Socialist Party (PS)/Social Democratic Party (PSD) coalition government, and ultimately resulted in elections from which a fractionalized parliament emerged, leading to a PSD minority government. The second, in 1987, followed the approval of a motion of censure against the aforementioned PSD minority cabinet, and resulted in elections that led the PSD to government again, albeit this time with the support of an absolute majority in parliament. The third, in 2001, followed the resignation of the prime minister of a minority Socialist cabinet, with the following elections resulting in a new cabinet supported by a center-right coalition. Finally, in 2004, following an internal crisis in a centre-right coalition government, parliament was again dissolved, and the new elections resulted in a PS cabinet supported by an absolute majority.

³ See descriptive statistics for all variables in the appendix.

⁴ All calculations made with XPost: Post-Estimation Interpretation Using Excel, by Simon Cheng and Scott Long, available in <http://www.indiana.edu/~jslsoc/xpost.htm>.

⁵ In cases where these values are outside the range of the scales, we use the appropriate endpoints.

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Table 1. Approaches to voting behaviour in (semi-)presidential elections

| Theories | Role of conventional cues | Performance of government endorsed candidates | Voters who defect from government to abstention | Voters who defect from government to opposition |
|------------------------------|----------------------------------|--|--|--|
| <i>Popularity contest</i> | Low or none | Not specified | Not specified | Not specified |
| <i>Second-order election</i> | Ideology; government performance | Loss | Dissatisfied voters | Dissatisfied voters and previous strategic voters |
| <i>Surge and decline</i> | Party identification | Loss | Low interest voters | Opposition partisans and apartisans |
| <i>Policy balancing</i> | Not specified | Loss | Not specified | Moderate voters |

Table 2. Electoral results, 2005 legislative and 2006 presidential elections (%)

| Parties | 2005 legislative elections | | Candidates | 2006 presidential elections | |
|---------------|----------------------------|-------------|------------------|-----------------------------|-------------|
| | Electorate | Valid votes | | Electorate | Valid votes |
| PS | 28.9 | 46.4 | Soares | 8.6 | 14.3 |
| | | | Alegre | 12.6 | 20.8 |
| PSD+CDS | 23.1 | 37.1 | Cavaco | 30.5 | 50.5 |
| Other parties | 10.3 | 16.5 | Other candidates | 8.7 | 14.4 |
| Null/Blank | 1.9 | | Null/Blank | 1.1 | |
| Abstention | 35.7 | | Abstention | 38.5 | |

Table 3. Parameter estimates for multinomial logit regression of presidential vote choice in Portugal, 2006 (reference category: vote for Soares; standard errors in parenthesis)

| Predictor variables | Soares vs. Alegre | Soares vs. Cavaco Silva | Soares vs. Others | Soares vs. Abstention |
|-----------------------------|---------------------|-------------------------|----------------------|-----------------------|
| Intercept | 7.209** (2.136) | 4.852* (2.208) | 8.149** (2.380) | 9.973*** (2.246) |
| Gender | -.878 (.513) | -1.483** (.527) | -1.185* (.579) | -1.038 (.543) |
| Age | -.025 (.017) | -.018 (.017) | -.023 (.019) | -.053** (.018) |
| Education | .094 (.125) | -.045 (.129) | .077 (.142) | .059 (0.135) |
| Subjective social class | .483 (.258) | .808** (.272) | .245 (.296) | .275 (0.281) |
| Union membership | 1.522* (.670) | .598 (.722) | .893 (.749) | -.121 (0.787) |
| Religiosity | -.475 (.289) | .522 (.305) | -.396 (.322) | -.066 (0.308) |
| Left-right self-placement | -.206 (.112) | .209 (.113) | -.435** (0.130) | -.005 (.117) |
| Attachment to PS | -.234 (.228) | -1.246*** (.243) | -.897** (.259) | -.553* (.249) |
| Government performance | -.157 (0.250) | -.364 (.254) | -.502 (.272) | -.486 (.259) |
| Interest in politics | -.308 (.312) | -.414 (.318) | .201 (.351) | -.974** (.324) |
| Soares's personal qualities | -6.076*** (.997) | -8.019*** (1.167) | -7.435*** (1.309) | -6.033*** (1.110) |
| N | | | 529 | |
| Nagelkerke r2 | | | .66 | |

*p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001

Table 4. Effects of evaluation of Soares's qualities on the probability of voting for different candidates

| Vote for | Sample distribution | Low | High | Change in probability |
|------------|---------------------|-------|-------|-----------------------|
| Soares | 8.3% | 0.9% | 8.1% | +7.2% |
| Alegre | 18.7% | 18.0% | 23.5% | +5.5% |
| Cavaco | 45.4% | 56.8% | 40.2% | -16.6% |
| Others | 10.4% | 8.6% | 7.3% | -1.3% |
| Abstention | 17.1% | 15.7% | 20.8% | 5.1% |

Table 5. Effects of attachment to PS in the probability of voting for different candidates

| Vote for | Sample distribution | Low | High | Change in probability |
|------------|---------------------|-------|-------|-----------------------|
| Soares | 8.3% | 0.7% | 5.1% | +4.7% |
| Alegre | 18.7% | 8.5% | 37.5% | +29.0% |
| Cavaco | 45.4% | 72.2% | 28.1% | -44.1% |
| Others | 10.4% | 7.7% | 6.9% | -.8% |
| Abstention | 17.1% | 10.9% | 22.4% | +11.5% |




Figure 1. The impact of partisanship and evaluations of Soares on the probability of voting for the Socialist candidate

Table 6. Parameter estimates for multinomial logit regression of presidential vote choice in Portugal among previous Socialist voters, 2006 (reference category: vote for Soares; standard errors in parenthesis)

| Predictor variables | Alegre | Cavaco | Others | Abstention |
|--|----------------------|-----------------------|---------------------|---------------------|
| Intercept | 11.228** (4.284) | 2.820 (5.082) | 17.078** (5.964) | 10.617* (5.072) |
| Gender | -.765 (.767) | -1.875* (.946) | -.125 (1.109) | .759 (1.108) |
| Age | -.012 (.026) | .019 (.033) | -.094* (.043) | -.009 (.035) |
| Education | .118 (.216) | .085 (.260) | -.197 (.314) | .111 (.262) |
| Subjective social class | .975* (.431) | 1.148* (.546) | 1.266† (.684) | 1.356* (.579) |
| Union membership | 1.549 (1.003) | .804 (1.190) | .592 (1.277) | .907 (1.210) |
| Religiosity | -.136 (.527) | 1.236† (.687) | .556 (.720) | .480 (.712) |
| Left-right self-placement | -.318 (.239) | -.176 (.264) | -.857** (.323) | -.438 (.712) |
| Attachment to PS | .213 (.407) | -1.289* (.524) | -1.897** (.631) | .275 (.609) |
| Government performance | -.464 (.394) | -.397 (.477) | -.993† (.511) | -.735 (.525) |
| Interest in politics | -.224 (.537) | .320 (.611) | .286 (.674) | -1.166† (.655) |
| Soares' personal qualities | -9.017*** (2.102) | -13.221*** (3.288) | -5.889** (2.677) | -6.922** (2.590) |
| Importance of election | -1.252† (.641) | -.440 (.713) | -1.981** (.755) | -2.040** (.756) |
| Distance from PS/PSD mid-point | -.246 (.202) | -.369 (.263) | -.225 (.278) | -.327 (.285) |
| N | | | 141 | |
| Full model Nagelkerke r² | | | .75 | |

†p<.10; *p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001

Table 7. Effects of evaluation of Soares in the probability of defecting from the Socialist candidate

| Defection | Sample distribution | Low | High | Change in probability |
|---------------|------------------------|-------|-------|--------------------------|
| No | 23.3% | 1.4% | 52.8% | 51.4% |
| To Alegre | 35.6% | 66.4% | 34.7% | -31.7% |
| To Cavaco | 24.3% | 25.8% | 1.8% | -24.0% |
| To others | 8.9% | 1.8% | 4.2% | 2.4% |
| To abstention | 7.9% | 4.5% | 6.4% | 1.9% |

Table 8. Effects of attachment to PS in the probability of defecting from the Socialist candidate

| | Sample distribution | Low | High | Change in probability |
|-------------------------|---------------------|-------|-------|-----------------------|
| No defection | 23.3% | 6.7% | 8.7% | 2.0% |
| Defection to Alegre | 35.6% | 39.1% | 79.3% | +40.2% |
| Defection to Cavaco | 24.3% | 30.8% | 2.6% | -28.2% |
| Defection to others | 8.9% | 19.4% | 0.5% | -18.9% |
| Defection to abstention | 7.9% | 3.9% | 9.0% | 5.1% |

Appendix: descriptive statistics

| | Mean | Full sample Standard deviation | N | Mean | 2005 PS voters Standard deviation | N |
|---|-------|--------------------------------------|-----|-------|---|-----|
| Gender (Male: 1; Female: 2) | 1.49 | .50 | 793 | 1.54 | .50 | 230 |
| Age | 45.82 | 16.65 | 800 | 48.85 | 15.63 | 234 |
| Education (No formal education:1; Post-graduate:12) | 6.00 | 2.39 | 798 | 5.91 | 2.49 | 233 |
| Subjective social class (Working class: 1; Upper class:5) | 2.16 | .95 | 787 | 2.17 | .94 | 231 |
| Union membership (No: 0; Yes:1) | .16 | .36 | 790 | .24 | .43 | 228 |
| Religiosity (Not at all religious:1; Very 4) | 2.75 | .89 | 805 | 2.71 | .83 | 236 |
| Left-right self-placement (Left:0; Right 10) | 5.46 | 2.53 | 666 | 4.83 | 2.15 | 200 |
| Attachment to PS (Very close to opp. party: -3; very close to PS:3) | -.22 | 1.48 | 812 | .55 | 1.04 | 236 |
| Evaluation of government performance (Very bad:1; Very good:5) | 3.05 | 1.12 | 812 | 3.38 | 1.02 | 236 |
| Interest in politics (Not interested: 1; Very interested: 4) | 2.57 | .95 | 812 | 2.62 | .94 | 236 |
| Soares's personal qualities (Not selected as best in any: 0 Selected as best in all:1) | .11 | .19 | 812 | .19 | .26 | 236 |
| Importance of elections (Not at all important:0; Very important:4) | 3.42 | .86 | 812 | 3.41 | .85 | 236 |
| Distance to mid-point PS-PSD (Absolute difference LRSP and mid-point of perceived positions of PS and PSD in 11-point scale) | 2.17 | 1.80 | 650 | 2.14 | 1.64 | 202 |