

First draft

## Europe as our new nation: trust and legitimacy in EU

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### Abstract

*Citizenship as a set of roles and expectations on a level of individual is in a process of transformation. In a modern view it was attached to a nation state. The question of an empirical research remains if EU as new institutional and political entity resembles the type of emotionally leaden attachment typical for national states, or is the attachment of citizens to it of a more dispersed and unaffected kind. The question resembles that of a change in territorial identity in a process of globalisation. Moreover it is interesting to explore into a topic comparing the old and new members of EU, and to look at the factors influencing the support to institutions at different levels in a hierarchy. One may contemplate about the dynamic of different strategies that actors are choosing fulfilling their interests as members of groups in a political and social spectrum, much of it traversing national state boundaries, but including also national elites' interest, like exit or veto strategies. A topic is important for evaluation of legitimacy of institutions.*

### Introduction

The relationship between citizens evaluation of democratic institutions on a national and European level received considerable attention in recent studies. Most of the studies dealt by the impact that evaluation on a national level might have on support for integration, European identity and evaluation of regime performance. A common finding is that correlation is high and positive. Our analysis starts from that perspective. We have set a modest goal to explore possible factors that might lay behind that correlation in a comparative context. Our emphasis is to put East European new members state on a map of research agenda. We know from previous studies that national contexts are important in understanding patterns of relations among various levels of explanation (**Brinegar and Jolly 2005, etc.**).

Initial explanation for the high support of European institution in some countries compared to national institution starts from perspective that the meaning of European is different in contexts where there is no particular political and interests cleavages in relation to European institutions. Italy is quoted as a case in that respect. (M. Koenig-Archibugi). In East European countries European accession and reforms associated with that are often perceived as inevitable. There is basic consensus about that common goal that it is better compared to staying outside, as ideal that brings benefits to all.

Low level of trust and support for political entities at the national level in Italy is, contrary to a notion of EU, connected with sharp cleavages in historical periods of a process of nation state building (M. Koenig-Archibugi). Again East European political situation can stay in parallel with

the generally low level of trust and support of national institution, as a consequence of sharp political disensus about national priorities in a government performance. Divisions, which are consequences of “ideological wars”, made national identity weak (M. Koenig-Archibugi, 86). There is hope that European influence would enhance better functioning of national institutions.

Support to institutions in societies with long established democratic tradition and in new democracies has different background and different meaning. Therefore also the relationship between support of national and European institutions can reveal that specifics in formation of attitudes.

### **Citizens' identity**

A concept of national citizens' identity has specific meaning when European level is taken into consideration.

A thesis about a protest vote or secondary elections, when citizens that are not satisfied with the national government can chose to punish national government by withdrawal of a support for European processes and institutions. European level is but one additional problem of internal political debate.

Conception of citizens identity in that context is very much a consequences of negotiations between political actors and interest groups, it represent type of a 'thin' locality on a national and European level. It does not suppose strong connection among members of a group.

Politics at the domestic level is a 'nested game'; here strategies that are suboptimal at one level can be optimal if political outcome at another level is taken into account. (Hix, Goetz 2000:271). Actors may chose to exit the domestic area, or can use veto strategies to promote their cause, or use information advantage to achieve additional benefits in domestic area (Hix, Goetz 2000:271). There is an inherent interplay between the two levels.

Citizens' identity on European level does not resemble that of a nation state, citizenship is separate from national identity. Allegiances that EU seeks to elicit are of post-national kind (*Fossum 2005*). The EU is pursuing the modern idea of statehood, as divorced from nationhood: the polity is not bound by pre-political bonds. (ODDVAR ERIKSEN AND JOHN ERIK FOSSUM 2004)). Europe citizens' identity consists of networks independent of nations boundaries and as such is not in a conflict with national citizens identification, which itself is in a process of transformation.

What constitute a citizens identity is a social power as a potential that can be realised by expressing opinions and making judgement about national and European institutions as one of a form of citizens activity. Both positive and negative support of political system shows that kind of identity and belonging. (Franklin and Van der Eijk, 1996).

We can conceive a theoretical relation between different types and objects of support to political system and broader identification with the system. This can be conceived more as a latent trait that lies behind various manifest forms of expressing judgements. Among synonyms of political trust or, in parallel to social capital, political capital are also citizenship as well as civic duty, political participation, political interest and knowledge, and so on. It signals a common political identity with fellow citizens (Newton 1999:5). Newton, K. (1999a) 'Social capital and democracy in modern Europe', in Jan van Deth, Marco Maraffi, Ken Newton, and Paul Whiteley, eds., *Social Capital and European Democracy*, London, Routledge, 1999, 3-24.

Explicit symbolic identity with European symbols is not necessary part of a broader citizens identity formed on a base of democratic character of a system (Bruter, 1149). A definition of citizens identity remains based on identification with the political system as an institutional framework that support a base for commonality with other citizens. (Bruter, 1155). In that definition we have explicit mentioning of a relation of citizens to an institutional framework. That itself is on a concrete level encompassed in relationship to functioning of its political institutions. And there is no reference on formation of belonging to a social group (Bruter, 1156).

Connected with the definition of citizens identity in a context of evaluation of institutions at European level is a question of democratic deficit. The European Union can be conceived as an elitist project without widespread public support that affect its legitimacy (Claes H. de Vreese Hajo G. Boomgaarden 2005) . What constitute a debate about democratic deficit is reconsideration of Identity and legitimacy in a European context. (Cerutti, 2003) . Citizenship can be made tough active search of post-national identity (Eriksen, 2005), a new conceptualization of culture and feelings of belonging, where ambivalence, transition and being more historically informed are some key elements. (Stråth 2002)..

Reforms imposed on European level have indirect distributional effect. Many of the reforms are also in common benefit. The enlargement/integration process constrained democratic principles because of its inevitability, speed, expertise. However as globalization weaken of the overall ability of nation-states to control developments in society, one talk about a global citizenship (Turner 2002). The new Eastern EU members would hardly have more space for choice in domestic politics if they had stayed outside the EU. (Claes H. de Vreese, Hajo G. Boomgaarden 2005)

European governmental model can be conceived also as a pluralist model (Coultrap, 1999) Institutions that are deemed inefficient in a parliamentary democracy model can be efficient in a pluralist model.

We use two pairs of indicators of trust to political institutions on a national and European level. We want to reveal what is common and what remains specific in attitudes to institution at different levels, while sets of measures are parallel in a form of scales and referents. National and European political representative and executive institutions are used as measure of that broader citizens identity. Correlation between the two levels in our conception is a result of congruence of specific and general factors of identity formation.

#### Explanatory factors

Therefore we use explanatory variables that can shed light on specific components of each of the aspect, national or European. We allow for contextual factors to reinforce the character of that specific background in meaning of each level nationally. We allow exploring domestic politics as explanatory factor in relation to European institutions – and also a reverse effect, European as an explanatory factor in domestic political situation (Hix, Goetz 2000).

The variables that are expected to have more in common with the national institutions are those that are directly related to their evaluation. Trust in national institutions is dependent on institutional performance both in old members as in new EU members. In post-communists societies there is a situational component more in at front then deeply rooted cultural gained trust in institution (MISHLER, ROSE (2001; 2005). In evaluation of institutions citizens evaluate the representational capacity of national institutions (ROHRSCHEIDER, 2005). We use retrospective and prospective

sociotropic economic evaluation and approval of [country] government's record. Attendance at religious services is used as proxies for cultural political cleavages that are effective in most of the European countries. These same variables would affect also trust in European political institutions, a simple explanation here given would be that those institutions are deemed accountable for what happened in a national frame as well (**Ronald D. Gellens , Christopher J. Anderson, 2000**), or a **second order elections Liesbet Hooghe, Gary Marks 2005 ; similar to a punishment trap theory. (Leonard Ray)** Cue theory follows the reasoning that national political elites that are strongly divided attract the followers of the parties to express similar opinions. (**Kitzinger 2003**)

Two measures of perceived interest of EU societal and individually, eu in the interest of [country] eu in respondent's interest, tap the factors that connect the evaluation of European institutions in relation to national institutions. It is those two measures that one would expect transfer of evaluation happened from European institutions to domestic ones, showing also a degree of interconnectedness of national and European interest. (Franklin and Van der Eijk, 1996). (**Ignacio Sánchez-Cuenca 2000**)

Three other measures directed to European level shows openness and tolerance in a notion of social welfare and political rights of non-national citizens, where there is possible a conflictual relation to national level, on employment - priority to [country] members, citizens of eu countries in [resp. country] vote in [resp. country] and citizens of eu countries in [resp. country] social benefits of [country], and respondent's attitude to European unification (**Claes H. de Vreese Hajo G. Boomgaarden 2005. Adam Luedtke 2005**) Attachment to a nation is a question of emotional investment and rational expectations. One can save emotional investments by taking an inclusive identity, where e.g. ethnic and citizens identity do not overlap. (Mikael Kjerm: National Identities....Acta Sociologica 1998)


Anti-immigration attitudes are expected to be more important in old members than in new. Finally two measures of what we may call European symbolic identity, a nonexclusive national identity and a European national pride: not only [country] citizen, but also European citizen and proud of eu citizenship, are close to a notion of undivided European and national identity. (**Liesbet Hooghe Gary Marks 2005**)

Individual political ideology, general political interests, subjective middle and upper class, media exposure, education, and gender and generation cohort are among the remaining variables that are candidates for showing additional meaning of two indices of citizens identity, European and national trust.

*Method section*

Results

Cross-country variations in levels of trust to institutions at European level are profound already on a level of expressing opinion (Figure 1). European institutions, due to a lack of information despite pre-accession media coverage and referendum campaigns, at the very low levels of opinion expression among new members. This might reflect a notion of inevitability of European frame of living, which goes in favour of some of the democratic deficit thesis, and which lead to a political alienation, widespread among Eastern European countries, that one has no influence and thus no need to act. A power potential is also one of the basic prerequisites of citizens identification.




Note: Austria (AT), Belgium (BE), Britain (GB), Cyprus (CY), Czech Republic (CZ), Denmark (DK), Estonia (EE), Finland (FI), France (FR), Germany (DE), Greece (GR), Hungary (HU), Ireland (IE), Italy (IT), Latvia (LV), Lithuania (LT), Luxembourg (LU), Netherlands (NL), Northern Ireland (NI), Poland (PL), Portugal (PT), Slovakia (SK), Slovenia (SI), Spain (ES), Sweden (SE),

**Figure 1:** No opinion on composite indices of trust in European and National institutions.

Countries where citizens dealt easier with EU institutions then with national institutions are, excluding Slovakia and Cyprus on a borderline, all new member countries (Figure 2). Those join old members Ireland, Italy, and Portugal. Italy is a special case because of its historical process of

state building and rather unproblematic pro-European stance. New member states are all exposed to positive expectations from Europe, e.g. have also a positive budget exchange with the EU. On the other side, euro sceptic sentiment gains established position in public debate and in overall count of institutional support in Denmark, Sweden and Great Britain. Poland is an exception of low level of trust in national institutions, probably due to inherent political instability of coalition governments.

Is there a weak or strong national trust causing levels of EU trust in a country? Having an exclusive national identity would mean that it suppress EU orientation. What is more common is having inclusive relations with both levels: one normally trust political institutions at both levels or do not trust any of them.




Note: Austria (AT), Belgium (BE), Britain (GB), Cyprus (CY), Czech Republic (CZ), Denmark (DK), Estonia (EE), Finland (FI), France (FR), Germany (DE), Greece (GR), Hungary (HU), Ireland (IE), Italy (IT), Latvia (LV), Lithuania (LT), Luxembourg (LU), Netherlands (NL), Northern Ireland (NI), Poland (PL), Portugal (PT), Slovakia (SK), Slovenia (SI), Spain (ES), Sweden (SE),

**Figure 2:** Means on composite indices of trust in European and national institutions

This is confirmed also at the individual level correlations among indices of trust. This range from 0.2 to 0.9, with most of them around 0.6. This level of correlation is by most standards

confirmation of a suggestion that both indices at least in a larger part measure the same trait, a general citizens identity and sense of participation in a common political space. Yet it is a notion of an undivided identity that is more profound in some of the countries than in other. This might show a congruence of effects of factors on both levels or a general congruence of national interest fulfilled also at European level. The remaining specificity of the two levels of citizens evaluations are subject of further inquiry.



Note: Austria (AT), Belgium (BE), Britain (GB), Cyprus (CY), Czech Republic (CZ), Denmark (DK), Estonia (EE), Finland (FI), France (FR), Germany (DE), Greece (GR), Hungary (HU), Ireland (IE), Italy (IT), Latvia (LV), Lithuania (LT), Luxembourg (LU), Netherlands (NL), Northern Ireland (NI), Poland (PL), Portugal (PT), Slovakia (SK), Slovenia (SI), Spain (ES), Sweden (SE),

**Figure 3:** Correlations between composite indices of trust in European and national institutions

To test some of possible explanations of congruence and divergence of two levels of trust in institutions, a set of factors is correlated with both levels and compared side by side in a Table 1. A selection of countries represented those among cases in different positions in previous results and comprising most of East European new members states. Results are still revealing a general congruence of indices. Most correlations, irrespective of the fact that some are measuring 'outputs' of institutions on a national level while others on a European level, are of a roughly same size and direction. Literature suggests that this might change after some powerful variables are controlled in a multivariate fashion. The highest correlation with the national institutional trust shows a government performance, following with the economic considerations and, what confirms a similarity of contents of both variables, indices of European symbolic identity and European interests variables. The exceptions in later indices are Italy and to some extent Denmark, which both shows that there is a conflict in perception of national and European level, when judging national institutions. This is to be explained by overt euro sceptic orientation of respective governments. On the other hand this are the countries that shows lowest correlations of national performance indicators with the European evaluation, which is a reverse side of a coin just mentioned.

New members countries are, as expected, not divided on a stance of limiting access to foreigners to employment and other benefits of nationality.

Table 2 shows the same results in terms of differences between parallel institutions correlation with respective predictors. Positive difference is designed to show a dominance of a nationalist character. Citizens of new countries are made easier jump in understanding of their self in terms of abstract European and national citizens. This however does not preclude that this is not a result of lack of information on the possible negative effect that EU institutions might have on national interests. It might be that this is just a process of cognitive opinion formation based on most salient information which one have, and not discerning the subtleties of differences between institutions on different levels.

The extremes of correlations between two trust indices from Figure 3 are covered well in a tendency of parallel correlations with predictors. Where there is a divergent pattern of correlations with predictor, this might explain a weaker correlation among indicators of trust, a case of Italy, Denmark, Austria and Great Britain. And a convergent pattern might be a common source of covariation, as it is in Finland and Portugal. New members states has on average more congruent patterns of predictors, which shows a relatively unproblematic stance of public toward European institutions, while not at the same time to national institutions.

Table 1: Correlations of predictors with national political institutions trust and european political institution trust

Country:	AT		GB		CZ		DK		FI		DE		HU		IT		LV		PL		PT		SK		SI	
Trust/factors	Nat.	Eur.	Nat.	Eu.	Nat.	Eu.	Nat.	Eur.	Nat.	Eur.	Nat.	Eu.	Nat.	Eur.	Nat.	Eur.	Nat.	Eur.	Nat.	Eur.	Nat.	Eur.	Nat.	Eur.	Nat.	Eur.
ret_ec	0,19	0,15	0,30	0,24	0,19	0,17	0,27	0,09	0,25	0,20	0,21	0,16	0,35	0,18	0,27	-0,09	0,19	0,18	0,24	0,27	0,28	0,24	0,25	0,29	0,28	0,25
pro_ec	0,24	0,21	0,23	0,22	0,29	0,27	0,24	0,12	0,29	0,25	0,29	0,25	0,22	0,06	0,34	-0,05	0,28	0,27	0,21	0,25	0,20	0,14	0,36	0,35	0,30	0,32
gov_app	0,38	0,19	0,48	0,30	0,47	0,25	0,39	0,07	0,39	0,28	0,28	0,18	0,40	0,13	0,48	-0,01	0,44	0,24	0,37	0,20	0,47	0,40	0,38	0,46	0,46	0,26
rel_at	0,18	0,02	0,08	0,05	0,07	0,00	0,11	0,07	0,13	0,03	0,04	0,03	0,02	0,02	0,17	0,08	0,10	0,04	0,09	-0,09	0,18	0,09	0,07	0,07	-0,12	-0,03
cou_int	0,20	0,36	0,26	0,52	0,28	0,43	0,29	0,53	0,26	0,38	0,30	0,44	0,22	0,31	0,08	0,43	0,15	0,32	0,27	0,38	0,33	0,41	0,34	0,36	0,28	0,40
ind_int	0,22	0,35	0,24	0,51	0,23	0,45	0,28	0,53	0,29	0,43	0,32	0,39	0,21	0,31	0,04	0,40	0,18	0,32	0,26	0,38	0,34	0,42	0,33	0,34	0,27	0,35
empl	0,00	0,12	0,08	0,19	0,03	0,08	-0,02	0,12	0,03	0,06	-0,04	-0,05	-0,04	-0,03	-0,02	0,20	-0,04	0,00	0,05	0,06	-0,04	-0,07	0,07	0,08	0,03	-0,04
loc_vote	0,08	0,30	0,08	0,24	0,10	0,27	0,05	0,12	0,07	0,16	0,14	0,17	0,14	0,07	-0,08	0,17	-0,02	0,04	0,05	0,17	0,11	0,08	0,19	0,22	0,09	0,11
soc_ben	0,11	0,14	0,09	0,16	0,09	0,16	-0,02	0,04	0,19	0,16	-0,10	-0,13	0,00	0,04	-0,06	0,04	-0,02	0,00	0,14	0,13	-0,05	-0,08	0,16	0,13	0,09	0,11
eu_cit	0,14	0,29	0,18	0,37	0,13	0,32	0,21	0,32	0,23	0,32	0,21	0,23	0,02	0,17	0,03	0,23	0,22	0,30	0,11	0,22	0,11	0,15	0,27	0,26	0,23	0,33
EU_prou	0,19	0,34	0,20	0,44	0,15	0,36	0,24	0,41	0,29	0,40	0,22	0,29	0,22	0,34	0,09	0,40	0,14	0,34	0,16	0,35	0,25	0,28	0,38	0,41	0,24	0,38
far_right	0,03	0,04	-0,03	-0,06	-0,06	-0,03	0,11	0,02	-0,07	-0,07	-0,10	0,05	-0,10	0,02	0,12	-0,01	-0,03	-0,04	-0,08	-0,05	0,20	0,17	0,09	0,13	0,02	0,15
pol_int	0,13	0,10	0,10	0,05	0,10	0,15	0,15	0,13	0,17	0,11	0,20	0,11	0,02	0,12	0,03	0,12	0,07	0,11	0,04	0,13	0,16	0,18	0,03	0,06	0,15	0,20
mi_clas	0,14	0,17	0,06	0,04	0,10	0,18	0,26	0,20	0,10	0,17	0,07	0,01	0,01	0,04	0,04	0,01	0,15	0,15	0,09	0,17	0,09	0,11	0,16	0,20	0,06	0,14
up_clas	0,14	0,17	0,06	0,04	0,10	0,18	0,26	0,20	0,10	0,17	0,07	0,01	0,01	0,04	0,04	0,01	0,15	0,15	0,09	0,17	0,09	0,11	0,16	0,20	0,06	0,14
watch tv	0,03	0,01	0,09	-0,02	-0,06	-0,03	0,01	-0,05	-0,02	-0,01	0,06	0,00	0,10	0,11	0,06	0,08	0,03	0,02	-0,05	0,07	0,07	0,05	0,04	0,04	0,11	0,06
read newspaper	0,03	0,00	0,04	-0,07	-0,04	-0,04	0,16	0,09	0,14	0,07	0,09	0,07	-0,04	0,03	0,02	0,01	0,12	0,04	0,04	0,15	-0,04	-0,03	0,08	0,08	0,05	0,03
age full-time education	0,11	0,18	0,09	0,15	0,13	0,20	0,14	0,18	0,23	0,20	0,15	0,00	-0,12	-0,02	-0,04	-0,02	0,01	0,05	0,00	0,08	-0,01	0,06	0,16	0,15	0,10	0,07
men	0,02	0,02	0,08	-0,06	-0,06	-0,04	0,12	0,00	0,06	-0,01	-0,02	-0,08	-0,07	-0,02	0,00	0,01	-0,04	-0,07	0,00	0,03	-0,03	-0,05	-0,06	-0,06	0,03	0,02
year of birth	-0,05	0,13	0,03	0,21	-0	0,16	0,05	0,21	0,04	0,1	-0,03	-0,04	-0,12	-0,01	-0,08	-0,06	-0,02	0,06	0,09	0,1	-0,1	0,02	0,09	0,08	-0,08	-0,01

Note: Austria (AT), Belgium (BE), Britain (GB), Czech Republic (CZ), Denmark (DK), Finland (FI), Germany (DE), , Hungary (HU), , Italy (IT), Latvia (LV), Poland (PL), Portugal (PT), Slovakia (SK), Slovenia (SI);

ret\_ec - retrospective and pro\_ec - prospective sociotropic economic evaluation, gov\_app - approval of [country] government's record; rel\_at - attendance at religious services; cou\_int - eu in the interest of [country]; ind\_int - eu in respondent's interest; empl - priority to [country] members, loc\_vote - citizens of eu countries in [resp. country] vote in [resp. country], and soc\_ben - citizens of eu countries in [resp. country] social benefits of [country]; eu\_cit - respondent's attitude to european unification; eu\_cit - not only [country] citizen, but also european citizen, and EU\_prou - proud of eu citizenship. far\_right - Individual political ideology, pol\_int - general political interests, mi\_clas - subjective middle, and up\_clas - upper class, All original non-intervale measurement scales are dichotomised.

Table 2: Differences among correlations of predictors with national political institutions trust and European political institution trust

factors	Country													Average Total	Average Old	Average New
	AT	GB	CZ	DK	FI	DE	HU	IT	LV	PL	PT	SK	SI			
ret_ec	0,04	0,06	0,02	0,18	0,04	0,06	0,17	0,36	0,01	-0,03	0,04	-0,04	0,03	0,07	0,10	0,03
pro_ec	0,03	0,02	0,03	0,12	0,04	0,04	0,15	0,39	0,01	-0,03	0,06	0,02	-0,03	0,06	0,09	0,03
gov_app	0,19	0,17	0,22	0,32	0,11	0,10	0,26	0,50	0,20	0,16	0,07	-0,07	0,20	0,19	0,20	0,17
rel_at	0,17	0,03	0,07	0,04	0,10	0,02	0,00	0,08	0,07	0,18	0,09	0,00	-0,09	0,06	0,09	0,04
cou_int	0,17	0,26	0,16	0,23	0,12	0,14	0,08	0,35	0,17	0,11	0,08	0,02	0,12	0,15	0,19	0,12
ind_int	0,13	0,27	0,22	0,25	0,13	0,07	0,10	0,37	0,15	0,13	0,07	0,00	0,09	0,15	0,18	0,13
empl	0,13	0,11	0,04	0,14	0,03	0,00	0,00	0,22	0,04	0,01	-0,03	0,01	-0,07	0,05	0,09	0,02
loc_vote	0,22	0,16	0,17	0,06	0,09	0,03	-0,07	0,26	0,06	0,12	-0,03	0,02	0,02	0,09	0,13	0,07
soc_ben	0,03	0,07	0,06	0,06	-0,03	-0,03	0,04	0,10	0,02	-0,01	-0,03	-0,03	0,02	0,02	0,03	0,02
eu_cit	0,14	0,19	0,19	0,11	0,10	0,01	0,14	0,20	0,09	0,11	0,04	-0,01	0,10	0,11	0,12	0,11
EU_prou	0,15	0,25	0,20	0,17	0,11	0,07	0,12	0,31	0,20	0,19	0,02	0,03	0,14	0,15	0,15	0,15
far_right	-0,01	0,03	-0,03	0,09	0,00	-0,16	-0,12	0,13	0,01	-0,03	0,03	-0,03	-0,13	-0,02	0,01	-0,05
pol_int	0,03	0,05	-0,05	0,01	0,06	0,09	-0,10	-0,09	-0,04	-0,10	-0,02	-0,03	-0,05	-0,02	0,02	-0,06
mi_clas	-0,03	0,02	-0,08	0,05	-0,07	0,06	-0,03	0,03	0,00	-0,08	-0,02	-0,04	-0,08	-0,02	0,00	-0,05
up_clas	-0,03	0,02	-0,08	0,05	-0,07	0,06	-0,03	0,03	0,00	-0,08	-0,02	-0,04	-0,08	-0,02	0,00	-0,05
watch tv	0,02	0,11	-0,03	0,05	-0,01	0,06	-0,02	-0,02	0,01	-0,13	0,02	0,00	0,04	0,01	0,03	-0,02
read newspaper	0,04	0,11	0,00	0,07	0,07	0,01	-0,07	0,00	0,07	-0,11	0,00	0,00	0,01	0,02	0,04	-0,01
age full- time																
education	0,07	0,06	0,07	0,04	-0,02	-0,15	0,10	0,02	0,05	0,08	0,07	-0,01	-0,03	0,03	0,02	0,04
men	0,00	0,14	-0,02	0,13	0,07	0,06	-0,05	-0,01	0,03	-0,03	0,02	0,01	0,01	0,03	0,05	-0,01
year of birth	0,17	0,18	0,16	0,16	0,06	-0,02	0,11	0,03	0,07	0,02	0,12	-0,01	0,08	0,09	0,11	0,08
Total	0,08	0,12	0,07	0,12	0,05	0,03	0,04	0,16	0,06	0,02	0,03	-0,01	0,02	0,06	0,08	0,04

Note: Austria (AT), Belgium (BE), Britain (GB), Czech Republic (CZ), Denmark (DK), Finland (FI), Germany (DE), , Hungary (HU), , Italy (IT), Latvia (LV), Poland (PL), Portugal (PT), Slovakia (SK), Slovenia (SI);

ret\_ec - retrospective and pro\_ec - prospective sociotropic economic evaluation, gov\_app - approval of [country] government's record; rel\_at - attendance at religious services; cou\_int - eu in the interest of [country]; ind\_int - eu in respondent's interest; empl - priority to [country] members, loc\_vote - citizens of eu countries in [resp. country] vote in [resp. country], and soc\_ben - citizens of eu countries in [resp. country] social benefits of [country]; eu\_cit - respondent's attitude to European unification; eu\_cit - not only [country] citizen, but also European citizen, and EU\_prou - proud of eu citizenship. far\_right - Individual political ideology, pol\_int - general political interests, mi\_clas - subjective middle, and up\_clas - upper class, All original non-intervale measurement scales are dichotomised.

## Conclusions

In this preliminary analysis we followed a logic that citizens identity can be conceptualised as based on simultaneity of judgement about institutions in political sounding at different levels. Both national state level citizenship and European level citizenship influence one another in actors' strategies to seek gains and influence in on one or another level.

A positive message of a story for new eastern European members is that despite internal difficulties in reaching a consolidated democracy with certain above minimum level of trust in national institutions, citizens in those countries did not projected the same criticism also to European level. There is a broad consensus that EU common future is inevitable and good in a sum.

A general conclusion is that situational factors, some deeply rooted in country historic tradition, as is case of euro sceptic attitude in Great Britain, some probably also accountable by composition of current government coalitions, act behind the correlation of two measures of trust.

What remains to be check is to reveal some possible interaction effect in typology of trust in different levels, like inclusive, exclusive and cosmopolitan identities in relation to factors that lie behind. There also remain to be tested a direct effect of factors in a multivariate model.

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