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# Split-Ticket Voting in Multi-Level Electoral Competition: European, National and Regional Concurrent Elections in Spain.

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Paper presented at the spring 2007 CONNEX conference “The Multi-level Electoral System of the EU”, on march 19-22, in Cadenabbia, Italy.

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[WORK IN PROGRESS, as on 14 March 2007]

## Abstract

This paper intends to shed new light on the causes of split-ticket voting in concurrent multi-level European, national and regional elections. Up to now, differences in electoral outcomes shown in Spanish concurrent regional elections have been understood as a product of higher levels of *tactical* voting associated to *second order* elections. Evidence against this interpretation is presented, and alternative explanations from the international literature are then tested. Preliminary evidence shows that Spanish ticket-splitters *weight* their European, regional and local electoral choices in a different manner: while they are salient for basing their local vote in personal interests (egotropic vote), they outstand in the regional *arena* by using regional interests as criteria for issuing their vote. Finally, in European elections –in the absence of real executive power– ticket-splitters tend to issue their votes based on their ideological preferences, more often than the rest of the electorate. As a whole, the evidence reviewed in this paper suggests the possible existence of a gradient in the impact that ideology has in concurrent electoral choice. Understanding ideology as a heuristic, the closer the elector to the object of election, the less relevant appears the ideological shortcut; the furthest the object of election from the voter, the more useful the ideological shortcut appears to be.

**Key words:** Elections, Spain, electoral behaviour, split-ticket voting, ideology.

## INTRODUCTION

The upraise of new political entities like the European Union or the Spanish *Estado de las Autonomías*, supposes a challenge to some *classical* theories of electoral behaviour, since this new institutional settings allow new behaviours –like Split-ticket Voting–, for which those theories can not account.

Split Ticket Voting appears when one elector chooses simultaneously for two or more different party options in different elections that are held concurrently<sup>1</sup>. Then, split-ticket voting supposes a *critical case* of electoral behaviour particularly interesting, since the simultaneity of the elections implies a quasi-experimental situation, in which many of the socio-demographic and attitudinal characteristics of the elector keep constant across the different electoral situations, and despite this, a proportions of electors behave differently in each electoral arena. Up to now, the field of *horizontal* split-ticket voting has been intensively studied with specific explanations that appeared for the majoritarian and presidentialist American political system (Campbell and Miller 1957, DeVries and Tarrance 1972, Fiorina 1992, Jacobson 1990, Petrocik and Dohety, 1996) or in the context of parliamentary democracies with mixed-member electoral systems, like Germany or New Zealand (Jesse 1988, Karp et al. 2002, Gschwend and van der Kolk 2006, Gschwend, 2007). On the other hand, the field of *vertical*<sup>2</sup> split-ticket is far less theorized nor empirically studied, being an exception the recent work of Elklit and Kjaer (2005, 2006) on *vertical* split-ticket in Sweden and Denmark.

## RESEARCH QUESTION AND GOALS

In a situation of concurrent elections in countries with proportional electoral systems and multi-level government, being controlled the socio-demographic dimensions of the electors: which are the causes for them to behave differently in each of the electoral levels? Is it possible to identify some general behavioural pattern?

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<sup>1</sup> Some examples of institutional settings that allow for Split-ticket voting would be the Presidential and Congress elections in de United States, the simultaneous choice for seats and candidates in German and New Zealand national elections and other countries with mixed electoral systems, or the coincidence in time of regional, national or European Parliamentary elections in Spain and in another European countries.

<sup>2</sup> Following Gschwend and van der Kolk (2006) categories, *vertical* split-ticket voting is referring to the fact of voting for two (or more) different parties in concurrent elections celebrated for electing representatives in two (or more) supra-ordinate levels of governance (*i.e.*: European, national or regional concurrent elections)

In Spain, discrepancies in the results of concurrent elections have usually been assumed as an outcome of some of the mechanisms identified by Reif and Schmitt (1980) in the European Elections, understood then as *second order national elections* (Montero, 1988a; Montabes, 1996; Pallarés and Keating, 2003); but none of these studies have tested the aforementioned mechanisms.

In order to answer the research question, this study has set three goals. Firstly, to show that the mechanisms associated to *second order national elections* have a limited covering range in order to explain split-ticket voting for the case of concurrent multilevel elections in Spain. Secondly, to review and test -in the case of Spain-, other *classic* explanations of split-ticket voting, like the *balancing* hypothesis of Morris Fiorina (1992) or the accidental theory of Gary Jacobson (1990). Finally, at the light of the presented evidence, inductively study the available evidence at the search of some regularity.

#### VERTICAL SPLIT-TICKET VOTING IN SPAIN

Up to now national and regional elections have been celebrated concurrently four times in Spain. After the first legislature of Regional Parliament in Andalucía autonomous community (1982-1986) national prime minister Felipe Gonzalez called for national elections concurrently with the previously appointed regional elections. After that moment, regional and national elections were held concurrently in Andalucía in 1986, 1996, 2000 and 2004. With almost 8 million inhabitants Andalucía it is the most populated region in Spain, and it is also one of the so called *historical* autonomous communities.

**Table 1.** Electoral results of the main parties in national and regional elections in Andalucía. Entries are vote percentages. In parenthesis the number of parliamentary seats.

	PSOE		AP/PP		IU		PA	
	Aut.	Gen.	Aut.	Gen.	Aut.	Gen.	Aut.	Gen.
<b>1986</b>	46,44 (60)	56,53 (42)	21,89 (28)	22,47 (15)	17,58 (19)	8,02 (3)	5,78 (2)	2,76 (0)
<b>1996</b>	43,78 (52)	46,39 (32)	33,75 (40)	35,18 (24)	13,88 (13)	13,40 (6)	6,62 (4)	3,51 (0)
<b>2000</b>	44,03 (52)	43,55 (30)	37,77 (46)	40,28 (28)	8,05 (6)	7,76 (3)	7,39 (5)	5,07 (1)
<b>2004</b>	50,03 (61)	52,54 (38)	31,58 (37)	33,48 (23)	7,46 (6)	6,35 (0)	6,12 (5)	4,02 (0)

Source: [www.eleweb.net](http://www.eleweb.net)

Electoral results in the concurrent elections show important differences in the outcomes than the parties obtain in each of the electoral arenas, while turnout levels were almost identical. Tables 1 and 2 show the results for the main parties in each electoral arena, and the regional *advantages* taken by those parties expressed in percentage points respectively<sup>3</sup>.

**Table 2.** Regional and national aggregate vote advantages by year and party. Entries are regional percentage advantages.

	1986	1996	2000	2004	Mean 1986-2004
PSOE	-10,10	-2,58	0,47	-2,71	-3,73
AP/PP*	-3,00	-1,45	-2,59	-2,00	-2,26
IU	9,80	0,48	0,29	1,13	2,92
PA	3,10	3,52	2,36	2,15	2,78
Saldo total autonómico	12,90	4,06	3,12	4,80	6,22
Saldo total nacional	-13,10	-4,03	-3,04	-4,71	-6,22


\* For 1986 AP + CDS  
Source: Ministerio del Interior and Junta de Andalucía

PSOE and AP/PP/CDS appear as vote losers in the regional calls (and therefore vote winners in the national calls), while IU and PA obtain positive balances in the regional elections and negative ones in the national calls. The greater differences took place in 1986, with 13 percentage points, and the minors in 2000, with a level of advantages near 3 percentage points. The average of the advantages in the studied elections slightly surpasses the level of the 6 percentage points. These data show the existence of differences in the electoral results in regional and national *arenas*, and raises the question of a possible existence of certain split-ticket voting patterns between certain electoral options. We have studied these patterns at individual level by constructing transference tables of regional and national vote, using data from CIS post-electoral surveys. These tables (appendix I) demonstrate that of all the possible vote transfereces, split-ticket voting only takes place following three patterns in the national (Nat.) to regional (Reg.) direction: *intra-block ticket splitting* from PSOE (Nat.) to IU

<sup>3</sup> This *advantage* index is calculated by subtracting the number of votes that each party received in regional elections from the number of votes received in the national elections (only in Andalucía), and expressing it as a percentage of candidature votes. This index provides us with a good measure of the vote *advantage* for each party, in each of the electoral levels. Positive values indicate regional *advantage* while negative values indicate national advantage.

(Reg.) in 1986, *regionalist ticket splitting* from majority national parties to PA (Reg.) and *inter-blocks ticket splitting* PP (Nat.) to PSOE (Reg.).

Figure 1 represents the evolution of the levels of these three types of split ticket voting between 1986 and 2004.



**Figure 1.** Percentage of split-ticket voters, by type of transfer and year.

\*From all parties to PA. Source: Banco de datos del CIS.

In other place (Sanz, 2006) I have studied in depth all three types of split ticket voting, in this case and due to space constraints I will focus on the case of intra-block (PSOE-IU) vertical split-ticket voting.

#### THEORETICAL FRAME AND HYPOTHESIS

In the seminal work by Reif and Schmitt (1980) a series of mechanisms operating in (not necessarily concurrent) European Elections were identified. These mechanisms, accounting for discrepancies between national and European electoral results, allowed to understand this last type of elections as *second order national elections*. As I have mentioned, many scholars present in the Spanish literature have understood the discrepancies between concurrent regional and national elections in Andalucía as the result of their intrinsic nature of second order elections. Here I will review the mechanisms proposed for European Elections by Reif and Schmitt (1980) [and revisited by Schmitt (2005)], now in the context of concurrent national and regional elections in Andalucía; as I will deduce some contrastable hypothesis.

### *Participation is lower*

In second order elections the level of politization is lower than in national elections. This would lead to differential mobilization in both types of elections. In Spain this differences in the electorates that actually vote in each type of election has been proposed as the explanation of the differences in the outcomes that some parties systematically get in each electoral arenas. In our case of study, the concurrence factor, with almost identical levels of participation in both electoral arenas neutralise the potential impact of this mechanism as antecedent of split-ticket voting.

### *Government Parties Lose*

In *second order elections* parties in national government systematically loses support in comparison with previous national elections.

There have been proposed at least two mechanisms to explain this regularity. First one would be the *Popularity function effect* in which support for the party at national executive is maximum after the election day, minimum in the middle of the legislature and restores the initial levels by the time of next national election. Then, the celebration *timing for second order election* would be a factor for the differences in electoral outcomes, comparing with national elections. Again, the concurrence factor neutralise any impact of this mechanism on split-ticket voting.

The second explanation for government parties to loose, is related to the opportunity for a number of electors to *voice* their dissatisfaction with the performance of the party for which they voted at national elections, by voting for another party in a level of elections where this behaviour would have lower costs. This mechanism is perfectly applicable in our case of study, and will be tested in the first hypothesis.

If split-ticket voting is at some extent the product of *voicing* at the regional level dissatisfaction with national executive performance, then:

**(H1) The more dissatisfaction with national executive performance, the higher probability of ticket splitting.**

### *Big Parties Lose*

In *second order elections* big parties systematically lose ground in favour for small ones. Again we can find that at least two mechanisms have been proposed to explain these differences.

The first one is an institutional factor, and defends that differences in proportionality between regional and national electoral system can introduce differences in the incentive for voting *strategically*, this is to vote for a party different from the one that would be the elector *first preference*<sup>4</sup>. In Spain regional electoral systems are more proportional than the national one, and this can be understood as a factor to vote *more sincerely* in regional election (favouring small parties) and more strategically in national elections (penalizing here small parties).

The second mechanism proposed for explaining big parties loses in *second order elections* is the differences on what “it is at stake” in each level of election. Being less what “it is at the stake” at regional election electors would behave *more sincerely* in this type of elections, favouring to small parties in regional elections.

Both mechanisms (the one related to electoral system and the one related to what it is “at the stake”) share a unique structure of incentives, favouring a *more sincere* vote in regional elections and *more strategic* vote in national elections. These mechanisms are applicable to our case of concurrent elections, and will be tested in the second hypothesis.

If split-ticket voting it is to some extent the product of a more sincere regional electoral behaviour, then:


**(H2) Split-ticket voters will vote for their *first preference* at the regional level and for their *second preference* at the national level.**

Another influential explanation for split-ticket voting begins with the influential book *Divided Government* by Morris Fiorina (1992), where he defends an *intentional* split-ticket voting model of *policy balancing* in the United States. According to his model, when voters split their tickets between two parties that present candidates to the

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<sup>4</sup> There is a theoretical discussion on the definition and operationalization of *first preference* concept. In this paper, by reasons of space and simplicity we will follow the one that understands *first preference* as defined by ideological proximity and party identification.

Presidency and the Congress, the voters act *as if* they had the intention of favouring a *divided* electoral result, in such manner that power would be distributed between two parties that, dominating different institutions, would produce a situation of balance and mutual control. Ticket splitters would be moderate voters who do not fully identify with any of the electoral options -that they perceive as extreme- and they would choose simultaneously for candidates of both parties, with the final intention of obtaining moderate policies. Fiorina models voters behaviour, specifying that a voter will tend to split his vote when, in the space of the partisan identification, it is located between the parties for which it is possible to split the vote. Figure 2 represents an adaptation of his model to the left-right (L-R) ideological space, more suitable to structure European politics.



**Figure 2.** Adaptation to the ideological Left Right space of Fiorina's (1992) model for split-ticket voting.

In this model, *voter 2* -that is located in *inner space* defined by the positions of the parties A and B in the L-R scale- will have a greater probability to split the vote between both parties, that the voters 1 and 3; who are located in the *outer space* to both parties (they are more extremist than its closer party) and therefore, is not possible to attribute them any *intentionality* to obtain a final situation of moderation in the policies. Originally Fiorina's *intentional* model was presented to account for split-ticket voting in the context American two party system. In our multi-partisan and multi-level context, the model maintains its original sense as long as the assumption that the parties for which it is possible to split the vote are contiguous in the main competition axis. That is to say, whenever it does not exist a third party located ideologically between both parties A and B, the parties between which the split of the vote takes place.

If split-ticket voting is at some extent the product of Fiorina's *intentional balancing*:

**(H3) Split-ticket voters will tend be ideologically self positioned between the two parties for which they split the vote.**

The last explanation of split ticket voting that we will consider it is the one introduced by Gary Jacobson (1990 and 1991) and that it is known as *accidental* model of split-ticket voting. This explanation also arises in the American context, and defends that voters decisions in both electoral *arenas* (Presidential and Congress) are independent; that is to say, they do not depend on any preference of the voters on the final configuration of forces in different institutions. Thus, the causes for voters to split the vote would reside in differences in the political *offer* that the parties present in each electoral scene, and very especially in differences in the quality and visibility of candidates. On the other hand, Jacobson also defends that split-ticket voting could happen because of differences of what the citizens *demand* in each type of election. For the American case Jacobson maintains that, although the voters demand to the executive an effort to maximize the collective goods, they demand to legislative power an effort to minimize individual risks, to optimize wealth distribution and minimize local costs (Jacobson 1991: 641).

Any way, a final situation of *divided government* it would be *accidental* or not *intentional* by the voters, as they would not be looking for any type of compensation between powers. They would be simply maximizing their preferences, that are different in each type from election<sup>5</sup>.

If split-ticket voting is to some extent the product of the offer of specially visible or valuable candidates in some of the electoral *arenas* then:

**(H4.1) The better voters valuate a candidate, the higher their probability of ticket splitting.**

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<sup>5</sup> This explanation, while being very suggesting, it is not exempt of problems because of it is elusive at the time of being tested. This is so since it encompasses two complementary sides of the problem. In one hand the *accidental* explanation signals the causes for ticket splitting in the *supply* side of the problem (differences in the quality and visibility of candidate offer), but on the other hand and simultaneously the causes for ticket splitting are also signalled on the *demand* side (citizens demand a strong President but a risk minimizing House). Thereby, as I understand it is difficult to disentangle how well is valued a leader (or the ability of a Party to handle any type of *issue*) and its impact in actual voting behaviour, from how important it is *leadership* (or to handle with an *issue*) for voting behaviour in each one of the electoral arenas. Being aware of this intrinsic difficulty, in this research I will try to test one side of the problem.

**(H4.2) The better the voters value two candidates from different parties, competing in different electoral arenas, the higher probability of ticket splitting.**

It is important to note that while H4.1 defends that split ticket voting it is about *leadership* in at least one electoral level, H4.2 defends that split ticket voting it is about *leadership* in both electoral levels.

Summing up, we have reviewed three families of relevant explanations for Split-ticket voting. The first one stresses the role of *the voters*. One mechanism proposed by Reif and Schmitt (1980) argues that electors *voice* national executive dissatisfaction in *second order elections*; the other mechanism presented by Fiorina (1992), defends that split-ticket as an *intentional* behaviour and proposes that it would depend on voters relative position in respect to two partisan options. The second family of explanations started by Jacobson, puts the emphasis on the role of *parties* at the time of presenting an offer different in quality in each type from election; and it emphasizes the importance of the differences between the candidates in each election type. The third and final family, emphasizes the importance of *institutions* when defending that split-ticket voting is a form of strategic vote, and would exist two possible mechanisms involved. For the *strategic* explanation, differences in the electoral system *permissiveness* would be an antecedent for split-ticket voting; whereas from *second order elections* theory (Reif and Schmitt 1980) differences between what “it is at the stake” in each level of election would constitute a relevant incentive for differentiated electoral behaviour: more *sincere* in *second order elections*, more *strategical* in those of first order.

#### DATA AND METHOD

In this work I used data from a panel survey from the Spanish *Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas* (CIS) (CIS 1536 and CIS 1546) with a representative sample of the electorate in Andalucía, in 1986 regional and national elections<sup>6</sup>. In order to test the

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<sup>6</sup> Because of sample attrition this study has a limited sample size compared to other available studies for the same elections (i.e.: CIS 1539), but it offers the added value of being panel survey. This fact allows measuring the independent variables (ideology, executive performance, candidate evaluation, etc.) in the pre-electoral wave, while the dependent variable (vote recall) in the post-electoral wave. This is important because measuring both the consequent and the antecedents in the same moment raise concerns on the direction of causality. This is especially relevant when leaders and executive evaluations and vote recall are measured concurrently. Despite its reduced sample size the analysis presented in this paper gain in robustness because they are a good replication of previous analysis performed on data coming from the aforementioned bigger sample but only “one wave” pre-electoral survey (Sanz 2006).

aforementioned hypothesis, and at the current state of development of this research, I used both bivariate analysis and a multinomial logistic regression model. In next development of this research I plan to operationalize the concepts related to hypothesis 2 and 3 in such way that they could be tested also concurrently in a unique multinomial logistic regression model, that will be fitted with data from the different (and bigger) available datasets, and also in different electoral years.

In the multinomial logistic regression model, the dependent variable had three possible values. First one was straight vote PSOE-PSOE (Nat-Reg) (base category), second was straight vote IU-IU, and last one was split vote PSOE-IU (Nat-Reg). The independent variables were the evaluation of national executive performance (measured in a 1 to 5 scale), the ideological self-position (measured in a 1 to 10 scale), the PSOE national candidate evaluation (incumbent Felipe Gonzalez, measured in a 0 to 10 scale) and the IU regional candidate evaluation (Julio Anguita) (measured in a 0 to 10 scale). As a control variable was used the vote recall in recent NATO integration referendum celebrated three months in advance, in which PSOE campaigned for the “Yes” while prior to taking control of national executive in 1982 publicly defended the “No” option.

Additionally, in a second exploratory moment, I use data from another post-electoral CIS survey, applied after 1987 European, regional and local elections celebrated concurrently in Spain. Using this data I have studied the different declared reasons to decide de vote, at the European, regional and local levels, and explored the different levels of association between ideology and vote probability, again in at the European, regional and local levels.

## RESULTS

The result of fitting a model of intra-block split ticket voting in 1986 national and regional elections in Andalucía show us that -as comparing to the base (and majoritarian) behaviour of straight voting for PSOE- straight voting for IU it is significantly related to ideology and to the evaluations of the regional communist (and charismatic) leader Julio Anguita. On the other hand split-ticket voting it is statistically independent from ideology, and it is significantly related to the positive evaluation of both national and regional candidates from PSOE and IU respectively. Positive evaluation of national executive does not reach the level of statistical significance.

Finally the control variable for NATO vote recall while also not reaching significance levels it is close of doing so (p-values of 0.06 and 0.09 for IU-IU and for PSOE-IU respectively), and both cases share the same pattern. Having voted 'No' in previous NATO referendum it is related to a (non significant) increase in the probability of a straight IU vote or a split PSOE-IU vote.

**Table 3.** A multinomial model of vertical intra-block split ticket voting in 1986 national and regional elections in Andalucia, Spain. Entries are regression coefficients, standard errors in parenthesis<sup>1</sup>.

	<b>Straight IU-IU</b>	<b>Split PSOE-IU</b>
Evaluation of national executive <sup>2</sup>	-1,23 (0,90)	0,17 (0,55)
Ideology <sup>3</sup>	-1,17* (0,57)	-0,05 (0,34)
PSOE national candidate evaluation (Felipe González) <sup>4</sup>	-0,56 (0,32)	-0,67** (0,25)
IU Regional candidate evaluation (Julio Anguita) <sup>4</sup>	0,72* (0,33)	0,51* (0,22)
NATO 'Yes'	-2,38 (1,24)	-1,31 (0,78)
<b>Constant</b>	<b>6,43</b> (4,40)	<b>0,66</b> (3,03)
(n)	111	
Nagelkerke R <sup>2</sup> :	0,64	

<sup>1</sup> Base category is straight vote PSOE-PSOE.

<sup>2</sup> 1 Very bad, 5 Very well.

<sup>3</sup> 1 Left, 10 Right

<sup>4</sup> 0 Very Bad, 10 Very well.

\* Significant at 5% \*\* Significant at 1%

In order to make more accessible the interpretation of the coefficients in the logistic model, I have presented graphically the predicted probabilities derived from the equation coefficients. Predicted probabilities were calculated keeping the values of other independent variables at their means. Now we will review the impact on split-ticket voting probability of each one of the independent variables, and its implications to the presented hypothesis.

Figure 3 puts in relation a positive evaluation of national executive performance with the probability of vote options IU-IU and PSOE-IU. In the case of straight IU-IU vote (solid red line), an increase in this positive evaluation decreases the probability at the lower levels of the scale. In the case of split ticket voting (green broken line), can be appreciated a flat slope indicating that split ticket voting it does not appear to be related to a (negative) national executive performance evaluation. This evidence is not favourable to the H1 relating negative evaluation of national executive with *voicing* dissatisfaction only at the regional level.




Figure 3.

Figure 4 puts in relation the ideology (L-R) with the probability of vote options (IU-IU and PSOE-IU). In this case, and again in reference to issuing a straight PSOE-PSOE vote it can be clearly appreciated that the more on the right an elector is, the less probability for a communist straight vote. On the other hand it also appears clear that issuing a split socialdemocrat-communist vote it is not related to the ideology of the electors. Another way to express the same idea is to say that the ideology is related in the same manner to issuing a straight PSOE-PSOE vote than to issuing a split PSOE-IU vote. Or as we can see also in figure 8 (appendix II), the ideology of split ticket voters it is the same that the ideology of straight PSOE voters.





Fig.4

This is evidence contrary to H3, since as can be also appreciated in the bivariate analysis presented in Figure 5, split ticket voters do not show a characteristic ideological pattern, different from both IU-IU and PSOE-PSOE straight voters (they are ideologically different from IU straight voters, but equal to PSOE straight voters).

Figure 5 **Confidence intervals for the mean of ideology, by vote**  
(n)=223



Source: Banco de datos del CIS

In the same line this evidence contradicts completely H2., since split ticket voters choose their *first* (ideological) *preference* (PSOE) at the national level.

Then, if intra-block split ticket voting seems not to be about *voicing* dissatisfaction at the regional level, nor about *strategic* or ideological voting, what can explain that some electors, ideologically close to PSOE, and not influenced by national executive performance vote for IU in the regional elections?

Figures 6 and 7 give us some useful clues for the understanding of 1986 high levels of *intrablok* split ticket voting in Andalucía.

In figure 6 we can appreciate how a positive evaluation of the communist regional candidate Julio Anguita it is directly (and significantly) related with an increase of the probability of split PSOE-IU vote. This increase in the probability it is comparable to the one experienced by straight communist voters, as they better value the IU candidate. This evidence confirms H4.1 as the better the electors evaluate the candidate who get inter-level vote *advantages* the more probability of splitting the regional vote into his (party) favour.




Fig. 6

Figure 7 gives us the opposite situation, since a positive evaluation of the national PSOE candidate Felipe González drastically decreases the probability of split-ticket voting, in favour of a straight PSOE-PSOE vote (base category). This evidence is contrary to H4.2, since it shows that it is not necessary to be about two visible leaders pulling from the electorate in different levels, for different parties.




Fig. 7.

### Section conclusions

In this section we have tested several hypotheses present on the literature on split-ticket voting as well as multi-level electoral competition in Europe and Spain. Through this process of hypotheses testing we have learned about several characteristics of *intra*block split ticket voters in Andalucía that let us have now a better picture of the situation. We know that ticket splitters vote for PSOE at national level, that ideologically they are close to PSOE, and that their main party identification is also with that party. We also know that they tended (while not significantly) to vote ‘No’ in NATO referendum, that they value poorly Prime Minister Felipe González, and that they value very well the communist regional leader Julio Anguita.

While a formal procedure would lead us to reject all the presented hypothesis, with the exception to the Jacobson *accidental* theory based on the differences on the visibility and quality of candidates *supplied* by the parties, a more contextual interpretation would differ in the conclusion. In fact, I completely agree that 1986 *inter*-block split ticket voting in Andalucía was not caused by ideological *balancing* nor about

*strategic* considerations of the electorate. But despite formal analysis would ask to reject the regional *voice* of national dissatisfaction hypothesis I consider that it is still defensible that, a number of electors fully belonging to the PSOE caucus, dissatisfied with the executive performance on NATO issue, may be “channelled” their disgust through leader evaluation: the negative evaluation of Felipe Gonzalez and the positive evaluation of Julio Anguita (this last one strongly campaigned for ‘No’ to NATO). Again the task of disentangling *second order* election *voicing* from the differences in the quality of candidate *offer* does not appear to be simple and direct.


#### CONTEXT AND FURTHER RESEARCH

The small piece of research that I have just presented it is part of a wider research project. In that context the presented results gain in robustness and clarity since they are a replication of a part of a previous work (Sanz 2006) in which I have tested similar hypothesis on bigger datasets and in different moments in time. In that research I have studied *intra-block*, *inter-block*, and *regionalist* split ticket voting in the concurrent national and regional elections of 1986, 1996 and 2000. These three modalities of *vertical* split ticket voters have a number of peculiarities as antecedents ticket splitting, but all of them show a regularity: *Split-ticket voters in Andalucía tend to follow their ideological preferences at the national election level*, while are a number of changing factors (or issues) that *pull* the electors in order to *cross their ideological lines, at the regional level*. This fact is, to some extent, not fitting with some predictions from the *second order elections* paradigm that expect a *more sincere* (or more ideological) vote at the regional (not national) *second order elections*.


Figure 7. Fitted vote probabilities for PSOE (0) and IU (1) in 1987 European, regional and local elections, by ideology.

Solid black lines represent straight voters. Broken red lines represent ticket splitters.


Fitted Vote probability in 1987 European Parliament election, by ideology



Fitted vote probability in 1987 regional election, by ideology.



Fitted vote probability in 1987 local election, by ideology.



Source: Own elaboration in data from Banco de datos del CIS.

In order to solve this (only apparent) contradiction, it was raised the question of what would happen -in respect to *vertical* split-ticket voting- if two (or more) *second order elections* were held concurrently. At which electoral level would voters abandon their ideology and party identification? Spanish concurrent 1987 European, regional and local elections gives us an excellent opportunity to explore voting behaviour again in a quasi-experimental situation<sup>7</sup>. In that occasion the levels of vertical split ticket voting surpassed 15 percentage points in that occasion. Again, the more frequent modality of split-ticket was the *intra-block* PSOE-IU/IU-PSOE. Using data from the 1987 CIS post-electoral survey, I have fitted binomial logistic models of electoral choice between PSOE (0) and IU(1) separately at each of the electoral levels being ideology the independent variable, and leader and national executive performance evaluations the control variables.

As comparing the coefficients from different logistic regression models it is not an option commonly accepted, I used the straight voters as internal control for comparison (who logically maintain constant their relation between their ideology and their vote in all the levels). Figure 7 shows the fitted vote probabilities for voting for PSOE (0) and IU (1) in 1987 European, regional and local elections, by ideology and type of vote (straight or split). Solid black lines represent straight voters and broken red lines represent ticket splitters.

In figure 7 it can be clearly appreciated that the impact of ideology on the choice between PSOE and IU for split-ticket voters, reach its maximum in the European elections (higher than consistent voters), it is intermediate in regional elections (lower than consistent voters) and it is minimum at the local level (much lower than consistent voters).

Finally, and only with a descriptive and exploratory intention I have studied what ticket splitters answer when they are openly questioned on their reasons to vote at each level of election.

Tables 4 and 5 show the different declared vote reasons (in an open response question) by split ticket and straight voters. Table 4 shows this comparison for split-ticket voting in the European and at the regional elections, and table 5 shows the comparison for split ticket voting in regional and local elections.

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<sup>7</sup> In 1987 were celebrated local and European elections in the whole of Spain. The same day were celebrated also regional elections in all autonomous communities except from Andalucía, Cataluña, Galicia and País Vasco.

**Table 4.** Declared reasons of regional and European vote of straight and split-ticket voters in 1987 concurrent regional and European elections in Spain. Figures are row percentages. In parenthesis Haberman's Standard residuals<sup>1</sup>.

	Declared Reasons for Regional Parliament Vote		Declared Reasons for European Parliament Vote	
	Straight Vote	Split Vote	Straight Vote	Split Vote
The Candidate	4,8 (-2,1)**	9,6 (2,1)**	13,5 (-4,9)**	32,3 (4,9)**
The Party	42,1 (3,6)**	24,0 (-3,6)**	36,6 (3,7)**	18,2 (-3,7)**
Ideology	9,6 (0,6)	7,7 (-0,6)	9,7 (1,2)	6,1 (-1,2)
Executive Performance	7,8 (-1,6)	12,5 (1,6)	5,9 (0,8)	4,0 (-0,8)
Regional Interest	3,7 (-2,9)	9,6 (2,9)**	2,6 (0,3)	2,0 (-0,3)
Personal Interest	1,0 (0,1)	1,0 (-0,1)	1,0 (1,0)	0,0 (-1,0)
Lack of information	0,0 (-3,0)**	1,0 (3,0)**	3,0 (0,6)	0,0 (-0,6)
Other	31,0 (-0,8)	34,6 (0,8)	30,3 (-1,4)	37,4 (1,4)
n		1060		1025
Cramer's V		0,173**		0,182**

<sup>1</sup> Values over 1,96 indicate statistical signification (Haberman 1973).

\* Significant at 5% \*\* Significant at 1%

Source: Banco de datos del CIS.

**Table 5.** Declared reasons of regional and local vote of straight and split-ticket voters in 1987 concurrent regional and local elections in Spain. Figures are row percentages. In parenthesis Haberman's Standard residuals<sup>1</sup>.

	Declared Reasons for Municipal Vote		Declared Reasons for Regional Parliament Vote	
	Straight Vote	Split Vote	Straight Vote	Split Vote
The Candidate	9,8 (-4,3)**	23,1 (4,3)**	4,8 (-2,0)**	9,1 (2,0)**
The Party	36,1 (4,5)**	15,7 (-4,5)**	40,8 (0,9)	36,4 (-0,9)
Ideology	10,6 (2,5)**	3,3 (-2,5)**	9,9 (1,5)	5,8 (-1,5)
Executive (local/regional ) Performance	12,6 (-5,5)**	31,4 (5,5)**	8,3 (0,0)	8,3 (-0,0)
Regional Interest	3,2 (0,4)	2,5 (-0,4)	4,3 (0,1)	4,1 (-0,1)
Personal Interest	1,6 (-2,5)**	5,0 (2,5)**	1,1 (0,2)	0,8 (-0,2)
Lack of information	0,1 (0,4)	0,0 (-0,4)	0,0 (-2,8)**	0,8 (2,8)**
Other	25,9 (1,6)	19,0 (-1,6)	30,9 (-0,9)	34,7 (0,9)
n		1048		1060
Cramer's V		0,258**		0,117*

<sup>1</sup> Values over 1,96 indicate statistical signification (Haberman 1973).

\* Significant at 5% \*\* Significant at 1%

Source: Banco de datos del CIS.

As a whole when asked on voting decision criteria, split ticket voters tend to declare “Candidates” as a vote reason, more often than the rest of the electorate, and “partisanship” less often than straight voters. But when we compare their given reason between electoral levels they outstand at the local level by a lesser use of ideology and a more intense use of personal interest, while at the regional level by declaring regional interest as a key factor.

## CONCLUSIONS

In this paper I have reviewed some preliminary results on *vertical* split-ticket voting in national and regional elections in Spain. In this review I have identified a variety of factors *pulling* from electorate for crossing their ideological preferences at the regional level. On the other hand, despite this variety on the antecedents for vertical split-ticket voting; a regularity was also noticed: *split ticket voters tended in a majority to vote according to their ideological preferences at the upper or national level*, in the 1986, 1996 and 2000 concurrent elections in Spain. Since this seemed not to fit with the *strategic* predictions for *second order elections*, the impact of ideology on split ticket voters was compared in 1987 concurrent European, regional and local elections in Spain. Results from this comparison (altogether with the previously presented) suggest a possible gradient in the impact of ideology on split ticket voters choice: The closer the elector to the “object of election” the less impact of ideology on their choice. The furthest the elector from the “object of election” the bigger the impact of ideology on their electoral choice. Further –more refined- confirmations of this hypothetical regularity are needed. For doing so a cross national comparative study (in the frame of my doctoral research) is under theoretical discussion. The cases of concurrent elections celebrated in Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Italy, Spain, and Sweden are candidates to enter in a comparative research design. If the suspected regularity were further confirmed, ideology would gain in its role as heuristic or cognitive shortcut; at least for the small group of *sophisticate* voters that vertically split their votes across different electoral arenas.

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## Appendix I. Regional-national transference tables 1986-2004.

**Table 11.** Vote Recall. National and Regional elections in Andalucía.. 1986.

		Regional elections					(n)
		CP	CDS	IU	PSOE	PA	
National elections	CP	94	0	3	3	0	64
		94	0	3	1	0	
	CDS	10	67	17	0	7	30
		5	100	7	0	17	
	IU	0	0	100	0	0	29
		0	0	43	0	0	
	PSOE	0	0	11	87	2	286
		2	0	44	99	50	
	PA	0	0	33	0	67	6
		0	0	3	0	33	
(n)		64	20	68	251	12	415

First entries in each cell are row percentages, second entries are column percentages.  
Source: Banco de datos del CIS.

**Table 12.** Vote Recall. National and Regional elections in Andalucía. 1996.

		Regional elections				(n)	
		PP	IU-LV	PSOE	PA		
National elections	PP	90	1	2	7	237	
		99	2	1	22		
	IU	1	87	3	9	129	
		1	94	1	16		
	PSOE	0	1	93	6	443	
		1	4	98	36		
	PA	0	0	0	100	20	
		0	0	0	26		
	(n)		216	119	418	76	829

First entries in each cell are row percentages, second entries are column percentages.  
Source: Banco de datos del CIS.

**Table 13.** Vote Recall. National and Regional elections in Andalucía. 2000.

		Regional elections				(n)	
		PP	IU-CA	PSOE	PA		
National elections	PP	89	1	7	3	271	
		99	4	7	21		
	IU	0	93	2	5	43	
		0	89	0	5		
	PSOE	1	1	94	4	241	
		1	7	93	21		
	PA	0	0	0	100	22	
		0	0	0	52		
	(n)		244	45	246	42	577

First entries in each cell are row percentages, second entries are column percentages.  
Source: Banco de datos del CIS.

**Table 14.** Vote Recall. National and Regional elections in Andalucía. 2004.

		Regional elections				(n)	
		PP	IU-CA	PSOE	PA		
National elections	PP	90	1	5	4	251	
		96	4	2	28		
	IU	3	88	9	0	34	
		0	67	1	0		
	PSOE	1	2	94	2	562	
		3	29	97	36		
	Otros (PA)	0	0	0	100	13	
		0	0	0	36		
	(n)		235	45	544	36	860

First entries in each cell are row percentages, second entries are column percentages.  
Source: Banco de datos del CIS.