

Differential voting for *Ethnoregionalist* Parties in Multilevel electoral Systems

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1. Introduction:

This paper deals with differential voting (from now on, DV) patterns between General Elections (GE) and Regional Elections (RE) in six European regions that share in common the existence in their regional party systems of, at least one, *ethnoregionalist* party. In our six regions, one or two *ethnoregionalist* parties have won in their last RE more than 15% of electoral support. The regions we deal with in this paper are Catalonia, the Basque Country and Galicia in Spain; Scotland and Wales in the UK; and Flanders in Belgium.

Our six regions share in common the existence of devolved regional parliaments although there are great differences with regard to the time experience with decentralization and the degree of self-government and powers granted to each of these regional chambers (very extensive in the Basque Country and very limited in the case of Wales, to cite only the two ends of the scale). As we will see in more detail, the contrast between elections to these regional parliaments and GE elections within each region shows certain similarities across cases, although there are also important differences. One first similarity is that, as a general rule, turnout rates tend to be lower in RE than in GE (although the gap between election types varies greatly from region to region). The second similarity across cases is that while state-wide parties (particularly big parties) fare better in GE and do worse in RE, the opposite happens with *ethnoregionalist* vote which grows in RE and declines again in GE.

Taking a first look at this DV patterns, the Secondary Order Elections (SOE) Model would seem an appropriate theory to explain these differences in electoral behaviour between GEs and REs. Reif and Schmitt (1980) coined this phrase in their study of elections for the European Parliament as a means of describing voting patterns in elections considered by the voters as less relevant, and the results of which are influenced heavily by issues beyond the arena in which the elections are taking place. Based on these arguments, Reif and Schmitt offered three propositions to characterize regular differences between aggregate behaviour in European elections and previous (and subsequent) GEs (Marsh, 1998: 592; see also Norris, 1997: 112). After adapting them to study the validity of the SOE Model when looking at REs, the three propositions are as follows: 1) Turnout will be lower in REs than in GEs; 2) National government parties will suffer losses in RE and will fare better in GEs; and 3) Larger parties will do worse and smaller parties will do better in RE than in GEs.

However, in this paper we do not assume the SOE model to be valid model for REs. This is because the SOE model was thought to explain electoral patterns for the European Parliament elections in relation to GEs, but there are some characteristics of the European Parliament elections, important which cannot be transposed to the REs. First, European Parliament elections are not generating an executive power as is the case for RE; second, and consequently, the output that European Parliament elections produce is unaccountable before the citizens, which is neither the case for the output of the RE; thirdly, citizens awareness of regional arenas might be higher than the European one. Therefore, we only take SOE literature and propositions as a departure point to frame our first hypotheses to explain DV patterns between GEs and REs in regions with relevant contending *ethnoregionalist* parties.

SOE model as a starting point is especially important to frame some of hypotheses of voters' behaviour that can be tested empirically with individual level

survey data. This way, the first one of the three propositions quoted above is explained with the assumption that citizens regard REs as less relevant than GEs because they feel that less is at stake in the GE than in REs, but this assumption should be contrasted empirically because some single case studies suggest that this might not be the case for differential voters (Pérez-Nievas and Fraile 2000; Riba 2000). Regarding the second proposition according to which national government parties fare better in GE than in RE, we can depart from theories proposing a conception of DV as an effect of the protest vote against the governing parties, which would be expressed in the RE because they would be conceived as elections where less is at stake. Finally, concerning the third proposal (larger parties do better while small parties do worst in GE than RE) we could depart from (Marsh 1998) explanation according to which there would be an institutional feature (proportionality) giving incentives to vote strategically (not first order preferences) in the GE while giving more room in RE to vote sincerely (vote for the first order preference).

In Part 2 of this paper we describe the contrast between GEs and REs in our six regions. The purpose of this description is to identify similarities and differences in DV patterns across regions. Also in Part 2, we will try to validate the three SOE propositions for aggregate data when looking at DV patterns in regions with an *ethnoregionalist* cleavage (though concerning only the contrast between GEs and REs). We hope this initial validation will help us framing some of the questions and hypothesis that will allow us, later on, analyse DV patterns with individual data. In Part 3 of the paper we review some of the hypotheses derived from the SOE Model when using individual data. These will have to be adapted to the analysis of REs (which surely has different implications and leads to different hypotheses to those derived from the analysis of European elections). Also in Part 3, we will look at alternatives explanations to the SOE model when looking at individual data, and though we will also consider other existing theories, we will pay particular attention to the *two-dimensional* model to explain similarities and differences in DV patterns across our six regions. The aim of this review is only one first attempt to search for indicators and concrete hypothesis to explain DV patterns at the individual level in the six regions.

As we will see in Part 3, the centrality we give in our analysis to the *two-dimensional* model is because, unlike the SOE model or other theories, this model is only relevant to explain DV patterns in regions that have an *ethnoregionalist* cleavage. Thus, contrasting the explanatory power of this last model against other theories of voting justifies our selection of six regions which share in common the presence of, at least, one *ethnoregionalist* party.

2. Differential Voting in regions with *ethnoregionalist* parties.

The six regions in which our eight *ethnoregionalist* parties operate face different forms and degrees of differential voting (DV). Thus, our first task is to describe the phenomenon in the six regions with the aim of identifying similarities and differences between regions and between *ethnoregionalist* parties. Although in all six regions there are, at least, four electoral arenas: European, national, regional, and local, we will only focus on the contrast between the national and regional arena.

2.1. Differential voting in Spanish regions with *ethnoregionalist* parties: Catalonia, Basque Country and Galicia.

Owing to the longer experience with decentralization, the contrast between General (GEs) and Regional Elections (REs) has been perhaps better studied in the Spanish regions and, above all, in Catalonia where DV has been more marked. The most striking feature of Catalan electoral behaviour is the high inter-block volatility from GEs to REs (and vice versa) between *ethnoregionalist* vote and the vote to *state-wide* parties (see Table A1 in the Appendix). This high volatility between different types of elections has been at the centre of most analyses of Catalan electoral behaviour (Montero and Font, 1991; Padró-Solanet and Colomer, 1992; Font and Pallarés, 1994; Riba, 2000; Pérez-Nievas and Fraile, 2000). Since the first Catalan RE in 1980, this high inter-block volatility has determined which party emerged as the winner in every single election: the PSC, the Catalan branch of the PSOE, has won a majority of votes in every GE; whereas CiU has always won a majority of votes in every RE; the only exception in this respect was the 1999 RE when the PSC-PSOE won, from a short margin, more votes than CiU.

Looking both at aggregate and individual it was soon realised this high inter-block volatility had its roots in a DV pattern that in fact had two components. In Spain as a whole, electoral turnouts for regional elections are usually lower than for general elections, but this gap is widest, 14% on average, in Catalonia than in any other Autonomous Community (Riba, 2000: 61). This low electoral turnout in RE did not affect all parties to the same extent and that it was especially detrimental to state-wide parties and, most of all, to the PSC-PSOE. Thus the latter's electoral victory in all GEs is partly due to the behaviour of a section of the Catalan electorate that opts for abstention in REs and mobilises (particularly to vote for the PSOE) in GEs. This is known as *differential turnout* and is one first component of DV in Catalonia.

Together with *differential turnout*, early studies on Catalan elections showed a steady transfer of votes from *state-wide parties* to Catalan *ethnoregionalist* parties when moving from GEs to REs. In the 1980s and early 1990s this transfer was particularly pronounced from the PSOE-PSC, occupying central government for the period 1982-1996, to CiU, occupying the regional government for the period 1982-1996; although there were also lesser transfers from the PSOE to the ERC, and from the PP again to CiU (Montero and Font, 1991; Font and Pallarés, 1994). Since the late 1990s, with the growth of the PP (and its occupation of central government in the period 1996-2004) as well as the electoral upsurge of the second *ethnoregionalist* party, ERC, the Catalan party system became more fragmented and transfers began to show a more multilateral pattern. Nonetheless, on the whole, they continue to be detrimental to *state-wide* parties (and beneficial to *ethnoregionalist* parties) in REs; and vice versa in GEs.

In sum, Catalan electoral behaviour in REs at the aggregate level confirms many of the predictions of the SOE Model, though not others. First, turnout rates are indeed lower. Second, national government parties, PP and PSOE, suffer losses in REs and recover in GEs. However, losses are greater (and tend to concentrate) in the PSOE, whether this party is in government or in opposition in Madrid (It was in the opposition from 1996 to 2004). Third, *some* large parties do worse and *some* small parties do better in REs; however this only holds true if we define large from a national framework, not a regional one. If we adopt a regional perspective we observe, first of all, that the two parties that benefit most from REs, CiU and ERC, came out as the second and third largest parties within Catalonia in the last 2004 GE. And second, those parties that are small whether *smallness* is defined in regional or national terms, such as IC or CDS (see

Table A1), do not change their electoral support so significantly depending on the election

The picture offered by the contrast between GEs and REs in the Basque Country is quite different from that of Catalonia. To begin with, turnout differences between different type of elections are not so pronounced in the Basque Country: in the period from 1982 to 1993, there was only a 3-4% turnout difference between GEs and REs (Riva, 2000: 61; see also Table A.2 and Table A.3 in the Appendix). As politics became more polarised in the Basque Country from the second half of the 1990s onwards, turnout grew in REs, reaching the region's ever maximum for any type of elections in the 2001 RE. Nonetheless, RE turnout declined again in the last 2005 Basque elections (68%), showing a 7 point difference with the prior 2004 GE turnout (75%) in the region (Pérez-Nievas, 2006a: 37-38; see also Table A.2 and Table A.3 in the Appendix).

In the second place, the Basque Country presents a less marked inter-block volatility (that concerning *ethnoregionalist* vote versus *state-wide* vote) between the two types of elections, although some takes place. On the whole, over the last decade, there has been a 10 points difference in the votes gathered by each block depending on the type of elections, with state-wide parties winning a majority of votes in the last three GEs (between 52% and 58% of the valid vote), and nationalist parties winning the majority of votes in the last four RE (between 53% and 56% approximately: Pérez-Nievas, 2006: 37-38; see also Table A.2 and Table A.3 in the Appendix). Thus, some inter-block volatility does also exist in the Basque Country. However, the causes of this systematic change are less clear than in Catalonia. Basque DV has been less studied than its Catalan counterpart. This might be due to the fact that volatility has had less visible political effects since the main *ethnoregionalist* party, the PNV, has won every single election since 1977, whether regional or national.

Thus, *turnout* differences are not so marked between type of elections, and when turnout has declined in Basque RE there is not such a strong evidence that this was detrimental to *state-wide* vote. On the other hand, there is more clear evidence of vote transfers that go from the PNV in REs to both the PSOE and the PP in GEs and back (Llera, 1999; Pallarés, 2002) although these probably take place at a lower scale than in Catalonia. One last difference between the two regions deserves mentioning. In Catalonia the PSOE has always been the most voted party within the state-wide block, whether the party was in government or in opposition in Madrid. In the Basque Country, by contrast, PSOE and PP have swapped places roughly coinciding with their status as governmental parties in Spain as whole. Nonetheless these relative gains and losses of either state-wide party in the Basque Country would not only come from transfers come and forth the PNV but also (and perhaps mainly) from transfers between the two *state-wide* parties themselves (Pérez-Nievas, 2006b: 66). In any case, Basque DV has been less systematically analysed than its Catalan counterpart and one of the aims of this paper would be to contribute to a better knowledge and understanding of it.

In sum, Basque electoral behaviour at the aggregate level suits even less nicely the SOE model than the Catalan case. On average, turnout rates are slightly lower in REs than GEs, but the highest rates for any election in the Basque Country has been in a RE. Second, as in the Catalan case, REs are most clearly detrimental to the PSOE than to the PP, no matter which of the two occupies national government. There were important variations in the PP's electoral support from the 1990's onwards. However these do not follow a DV pattern, but the more frequent one of electoral upsurge and decline across election types. Also, as in the Catalan case, only if we define *smallness* in national terms, we can argue that *some* small parties benefit from REs. Parties that are

small, either defined in national or regional terms, do not so significantly change their electoral support across elections.

Looking at aggregate data, a DV pattern is also obvious in Galicia, the third of the Spanish regions with an *ethnoregionalist* cleavage, although this case has been even less studied at the individual level than the Basque Country. To begin with, turnout is on average 10% higher in GEs than in REs (Rivera et al. 1998: 296; Gómez-Reino 2006: 177; see also Table A.4 in the appendix). Second, over the last decade, the only *ethnoregionalist* party in the Galician party system, the BNG, has obtained, on average, an 8-9% better result in REs than in GEs (a 7,5% difference in the last 2005 RE in relation to the prior 2004 GE: see Table A.4 in the Appendix). The BNG's better result in REs is, of course, detrimental to *state-wide* vote in this type of elections, but almost exclusively to the regional branch of the PSOE. The PP is the main party of the Galician Party System since 1982, and though the party has suffered a slow electoral decline in the last three elections, this decline does not show a territorial pattern and has been steady across election types. Electoral support for the Galician PSOE, on the other hand, has been much more irregular and dependent on the territorial level of election. All through the period from 1997 to 2004, PSOE and BNG swapped places as second and third parties of the region depending on the type of election. In the last 2005 election for the Galician Parliament, the Galician PSOE was able to consolidate its position as the second party in a RE but it still obtained a 4 points worse result than in the prior 2004 GE. Thus, Galician DV affects mainly the BNG and the PSOE, and not the PP, and this is so whether the PP or the PSOE occupies central government in Madrid. In sum, by looking simply at aggregate data, we dare to hypothesize that the changing results of the BNG and PSOE depending on the type of election might be due to the combined effect of a 1) a *differential turnout* that is detrimental to the PSOE -and favourable to the BNG- in REs; and 2) to transfers of votes back and forth from the PSOE to the BNG when moving from one election type to the other. It is nonetheless important to stress that the swapping electoral fortunes of the PSOE and the BNG have not been more marked when the PSOE occupied central government, as the SOE model would predict, but rather the opposite, when the PSOE was the main opposition party in Madrid.

Thus, Galician DV confirms some of the predictions of SOE model but not others. First, it is true that turnout rates are considerably lower in REs. However, losses for national parties in this type of elections, more markedly so than in the previous two cases, tend to concentrate in the PSOE. In fact, losses for the socialist were greatest when this party was the main opposition party in Madrid. REs benefit the BNG; but, if we adopt a regional perspective, it is doubtful again whether we can define this party as small. The Galician party system is less fragmented than in the other two regions so we cannot check the effects of RE in other small parties.

It is worth to say that an explanation for the lower turnout levels in RE than in GE for Catalonia, Basque Country and Galicia, has been suggested sometimes pointing at an institutional feature. These three Autonomous Communities stage their elections independently of the other Autonomous Communities, which celebrate RE with local elections simultaneously and therefore can get higher levels of mobilization than Catalan, Basque and Galician RE electorates (Pallarés and Keating 2003). Albeit this explanation could account for the relatively lower levels of abstention in RE of the remaining Spanish Autonomous Communities, it would still remain to be explained why the general levels of turnout in RE are lower than in GE for almost all the Autonomous Communities, and the SOE Model can have something to say about it.

2.2. Differential voting in British regions with *ethnoregionalist* parties: Scotland and Wales.

The first devolved assemblies of Scotland and Wales were elected in 1999, only eight years ago. Thus, decentralization is a much more recent phenomenon in Britain than in Spain. At the aggregate level there are, nonetheless, certain similarities in DV between Spanish and British regions. However, the shorter experience with decentralization and the more limited form of self-government (particularly in the case of the Welsh Assembly) should also be kept in mind when contrasting the SOE Model against other theories of electoral behaviour in the British Regions.

In Wales, the two REs up to the moment shows a stark contrast between turnout rates in different type of elections. In the 1999 RE, turnout rate was 46%, nearly 30 points below the 1997 prior GE (74%); whereas the 2003 RE rate, at only 38,3%, lagged far behind the 2001 GE rate, at only 61,4% (McAllister, 2004; Orriols and Andrews, 2005: 9-10). Thus, turnout differences between different types of elections are greater in Wales than in any other of the five regions examined here. Second, when moving from GEs to REs, electoral results have rewarded the only *ethnoregionalist* party of the region, *Plaid Cymru* (PC) and punished Labour (See Table A5 and Table A6 in the Appendix). However, the extent of these gaps was much greater in the first 1999 RE than in the second 2003 RE. Whereas in the 1999 RE, the PC obtained a nearly 20 points advantage from the prior 1997 GE, the difference was reduced to only 6% of the total vote in the 2003 RE (Orriols and Andrews, 2005: 3)¹. In the case of Labour, the punishment was reduced from an 18 points difference in the 1999 RE to only 10% in the 2003 RE (see Table A5 and Table A6 in the Appendix) . Thus the 2003 Welsh elections have been regarded as a return to typical “first order” or Westminster Type of elections (McAllister, 2004: 81). One should also note that Conservative electoral support in Wales has varied to a much lesser extent across elections than that of Labour (only around 2-3% of the total vote) while that of the Liberal-democrats has not varied at all. Finally, as the SOE model would predict, in the 2003 RE small parties such as the Welsh Greens and UK Independence increased their electoral support, although they did not gain representation.

There are some strong resemblances between the Welsh and the Scottish case although also some differences. In Scotland, turnout rates have been lower in REs than in GEs although the gap is narrower than in Wales. Moving from GEs to REs, electoral results have rewarded the SNP and punished Labour. Nonetheless Labour’s punishment is on average, 10%, much greater than the SNP reward, 4% on average; while Conservative and Liberal-democrats support remains stable across elections (Orriols and Andrews, 2005: 5; see Table A7 and Table A8 in the Appendix). One should also note that in the Scottish case (much more so than in Wales), and particularly in the last 2003 RE, several small parties such as the *Scottish Greens* and the *Scottish Socialist Party* increased their electoral support and gained parliamentary representation, thus confirming the SOE model predictions for aggregate data (see the growth of electoral support to *other* parties in Table A7 and Table A8 in the Appendix).

Overall, the SOE model is better at predicting electoral behaviour in the British regions than in the Spanish ones. First of all, gaps in turnout rates are higher between

¹ In the case of Scotland and Wales, electoral results for RE are the average gained by each party from both the constituency and the regional lists.

election types, above all in Wales. Second, it is the national government party, Labour, which suffers the greatest loss of votes in REs. And third, small parties (both *ethnoregionalist* and others which are indeed small however we define it) fare better in REs than in GEs.

However, the experience in Spanish regions shows us that concentration of losses in Labour might be due to a cause *different* from its status as a governmental party in London. In Spain, up to the mid-1990s, when the decentralization process had only been experienced under PSOE's governments, the SOE model seemed better fit to explain DV parties in its different regions which have *ethnoregionalist* parties. However, when the conservative PP came to power, DV patterns (that is, losses in REs) carried on concentrating in the PSOE, something which is not properly explained by the SOE model. We dare to hypothesize that, also in the case of British regions, the concentration of losses in Labour are due to reasons different from its status as governmental party. In this sense, we would expect losses to carry on concentrating on Labour, even after a governmental change in London. As we will explain later on, individual data is a better strategy to validate this hypothesis.

2.3. Differential voting in Flanders.

Although, as in British regions, the opening of a subnational arena is quite recent in Flanders (1995), this represents a quite different case from either Spanish or British regions. The combination of two institutional features mark these differences although these have not remained constant since the Flemish regional assembly was first directly elected in 1995. To begin with, the 1995 and 1999 REs were concurrent (or coincided) with GEs. The 2004 RE did not, although this last election was still concurrent with European Elections. Second, voting is compulsory in Belgium, so turnout rates are high and they have remained equally high even when the 2004 RE did not coincide with elections for the national assembly (**to be continued**).

2.4. Some general conclusions on the comparison between aggregate data in the six regions.

First: generally speaking, turnout rates are higher in REs than in GEs, but there is great deal of variation between regions.

Second: losses in REs concentrate in national governing parties but much more so in some national governing parties than others. In Spain, losses in GEs are greater for the PSOE, regardless of which party is in national government. We dare to hypothesize the same pattern will take place after a governmental change in London: DV patterns will carry on affecting Labour more than other parties. Therefore, changes might be better explained by the position of these parties in the nationalist dimension rather than by a SOE logic.

Third: Ethnoregionalist parties fare better in REs; but it open to question if we might regard these parties as small. On the other hand, there is great variation between regions with regard to the extent other small parties benefit in REs.

3. Differential Voting in regions with *ethnoregionalist* parties at the individual level.

As we stated above, from SOE theory we should be able to derive hypothesis to predict DV patterns not only at the aggregate level but also with individual data. However, this is a more complex exercise. Testing the SOE model at the individual makes us look into the reasons *why* voters might regard REs as less important and what are the precise consequences of this perception in their voting decision-making.

Most SOE literature argues that the main reason why European elections are regarded as less important is because they do not contribute to form governments (Reif and Schmitt, 1980; Reif, 1985; Marsh, 1998). By contrast, REs in our six cases are the first step to the formation of regional governments. This reasoning has been used to criticize the use of SOE theory to explain DV in Spanish regional elections (see for instance Sanz, 2005). Nonetheless, *some* or *most* voters might believe (rightly or wrongly) that the reach or scope of the regional government is more limited than that of national government and, therefore, still perceive that there is less at stake in REs than in GEs. Although, at first hand, we assume that there might be a great variation with regard to the extent of this perception between our regions' electorates (depending not only in the political power granted to the regional tier but also on the time experience with decentralisation) we also think this view might be shared by, at least, *some* voters in *all* our six regions.

Assuming that such a perception might exist in the six regions, SOE literature would predict a DV effect that would be empirically contrastable at the individual level with two type of changes: first of all, some electors who voted in GEs will not vote in RE. If the view that less is at stake in REs is shared by the main actors in the political process –the voters, the parties, and the mass media- this would serve generally to reduce the expected benefits and increase the expected costs of voting for the individual elector and we would expect fewer people to turnout (Marsh, 1998: 593). Nevertheless there are four out of our six regions where where it is unclear whether this can hold. The process of decentralization in Spain since the recovery of the democracy has produced a territorial fragmentation of party systems and political representation and also has affected the institutional structures of the parties: *given the weakness of mass parties in Spain, control of institutional resources is critical, providing the financial bases for hiring staff and advisors as well as public goods for distribution to build up client networks* (Pallarés and Keating 2003:243). By its side, and for completely different reasons, Belgium has been said to have no state-wide parties but regional parties developing multilevel electoral programs (de Winter 2006). Hereby, at least both in the three Spanish Autonomous Communities and in Flanders Marsh's thesis may not serve as an explanation of DV.

In next the future we will contrast this hypothesis taking interest in regional politics, in whole country politics and in politics in general, as proxies of “what is at stake” in RE and GE. Following Riba (2000) we will try to identify the profile of the electorate that fits with the hypothesis and compare it with the profile of those who do not fit it.

The second change in electoral behaviour predicted by the SOE Model is one of party choice. Here we would face two possible mechanisms of change (Marsh, 1998: 593-594). First, in a context in which voters who opt for a party in a national election because they perceive there is more at stake (the formation of a national government)

they may be said to cast an insincere vote. Such voters may cast a sincere vote for the party they like best in a RE and cast a vote *strategically* in GE. However, the circumstances of a RE might also see a voter moving in the opposite direction, from a sincere choice (in the previous GE) to an insincere one in REs. Thus, the voter would change the vote in order to send a message to his/her party expressing (temporary) dissatisfaction with it. This second mechanism could be better conceptualised as an *instrumental* voting. Indeed, an *instrumental* logic might also be behind the decision not to vote in SE (Marsh, 1997: 594), that is in REs. Governing parties would be particularly vulnerable to such decisions and they would be so around mid-term, when government popularity tends to reach its lowest (Reif and Schmitt, 1980). Hence, the timing of REs would also be an important contextual factor in the performance of governing parties.

In line with the argument of the expressive vote producing DV, this could be interpreted as a protest vote (Riba 2000) against the governing party in the central government. Dissatisfied electors who voted in GE for the governing party can change their vote in RE to express a protest with low costs for the party –assuming that voter believes that what is at stake in RE is lower than what is at GE.

The strategic/instrumental can be contrasted empirically assuming a spatial modelling of voters' closeness to the different parties (Fiorina 1992). The problem in our six regions is that it has been assumed and largely proved empirically that there is no a single dimension but two: ideology and nationalism (Riba 2000 even argues for at least a third dimension in Catalonia). In this situation it could happen that, in one type of elections, a party might be the first option for a voter following the ideological dimension; but, in other type of elections, another party might be the first option following the nationalist dimension. If the relative weight that voters give to each of these dimensions changes depending on the type of elections the result will be a change in party vote. Indeed, some previous have claimed that each dimension would be weighted (for example Padró-Solanet and Colomer, 1992) strongly depending on the elections. Thus, in GEs voters will vote mainly according to the ideological dimension, while they will weight stronger the nationalist dimension to vote for the REs.. This two-dimensional voting as a general and alternative to the SOE Model to explain the DV has also been used with success to explain DV in some of the six regions (Orriols and Richards 2005; Pérez-Nievas and Bonet 2006). The empirical contrast of the two-dimensional voting model is more complex than the SOE Model because we need to work simultaneously with two factors to evaluate party closeness, one for each dimension.

First results of individual level data analysis

Tables A9 and A10 show the transfers from GE to RE between parties in the Basque Country and Catalonia, respectively. The differential abstention –voted for the party in GE and did not vote in RE- affects all the parties in the Basque Country, although the big losers are the post-communist IU-EB (16.8%) and the PSE (12.9%), but the order between both parties reverses if we consider not the relative but the absolute numbers. Also in Catalonia all the parties suffer from differential abstention

albeit in this case, as it was also expectable from the aggregate data, the magnitude is higher than in the Basque Country: PP has a 35.4% of differential abstention, PSC has a 28.6% and ICV a 26.7%. But in absolute terms differential abstention affects mostly to the PSC.

Concerning the dual vote, as it was advanced previously with the aggregated level data, it is also less pronounced in the Basque Country than in Catalonia. 7.1% of the PP voters in GE, vote for PSE in RE, while 6.1% of PSE voters in GE change their vote to PNV in the RE. In Catalonia there are three parties suffering mostly the effects of dual voting: PP (18.8% change their vote in RE to CiU), PSC (10.8% vote in RE also for CiU) and ERC (8.7% vote for ICV). As in the case of the differential abstention the biggest transfer of votes in absolute terms is the one that involves, both in Catalonia and in the Basque Country, the PSOE (PSE and PSC, respectively). This is also the dual vote that has strongest effects on the electoral results.

These data confirm the first and the second, maybe also the third, propositions of the SOE Model: there is a lower level of turnout in RE compared to GE and large or state wide parties do worst in RE while regional parties do better. But we cannot say anything about the second hypothesis concerning the governing parties because the governing party in Spain, the PSOE, obtains better results in GE but this is also the case for the remaining two state wide parties.

In the next future we will discuss more about the implications for the SOE Model of taking the party systems of the GE to define what are large and small parties. We also will explore the adequacy of the third SOE Model proposition with individual level data to see whether there is some kind of protest vote behind the DV phenomena. This will require the use of bivariate and multivariate analysis, which we will also use to contrast empirically the strategic/sincere and instrumental vote hypothesis, and the two-dimensional voting and accidental hypothesis.

FIRST CONCLUDING NOTES

The SOE framework has some flaws when it is applied to the RE where the political arena includes an ethnoregionalist cleavage. First of all, from a theoretical point of view, it is unclear whether the GE or the RE should be the reference framework from which to characterize which ones are *big* parties and which ones are *small* parties. The different electoral results are linked to different party systems between whole country political arenas and regional ones, then what is a big party in reference to the whole country political arena can be a small party respect the regional political arena.

Electoral Data Appendix

Table A.1. *Electoral results in Catalonia, 1977-99 (% of the valid vote)*

Year	CiU	ERC	Tot.nationalist	PSC-PSOE	PSUC/IC	AP/PP	UCD/CDS	PSA	C-PdC	Tot.state-wide
1977g	16.9	4.6	21.5	28.4	18.2	3.5	16.8	-		66.9
1979g	16.2	4.1	20.3	29.3	17.1	3.6	9.1	-		59.1
1980r	27.9	8.9	36.8	22.5	18.8	2.4	0.6	-		47
1982g	22.5	4.0	26.5	45.8	4.6	14.6	2.0	2.7		67.5
1984r	46.8	4.4	50.4	33.1	5.6	7.7	--	0.5		46.2
1986g	32.0	2.7	34.7	41.0	3.9	11.4	4.1	-		60.2
1988r	45.7	4.1	50.1	29.8	7.8	5.3	3.8	-		46.7
1989g	32.7	2.7	35.4	35.6	7.3	10.6	4.3	-		57.7
1992r	46.2	8.0	54.2	27.6	6.5	6.0	0.9	-		41
1993g	31.8	5.1	36.9	34.9	7.5	17.0	0.8	-		60.2
1995r	41.0	9.5	50.5	24.8	9.7	13.1	-	-		47.6
1996g	29.6	4.2	33.8	39.4	7.8	18	-	-		65.2
1999r*	37.7	8.7	46.4	37.8	2.5/1.4(IU)	9.5	-	-		51.3
2003r	30.9	16.4	47.3	31.1	7.3	11.9				50.3
2004g	20.8	15.9	36.7	39.5	5.8	15.5				60.8
2006r	31.5	14.0	45.5	26.8	9.5	10.6			3.0	49.9

Source: own elaboration from Table 5.1 in Marcet and Argelaguet (1998) and from Generalitat de Catalunya. Departament de Governació.(<http://www.gencat.net/governacio-ap/eleccions/index.htm>) * In the 1999 elections the PSC-PSOE formed an electoral coalition with IC except in the electoral district of Barcelona. On the other hand IC had broken off its relationship with IU which stood alone in that election. The results given for the PSC-PSOE are actually the sum of the vote obtained by the PSC in Barcelona and the vote obtained by the coalition with IC in the remaining districts. The results given for the IC are the vote obtained by this political force in Barcelona; the second percentage is the vote obtained by the former partner, IU.

Table A 2. Results of general elections in the Basque Country, 1989-2004. Percentages of the valid vote

	1989	1993	1996	2000	2004
PNV	22.9	24.4	25.4	31.3	34.2
EA	11.2	10	8.4	7.8	6.6
EE	8.9	--	--	--	--
HB-EH-Batasuna	17	14.8	12.5	-- ¹	-- ¹
Aralar	--	--	--	--	3.2
Total nationalist.*	60	49.2	46.3	39.1	44
PSOE-EE	21.3	24.9	24	24	27.6
PP	9.4	14.9	18.6	29.2	19.2
CDS	3.5	0.8	--	--	--
IU	3	6.4	9.4	5.6	8.4
Total sate-wide*	37.2	47	52	58.8	55.2
Voter turnout	66.9	69.7	71.5	64.8	75

* In this the total percentage of votes received by both the nationalist and the state-wide parties is a mere sum of the percentages received by the parties that are shown in the table. Therefore the sum does not add up to 100 per cent since there were other smaller nationalist and state-wide parties competing in all elections.

¹EH called for abstention, and therefore did not participate, in the 2000 elections; the party's new brand, Batasuna, was outlawed in 2002, and therefore could not participate in the 2004 elections.

Source: *Departamento de Interior del Gobierno Vasco* in <http://www.euskadi.net>

Table A 3. Results of regional elections in the Basque Country, 1990-2005. Percentages of the valid vote (number of seats in the Basque Parliament)

	1990	1994	1998	2001	2005
PNV	28.5	29.8	28	42.7 ¹	38.7 ¹
EA	11.4	10.3	8.7	-- ¹	-- ¹
EE	7.8	--	--	--	--
HB-EH-Batasuna/PCTV	18.3	16.3	17.9	10.1	12.5 ²
Aralar	--	--	--	--	2.3
Total nationalist	66	56.4	54.6	52.8	53.5
PSOE-EE	19.9	17.1	17.6	17.9	22.7
PP	8.2	14.4	20.1	23.1 ³	17.4
IU	1.4	9.2	5.7	5.6	5.4
UA	1.4	2.7	1.3	-- ³	0.4
Total sate-wide	31.9	43.4	44.7	46.6	45.9
Voter turnout	61	59.7	70	79	68

¹In the 2001 and 2005 elections PNV and EA formed an electoral coalition.

²Batasuna was outlawed in 2002 and could not participate in the 2005 elections; one week before the election Batasuna's leadership endorsed the "legal" candidacy of the PCTV and called its electorate to vote for this list.

³In the 2001 elections PP and UA formed an electoral coalition.

Source: *Departamento de Interior del Gobierno Vasco* in <http://www.euskadi.net>

Table A4. Electoral Results in Galicia: General and Autonomous Elections (1993-2005)

	G 1993	R1993	G1996	R1997	G2000	R2001	G2004	R2005
PP	47.1	52.2	48.3	51.5	53.8	51.6	47,1	45,2
PSOE	36.0	23.5	33.5	19.4	23.4	21.8	37,1	33,1
IU	4.7	3.1	3.6	0.9	1.3	-	1,7	
BNG	8.0	18.7	12.8	25.5	19.1	22.6	11,3	18,8
Other	4.5	2.5	1.8	2.7	-	-	-	-

Source: Gómez-Reino (2006)

Table A5. UK General Election Results in Wales (%) 1992-2001.

Year	Conservative Vote	Labour Vote	Lib Dem Vote	Plaid Cymru Vote
1992	28.6	49.5	12.4	8.8
1997	19.6	54.7	12.4	9.9
2001	21.0	48.6	13.8	14.3

Source: Van Morgan (2006: 259)

Table A6. Welsh Assembly Election Results (%), 1999 & 2003

	Constituencies		Regional lists		Total
	Vote	Seats	Vote	Seats	Seats
1999					
Conservative	15.8	1	16.5	8	9
Labour	37.6	27	35.5	1	28
Liberal Democrat	13.5	3	12.5	3	6
Plaid Cymru	28.4	9	30.6	8	17
Others	4.8	0	5.0	0	0
2003					T.Seats
Conservative	19.9	1	19.2	10	11
Labour	40.0	30	36.6	0	30
Liberal Democrat	14.1	3	12.7	3	6
Plaid Cymru	21.2	5	19.7	7	12
Others	4.8	1	11.8	0	1

Source: Van Morgan (2006: 260)

Table A7. UK General Election Results in Scotland 1992-2001.

Year	Conservative Votes	Labour Votes	Lib Dem Votes	SNP Votes
1992	25.7	39	13.1	21.5
1997	17.5	45.6	13	22.1
2001	15.58	43.26	16.37	20.06

Source: Lynch (2006: 232)

Table A8. Result of the Scottish Elections 1999 and 2003

Party	Constituencies				Regional lists				Total seats	
	% Vote		Seats		% Vote		Seats			
	2003	1999	2003	1999	2003	1999	2003	1999	2003	1999
Conservative	16.6	15.5	3	0	15.5	15.4	15	18	18	18
Labour	34.6	38.8	46	53	29.3	33.6	4	3	50	56
Liberal Dem	15.3	14.2	13	12	11.8	12.4	4	5	17	17
SNP	23.7	28.7	9	7	20.9	27.3	18	28	27	35
Others	9.8	2.7	2	1	22.3	11.3	15	2	17	3

Source: Lynch (2006: 234)

Table A9. Survey data results for Basque Country: GE 2004 – RE 2005

		RE 2005					Did not vote	Total	
		PNV/E A	PSE/EE	PP	PCTV/EHA K	IU(EB)			
GE 2004	PNV/E A	N	518	5	2	30	8	45	608
		GE 2004 (row)	85,2%	,8%	,3%	4,9%	1,3%	<u>7,4%</u>	100,0%
		RE 2005 (col)	92,5%	1,5%	2,6%	38,0%	6,7%	11,4%	39,0%
	PSE/EE	N	24	310	3	2	4	51	394
		GE 2004 (row)	6,1%	78,7%	,8%	,5%	1,0%	<u>12,9%</u>	100,0%
		RE 2005 (col)	4,3%	93,9%	3,9%	2,5%	3,4%	12,9%	25,3%
	PP	N	0	6	70	0	0	9	85
		GE 2004 (row)	,0%	7,1%	82,4%	,0%	,0%	<u>10,6%</u>	100,0%
		RE 2005 (col)	,0%	1,8%	92,1%	,0%	,0%	2,3%	5,5%
	IU(EB)	N	2	2	0	3	97	21	125
		GE 2004 (row)	1,6%	1,6%	,0%	2,4%	77,6%	<u>16,8%</u>	100,0%
		RE 2005 (col)	,4%	,6%	,0%	3,8%	81,5%	5,3%	8,0%
Did not vote	N	16	7	1	44	10	268	346	
	GE 2004 (row)	4,6%	2,0%	,3%	12,7%	2,9%	77,5%	100,0%	
	RE 2005 (col)	2,9%	2,1%	1,3%	55,7%	8,4%	68,0%	22,2%	
Total	N	560	330	76	79	119	394		
		GE 2004 (row)	35,9%	21,2%	4,9%	5,1%	7,6%	25,3%	1558
		RE 2005 (col)	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	

Underscored the differential abstention; bold the most important dual vote situations.

Source: CIS 2601, Postelectoral survey for Basque Country after RE 2005

Table A10. Survey data results for Catalonia: GE 2004 – RE 2005

			RE 2006					Total	
			CiU	PSC	ERC	PP	ICV	abst	
GE 2004	CiU	N	241	2	16	3	1	37	300
		GE 2004 (row)	80,3%	,7%	5,3%	1,0%	,3%	<u>12,3%</u>	100,0%
		RE 2006 (col)	70,9%	,8%	9,9%	6,0%	,9%	7,0%	20,6%
	PSC	N	58	247	34	2	43	154	538
		GE 2004 (row)	10,8%	45,9%	6,3%	,4%	8,0%	<u>28,6%</u>	100,0%
		RE 2006 (col)	17,1%	94,3%	21,0%	4,0%	38,1%	28,9%	36,9%
ERC	N	6	4	110	0	13	17	150	
	GE 2004 (row)	4,0%	2,7%	73,3%	,0%	8,7%	<u>11,3%</u>	100,0%	
	RE 2006 (col)	1,8%	1,5%	67,9%	,0%	11,5%	3,2%	10,3%	
PP	N	18	1	0	43	0	34	96	
	GE 2004 (row)	18,8%	1,0%	,0%	44,8%	,0%	<u>35,4%</u>	100,0%	
	RE 2006 (col)	5,3%	,4%	,0%	86,0%	,0%	6,4%	6,6%	
ICV	N	0	3	1	1	50	20	75	
	GE 2004 (row)	,0%	4,0%	1,3%	1,3%	66,7%	<u>26,7%</u>	100,0%	
	RE 2006 (col)	,0%	1,1%	,6%	2,0%	44,2%	3,8%	5,1%	
abst	N	17	5	1	1	6	270	300	
	GE 2004 (row)	5,7%	1,7%	,3%	,3%	2,0%	90,0%	100,0%	
	RE 2006 (col)	5,0%	1,9%	,6%	2,0%	5,3%	50,8%	20,6%	
Total	N	340	262	162	50	113	532	1459	
	GE 2004 (row)	23,3%	18,0%	11,1%	3,4%	7,7%	36,5%		
	RE 2006 (col)	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%		

Underscored the differential abstention; bold the most important dual vote situations.

Source: CIS 2660, Postelectoral survey for Catalonia after RE 2006

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